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THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

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THE
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

XVIII

BELIEF, CERTAINTY, AND FAITH.

JAMES WARD

§ 1. *Psychological Topic Defined*

There are psychological and there are epistemological discussions innumerable concerning belief and certainty. It is important to keep the two discussions distinct and yet they are almost invariably blended; for psychology and epistemology themselves are only gradually getting out of each other's way, and the fact that they often use the same terms renders such differentiation difficult. Moreover they have both used the same terms because both alike relate to experience, though from different standpoints or under different aspects. We have come upon these differences already repeatedly and so without further exposition here, we may seek at once to clear the way for our psychological inquiry.

Belief is sometimes used in a wider, sometimes in a narrower sense, the one including certainty, the other excluding it: the wider belonging to the psychological, the narrower to the epistemological standpoint[1]. Epistemology has constantly to distinguish between belief and knowledge as differing in *kind*, since belief is always, and (scientific) knowledge is never, a private and personal matter. Psychologically, however—for the individual that is to say—his belief and his knowledge (or certainty) differ only in *degree*. Certainty is then regarded as the upper limit of such personal belief; it may be represented by unity, lower degrees being represented by fractions, as in the 'odds' of betting transactions, for example. But epistemology also contrasts knowledge with probability in a similar fashion, save that the difference is then referred not to the pyschological causes of belief but to its logical grounds. With these the epistemologist is exclusively concerned: the psychologist, however, not with them at all. His business is entirely with the believing together with its causes and effects, as subjective, not with the grounds of the belief itself as objective: what interests him is a living process not a logical structure. Despite this wide difference the one term 'certainty' is often applied to both, though they are distinguished as respectively subjective certainty and objective certainty: so we say indifferently 'I am certain of' and 'It is certain that.' Such phraseology is often convenient; yet where scientific exactness is important it is to be avoided, and there are better terms available. At all events psychology is not interested in objective certainty or *truth* as such, but only in subjective certainty or *conviction.* Truth belongs entirely to the universe of propositions: certainty implies a complete state of mind. In this state propositions enter not as true or false but simply as believed or not believed. Whether propositions are believed or not is to be ascertained not by considering *them* but by observing the feeling they produce and the active attitude to which such feeling leads. How far there are exceptions to this generalisation sufficing to disprove it, or even, when carefully examined, to limit it, remains to be seen.

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[1] The two Mills, for example, adopted the former, Locke and Bain the latter, usage.

§ 2. *Direct (Objective) Causes of Belief*

Meanwhile it is at least safe to say that the most numerous and what we may call the typical cases of belief as such involve purely subjective factors which are absent altogether from that ideal of knowledge which is the lodestar of epistemology: there objective factors are the sole determinants. Yet even in the most subjectively conditioned belief objective factors are the *immediate* determinants, objective, that is to say in the psychological, yet far enough, it may be, from objective in the epistemological, sense. We may then begin by examining first of all the cases in which the characteristics of belief are clearest, the cases, that is, where the objective situation before him is such that the subject may, and if challenged would, say: I am certain. In all such cases we find an absence of any alternative or option: 'I am certain' is equivalent to 'I am convinced'; metaphorically, 'I am overcome and forced to assent'[2].

Here Herbert Spencer's 'inconceivability of the opposite' comes in; and had he been content to claim this, not as 'the highest possible logical justification of knowledge,' but only as the strongest possible psychological justification of belief, a great deal of rather aimless controversy might have been avoided. But then the inconceivability must not be resolved into indissoluble association, as James Mill, and Spencer too, maintained[3]. Association will not account for the certainty of simple perception. If 'dazzled by the sun' I say it is light, the psychological necessity accompanying this assertion, though it is confined to a single instance, is more absolute and immediate than that which is present when I say 'Unsupported bodies fall,' a proposition which I and my ancestors before me have verified innumerable times and never found to fail. Spencer oddly enough allowed all this: the certainty, he tells us, is one and the same, for 'the union of subject and object' is absolute in both. There is, however, a difference in respect of time: assertions like the first are '*temporarily* absolute,' assertions like the last are, '*permanently* absolute.' And yet the former assertions are, he holds, the more impressive; for in these cases 'the predicates ... not only invariably coexist with their subjects, but they invariably coexist with them in such ways that they cannot be overlooked'; whereas in the latter 'the invariable coexistence predicated is often inconspicuous, and may be overlooked.'[4] The truth here adumbrated can be more simply and definitely stated:—The certainty of sense is fundamental, whilst the certainty of thought, as concerned with objects of a higher order, presupposes sensory *fundamenta.* These psychologically secondary cases of certainty are impossible without those primary cases, which are not only experienced first but experienced also independently. Here with the subject confronted and determined by the immediately given or presented objective—here at the very outset of experience, before association begins—we have that complete state of mind in which all the factors of belief are found in Descartes' *Cogito* filled out: I am and It[5] is. Here, then, where as yet doubt is impossible, we have the type, the *fons et origo* of certainty.

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[2] Cf. the article Gewissheit in Eisler's *Worterbuch der phil. Begriffe*, where the following among many similar definitions are quoted: "*Certitudo nihil aliud est quam determinatio intellectus ad unam*," Aquinas; "*Die Gewissheit ist mit dem Bewusstsein der Nothwendigkeit verbunden*," Kant.

[3] James Mill *Analysis of the Human Mind* I. S. M., 5 ed. i. ch. 11 (cf the editor's note i. p. 402 *ff*.; Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, ii, § 430, p. 419.—*2nd ed.*

And were there no such psychologically primary certainty, it is hard to see how there could ever be any absolute certainty at all. Certainty determined wholly by invariable succession could obviously never be more than expectation, and expectation, is not yet actual presentation. We may indeed safely go further and say that there is—'objectively' at all events—no such certainty and that '*subjectively,*' the certainty of the most confident expectation will scarcely compare with the certainty of actual fact. The probability that depends on succession is of the form $m + 1$ $m + 2$ (m being the number of first succession so far). Theoretically it must always be at the mercy of a negative instance; for such an instance involves no contradiction. In attempting to account for the axioms of logic and mathematics in this fashion, Spencer forgot that the 'perpetually-repeated experiences' which make us so confident that, *e g.*, unsupported bodies will fall, greatly exceed those in which we have found things which are equal to the same thing to be equal to each other. And if we carry back the series to include both our savage and our brute ancestry, the disparity will be greater still. If then 'it be a fundamental law that connexions of ideas become strong in proportion as they are repeated '[6]—and this, *cæteris paribus,* we may safely allow—the axioms of exact science should be less convincing than many empirical inductions. But Spencer, of course, had to admit that actually it is far otherwise. These axioms are *a priori* for the individual, he allows; but still he contends that they are *a posteriori* for the race[7]. And then the objection just urged applies. There is, however, a further and perhaps more serious objection: irrational animals have no sense of the axioms of equality or generally of objects of a higher order at all. Not till the brute level is passed are there any individuals to whom 'these data of intelligence' can appeal, and then the single 'direct comparison' makes them as certain or convinced as they are by the dazzling sunlight, which they immediately perceive. In fact Spencer himself says, 'we immediately see [or intuit] that the alleged relation is as alleged'; and, we may add, the more clearly we see that the single case suffices the less we think of seeking confirmation by repetition. 'Seeing is believing', holds for objects of a higher order as well as for the sensory objects which they relate. Seeing is believing, and all talk of a further criterion of 'subjective certainty' seems as meaningless as to ask for a criterion of hunger or any other immediate experience.

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[4] Op. cit. ii. § 425, pp. 403 f.

[5] It is important to note, however, the we are not now directly concerned with the interpretation to put on these implicit existential propositions, the dual 'positions' of all experience.

But besides present 'matters of fact' and immediately intuited 'relations of ideas' there is still one important class of experiences wherein belief may amount to certainty *viz.* the memories of what as 'matters of fact' are past. The epistemological problems of memory-judgments are interesting as well as difficult. From this standpoint no memory-judgment—in fact, no judgment concerning 'matter-of-fact' —can lay claim to that 'objective certainty' or truth that belongs to the self-evident relations of ideas[8]. I am at this moment personally as certain that I breakfasted on porridge about an hour ago as I am that it is now broad day or that twice two are four. Yet from the universalistic standpoint —in view of the frequent fallibility of what is taken to be memory—though I still cannot deny that I am certain, I am bound to admit that *others*, though they may fully recognise my *bona fides*, are justified in holding that I may be mistaken and in seeking, if it is worth while, for confirmation. But from the nature of the case no confirmation is possible that does not assume the validity of memory, either directly, as in the demand for other instances ; or indirectly as in the appeal to the constancy of nature. All this, however, would be beyond the purview of psychology save for the one fact of obliviscence: this fact shows that memory and perception are not on a par. Reminiscence and obliviscence are inversely related in such wise, that one might be tempted to say: Reminiscence is only perfect where obliviscence is *nil*, that is, where what is remembered is just ceasing to be present. The present for experience, however, is comparable not to a point but to a line and a line too of very varying length; comparatively short for certain facts, such as those of the so-called 'specious present'; comparatively long for others, such as those of the temporal and spatial order—over and done with to be sure for perception—,but retained in the memory continuum. If this is intact, it constrains us, as much as perception constrains us, to recognise a present reality, the reality of the past[9]. In spite of the notorious deceptiveness of memory in many cases and the impossibility of proving it true in any case, this constraint or conviction is, we find, as complete in those instances of distinct memory as it ever is in perception. Such a position is logically (i. e. formally) indefensible. It might seem then that nothing better than scepticism was left[10]. But after all it does not follow that such subjective certainty is never right; and in fact, if it never were, experience such as ours would be quite inexplicable.

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[6] *Op. cit.* ii § 433, p. 426.

[7] *Op. cit.* ii § 430 p. 414 i § 208 pp. 465, 599

[8] *Cf.* the interesting discussion in Meinong's *Uber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unserer Wissens*, 1906, § 18.

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[9] It is the unique wonder of experience to be big with the future and laden with the past: it dwindles as its range in time diminishes, and disappears as this shrinks to the instantaneous.

[10] And a very wide-reaching scepticism it would be, as we may gather from the fact that Descartes found even a chain of reasoning untrustworthy unless God guaranteed the evidence of memory !

Certainty, then, we find may in all cases be described as a subjective attitude to which we are objectively constrained: we have to assent, even if we do not consent, much as a criminal is convicted, though he should plead 'not guilty'. But precisely in those cases where certainty is most certain, if the expression may be allowed—where, in other words, it is most immediate—we are least aware of it, ordinarily not aware of it at all. I do not say I am certain that I had porridge for breakfast, that it is now daylight, and that two and two equal four; on the other hand statements, which it would be natural for me in this way to certify, would be statements that I might have doubted or that I had previously to ascertain or verify. Then my certainty is said to be explicit; otherwise it is said to be implicit, inasmuch as the subjective factors are not definitely evoked. Among such implicit or indifferent beliefs we may include all those that now make up the stock of what we call our common sense and common knowledge, so long as nothing leads us to doubt them; for till then they are regarded so entirely from the universalistic standpoint, that they lose all personal colour; they are either truths *known* by 'the light of nature' or facts *known*, or at least accepted, by everybody.

§ 3. *Effect of Belief*

The immediate cause of all belief as a 'state of mind' being then the objective situation, we have now to try to analyse its effect in detail. As regards feeling, in the case of implicit or indifferent beliefs the effect may be *nil*: no one is affected by the fact that fish are cold-blooded or by the truth that the first three numerals are primes. But in the explicit acquisition of a belief there is always at least one feeling due immediately to the belief, as such, *viz.* the formal feeling of satisfaction, which, like Othello, we crave the more the more momentous the issue. Frequently we can even say, with Clough:

It fortifies my soul to know,
That though I perish, Truth is so.

To be rid of suspense and uncertainty is, so far, always at least a relief, and often the prelude to a great deal more, to which we must turn presently. As regards action, much has been written about the effect of belief upon it; and yet all that is of essential importance is very simple and very obvious. A sane man, and even an insane one, unless his disease is apathy, acts as he believes. He may indeed venture to act in cases where he is uncertain, but his venture is always backed by some belief and never diametrically opposed to all beliefs. Of course we may believe with complete certainty without at once acting or even resolving to act later; yet the efficacy of such belief, always holds good potentially and will shape our actions whenever it is relevant. Bain indeed went too far in maintaining that 'action is the *basis* of belief' yet he was right in saying that "preparedness to act is the sole, the genuine, the unmistakable criterion of belief"[11]. 'Faith without works is dead' we say and we distrust a man who has not the strength of his convictions. This strength of intensity of conviction, however, is not to be confounded with the certainty of belief: it is the practical consequence of—the 'confidence' begotten by—this certainty and therefore presupposes it. If the subject, who is convinced, were merely a logical ego and nothing more, these secondary emotional and practical consequences of belief, which make it a living fact, a complete 'state of mind,' would be non-existent.

§ 4. *Indirect (Subjective) Causes of Belief*

So far we have considered mainly 'the cases in which the characteristics of belief are clearest,' where, that is to say complete certainty is attained by a subject facing the situation with an 'open mind' without *parti pris*, his emotional demeanour following upon conviction instead of anticipating it. But in most cases we believe without being certain and again in the most important of these cases we are neither impartial nor disinterested. On a jury or as a scientific inquirer a man may maintain the 'detached' attitude, symbolized by allegorical statues of Justice, may be intent only on 'ascertaining' the real 'weight' of the evidence and blind to its specious appearances. Such 'deliberation' even if inconclusive will at least be fair but in his own personal concerns it is hard for a man to divest himself completely of private standards of estimation. Here accordingly his feeling and volition come forward in a new *rôle*—not this time as effects of a belief he already has but as causes of a future belief that he wants, or perhaps that some one else wants him to have. With tell-tale *naïveté* common speech ascribes the acquisition of such belief not to conviction, but to persuasion[12]: it is a result such as rhetoric, 'that powerful instrument of error and deceit'—as Locke called it—can achieve, though logically it may be unattainable. When certainty is out of the question the belief we want is always a possible one: people never believe that black is white or that two and two make five, but they are often confident that it won't rain, although the clouds are low and the glass is falling. It is this region of the possible, as distinct from the actual or the necessary, that imagination sets before us, and it is by means of this 'ideational mechanism' that our inclinations can bias our belief. This process we have now to consider.

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[11] *The Emotions and the Will*, 3rd ed, pp. 506. Italics mine.

It is obvious, from what we have already seen, that the process must be indirect. A man may wish to believe, he cannot, strictly speaking, will to believe; though he may deliberately set about deceiving another he cannot avowedly and straightway set about deceiving himself. He may indeed pretend or profess to believe without believing; but if he verily does believe his belief must be *bona fide*, founded on what he takes to be fact, not on what he knows to be fiction. This granted, we have to note, first of all, the power of imagination, when we attend passively and exclusively to its working, to impose upon us with all the air of complete reality. This power we continually experience in our dreams and can observe in others who are hypnotized. The vividness, the circumstantiality, the common-sense of matters-of-fact seem then to be all present; for there are then no opposing percepts to pale this phosphorescent light of imagery that only looks substantial in the dark; and the *alibis*, the anachronisms, the absurdities, do not then obtrude which are manifest the moment that we awake. Emotion rarely contracts attention and inhibits its spontaneity so much at once; yet it does so sometimes in sudden 'fits' of overmastering passion. But gradually it may achieve an imposture equally great and far more permanent. What is continually ignored lapses at length into oblivion, while what at first appeared only 'specious' and 'plausible' becomes in the end an obsession, a 'fixed idea' that needs *must* be believed. The result, so far as the working of the ideational mechanism is concerned, is essentially the same in the case of the man blinded by passion or desire as of the man who is hypnotized or demented. Both cases alike may be described as cases of fascination, and were, in fact, so described by Renouvier. In both, belief is constrained by the complete abeyance of all option: in both it is as if the men were 'bewitched'[13].

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[12] The etymology of the word itself emphasizes the seductiveness of views that gratify our prejudices.

The way in which such a spell may be wrought by our own 'passional nature' is in the main extremely simple, though the complexity in detail is great. We attend by preference to what for us are pleasurable situations and to the pleasurable aspect of a situation if its features are mixed[14].

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[13] Renouvier accordingly in his powerful analysis of these facts includes them all under the common heading of *vertige mental.* (*Traite de Psychologie rationelle*, 2nd ed. ch. xi and xii.) Locke had, however, anticipated him. Treating of the association of ideas, not as many have done, to explain human knowledge but with the opposite intent of accounting for human errors' (Fraser's note), he traces to this 'very same root' not only what is commonly called madness but "the sort of madness there is scarce a man so free from, but that if he should always...argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, [he] would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation," Essay *II*, xxxiii, §§3, 4.

[14] This preference of course, may be abnormal, grief, anger, jealousy often make the bitter sweet. A 'moody' mind like Jacques loved melancholy better than laughing. This unconscious bias has probably been exploited over much by the Austrian neuro-pathologist S. Freud.

We are too apt to contrast this as the 'fair' side or as the 'right' with the other as its 'shady or seamy side' forgetting how entirely subjective such a characterization is. But we have only to compare the utterly diverse but equally one-sided estimates of the same situation by persons of opposite temperaments or conflicting interests to realise this lack of genuine objectivity in both-- to compare, for example, the outlook on the world of Schopenhauer and Leopardi with that of Leibniz or Hegel, or the views of landlords and shipowners on the question of free-trade. In a word, personal bias--*Quot homines tot sententiæ*, as Terence expressed it—is fundamentally just subjective selection uncontrolled. To follow it blindly and exclusively is to live according to nature, when it is possible to live according to reason[15]. The brute is confined to its own subjective standpoint ; man only becomes man as he advances to the 'trans-subjective and begins to share in Universal Mind and to prove all things.' To do this, says Renouvier, 'he must learn to doubt...The ignorant man doubts little and the fool does not doubt at all...If men only knew how to doubt, there would be no fools among them, *intellectually speaking*' [16]. The nature of the remedy is the best evidence of the source of the disease.

But the remedy, since we are *not* merely intellectual, is itself mistaken for an evil, when the real evil is simply the uncertainty—there in any case—that doubt only leads us to recognise. Impatient of an uncertainty that we are anxious but impotent to resolve, we are tempted to suppress our doubts by emulating the fatuous procedure attributed to the ostrich. So the volitional rather than the emotional bias comes then to the fore : we wish to believe but doubt bars the way. A strange vicious circle here discloses itself that might well seem fanciful if it were not so notorious in fact. Doubt, that has proved to be prophylactic against error, is itself subjected to the very regimen that has fostered the disease. The classic instance, of course, is that of Pascal. A disciple of Descartes, who had made doubt the foundation of method, he was himself a profound sceptic. Like Descartes he regarded the association of ideas as depending on the body, which for Descartes was an automaton and which he himself called 'the machine.' He was well aware that this mechanism of habit and custom which provided that *consecration des bêtes*, noted by Leibniz as adequate to the narrow environment of the brute, was also the source of prejudices and superstitions innumerable among men. And yet he counselled those who would fain be 'cured of infidelity' to ply this machine:—'Do everything just as if you believed, use the holy water, have masses said, etc. *Naturellement même cela vous fera croire et vous abêtira*'[17]. Thus to stifle doubt has seemed to thousands sound advice. Such *ignava ratio*, as Kant would have called it, rests as we may presently see on a psychological confusion—the confusion of credulity (*Aberglaube*) with belief (*Glaube*) and both with faith.

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[15] This transition is a very gradual one. The thinking of the primitive man is a tissue of prejudices and superstitions shaped mainly by his emotions and desires. Ribot has dealt with this in a very interesting way cf his *La Logique des Sentiments*, 1905.

[16] *Op. cit.* vol. ii p. 39.

§ 5. *Faith and Moral Certainty*

Though intimately connected, faith and belief are not altogether the same, nor do we use the two terms indifferently. When belief is the more appropriate term, the stress is on the *cognitive* side of experience, on the 'objective situation': when it is more appropriate to speak of faith, the stress is on the *conative* side of experience, on our 'subjective attitude.' In the one we are constrained, more or less completely, to assent to what is there: in the other we strive to achieve what as yet is not there. In the one, facts convince *us*, the seen and actual hem us in: in the other, we—reaching beyond toward the ideally possible—create them. When the facts are such as were, are, or will be, apart from or even in spite of us or our efforts, we say we believe: when they are such as are not and would not be apart from us and without our efforts, then in proportion as we are confident in bringing them to pass, we say we have faith. The annuals of human enterprise in every department of life teem with examples of the power of faith in this sense, but a difficulty will at this point certainly suggest itself; for it is obvious that religious faith, for example, is not supposed to create its object or to maintain that apart from it God would not be at all. To clear up this difficulty, if we can, we must look closer into what we have hitherto been content to contrast as objective situation and subjective attitude--the theoretical and the practical sides of experience, as we otherwise say. Now we have from the first regarded experience not as passively moulded by circumstances but actively shaped by our own endeavour towards self-conservation and betterment. We might call the one natural selection --giving the term a wider than its ordinary meaning: the other we call subjective selection—selection, that is to say, within the possibilities that nature leaves open. And to this your subjective attitude belongs. The most that the theoretical contemplation of nature yields is the possibility of things divine—the impossibility of such things it does not claim to prove[18]. It is this open possibility, which Kant effectively disclosed, that leaves 'room for faith.' Within this theoretical gap faith creates the belief in God and all the corollaries to this belief. But it is a belief not beset by doubts: it claims to be certain, but on moral grounds. It is not a certainty that is intellectually enforced but one that is morally achieved. Starting from what can be, religious faith asserts that here it is, because it ought to be. In a word it is not the objective situation, the world or nature, but a particular subjective attitude towards this situation—with all the moral ends and aspirations which it implies—that gives rise to religious faith in a transcendental Ideal, as Kant called it. That alone assures the religious man of realisation of all his moral ideals. So far then religious faith is psychologically in line, with all lesser faiths: as I have said elsewhere it is 'foreshadowed in the upward striving that is the essence of life'[19].

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[17] *Pensées*, Brunschvieg's edn. 1900, No. 230, p. 441, Nos. 246, 7, p. 448.

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[18] There is no complete theoretical solution to the doubts and uncertainty that hence arise, and which Pascal accordingly advises us to stifle.

[19] *Realm of Ends*, 2nd edn. 1912, p. 448. Cf. also Lecture XIX on Faith and Knowledge.

§ 6. *The Genesis of Belief and Knowledge*

Religious faith we have seen does not arise from (theoretical) belief but gives rise to (doctrinal) belief, in simpler words creeds only attempt to formulate faith, they do not make it. The result we may generalise: belief including knowledge is not the source but the outcome of faith. It is the *agenda* of practical enterprise that promote progress, knowledge only registers the *acta.* Bain's able exposition of our topic is substantially in agreement with this, though less definitely expressed. 'The leading fact in Belief, according to my view of it,' he says, 'is our Primitive Credulity. We begin by believing everything: whatever is, is true...The supposition underlying belief is that we are *working to a lead, following out some end*, by the means that experience suggests [not only so, I would say], and that, so long as we are successful we raise no questions as to truth and falsehood; we believe without knowing it...[our] state of mind is practically one of unbounded confidence...the *pristine assurance is soon met by checks*; a disagreeable experience leading to new insight...The unconsciousness of an open way is exchanged for consciousness; *we are now said properly to believe* in what has never been contradicted' [20]. So then pristine confidence exploring a seemingly open way comes first, and thus, whether our enterprise succeed or fail, we gain some knowledge; whereas if we never ventured we should never learn.

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[20] *The Emotions and the Will*, 3rd., edn., 1875, pp. 511 f. Italics mine.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UPANISHADS

Rational Psychology—II

Life after Death

R. D. RANADE

The question of transmigration may fitly be regarded as the crux of Early Indian Philosophy. We have been often told that the idea of transmigration is of a very late origin in Indian thought, that it did not exist at the time of the Ṛigveda, that it was an un-Aryan idea, that as Professor Macdonell puts it, "it seems more probable that the Aryan settlers received the first impulse in this direction from the *aboriginal inhabitants* of India,"* that even though "the Aryan Indians borrowed the idea from the aborigines, they certainly deserve the credit of having elaborated out of it the theory of an unbroken chain of existences, intimately connected with the moral principle of requital". Having said that the idea of transmigration is of un-Aryan origin and that it was received from the aborigines by the *Indian* Aryans, Professor Macdonell is obliged to account for the appearance of the same idea in Pythagoras by saying that the "dependence of Pythagoras on *Indian* philosophy and science certainly seems to have a high degree of probability. . . . The doctrine of metempsychosis in the case of Pythagoras appears without any connection or explanatory background, and was regarded by the Greeks as of foreign origin. He could not have derived it from *Egypt*, as it was not known to the ancient Egyptians." † Since the appearance of Herr Rohde's book on *Psyche, Seelenkult*, and *Unsterblichkeitsglaube*

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* *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 387.

† *Loc. cit.* p. 422.

der Griechen in 1894, we have come to see the real source of a belief in transmigration among any people, under certain circumstances, in their own ethno-psychological development, and not in an unproven or unprovable inter-influence between one country and another. It is upon this fruitful hypothesis that we can see the upspringing and the continuance of the idea of transmigration among the Greeks from Homer downwards through Orpheus to Pythagoras in their own native land; it is upon the same hypothesis that we can see the development of the same idea among the Indian Aryans from the Ṛigveda through the Brāhmaṇas to the Upanishads, without invoking the aid of any unwarrantable influence from the aborigines of India. And thus, the idea of transmigration, so far from being merely an un-Aryan importation in Aryan thought, appears clearly to develop stage by stage in Aryan thought itself.

It is quite true that in the major part of the Ṛigveda, the idea of transmigration seems conspicuous by its absence. The mirthful attitude of the Indian Aryans made it impossible for them to think too much of the life after death. They believed in the world of the gods, and they believed in the world of the fathers, and they did not care to believe in anything else. It was sufficient unto them to know that the godly men went to a Heaven which overflowed with honey*, and that the commonalty went to a world where Yama had the privilege first to go and to gather a number of men about him, a not uncovetable place, it seems, "of which it was impossible that anybody could be robbed."† Even though, then, we grant that the idea of transmigration is not very conspicuous in the greater portion of the Ṛigveda, it remains at the same time equally true that, in certain other places, an approach is being made to the idea of transmigration. The first stage of the evolution of this idea consists in taking an animistic or hylozoistic view of the world. In a verse of the 16th hymn of the Xth Maṇḍala which is devoted to the description of a funeral occasion, the eye of the dead man has been directed by the Seer to move back to the Sun which is its analogue in the makranthropos, the *anima* to wind which is its analogue, and the *animus* has been directed to go to the heaven or to the earth according to its qualities (*dharma*), or else to move even to the waters or the plants if it so suited it*. This verse instead of expressing transmigration proper may be said to be putting forth certain hints towards an animistic or hylozoistic view of the world; but the word *dharma* which it introduces is a very significant word. It is the earliest trace of a theory of *karma*, especially as the soul is asked to go to the heaven or to the earth according to its qualities. But a still more definite passage is found in another hymn of the Xth Maṇḍala of the Ṛigveda, where a hylozoism is being advocated with even greater stress. There we definitely know that the whole hymn† is addressed to a departed spirit, and the poet says that he is going to recall the departed soul in order that it may return again and live. The poet says that the spirit which has gone far away to the world of death he will recall and make live once more. The spirit, he continues, " which may have gone to heaven or earth or to the four-cornered globe, which may have been diffused in the various quarters or have taken resort in the waves of the sea or the beams of the light, which may have ensouled the waters or the herbs, or gone to the sun or the dawn, or rested on the mountains, or which may have spread through the whole universe and become identical with the past and the future"—that soul, says the poet, he will recall by means of his song, and make it enter its tenement. Too great a belief in the power of song! But the fact remains that the whole hymn breathes an atmosphere of hylozoism, and the poet makes us feel that a soul is not wholly lost after bodily death, being mixed with the elements.

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* तदस्य प्रियमभि पाथो अश्यां नरो यत्र देवयवो मदन्ति ।
उरुक्रमस्य स हि बन्धुरित्था विष्णोः पदे परमे मध्व उत्सः ॥ ऋ. I.154.5.

† यमो नो गातुं प्रथमो विवेद नैषा गव्यूतिरपभर्तवा उ ।
यत्रा नः पूर्वे पितरः परेयुरेना जज्ञानाः पथ्या ३ अनु स्वाः ॥ ऋ. X.14.2.

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* सूर्यं चक्षुर्गच्छतु वातमात्मा द्यां च गच्छ पृथिवीं च धर्मणा ।
अपो वा गच्छ यदि तत्र ते हितं ओषधीषु प्रतितिष्ठा शरीरैः ॥ ऋ. X.16.3.

† *Rigveda* X.58.1—12.

But is hylozoism the final word of the Ṛigveda? By no means. We have one very characteristic hymn of the Ṛigveda which, we fear, has not been noticed with even a tenth of the attention which it richly deserves. The meaning which Roth, and Böhtlingk and Geldner have found in at least two verses of the hymn has been strangely overlooked, and it is wonderful that people keep saying that the idea of transmigration is not to be found in the Ṛigveda. The hymn we refer to is the great riddle-hymn of the Ṛigveda, I. 164. It consists of fifty-two verses and breathes throughout a sceptico-mystical atmosphere. It says that He who made all this does not himself probably know its real nature,[*] and it sets such a high price on the mystical knowledge which it glorifies that any one who comes to be in possession of this knowledge, so the hymn proclaims, may be said to be his father's father.[†] It is no doubt true that even though the hymn occurs in the first Maṇḍala of the Ṛigveda, it is not for that reason to be understood as belonging to the oldest part of the Ṛigveda. For example, it advocates a facile unity of godhood[‡], which is only a later development of thought. It quotes the very same verse[§] which we find in the celebrated Purusha-sūkta, which has been rightly recognised as one of the late productions of the Vedic period. It even contains the famous verse[¶] on the "two birds" which later plays such an important part in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad. All these things point unmistakably to the fact that the hymn of the Ṛigveda which we are considering must be regarded as a late hymn of the Ṛigveda, even though it has the privilege of being included in the canon of the first Maṇḍala. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the very important revelations which it makes on the subject of the idea of transmigration have been strangely neglected. In spite of the Herakleitean style in which the whole hymn has been composed, in spite of the fact that it contains allusions to such various conceptions as those of Fire, the Cow and the Calf, and the First-born of the Law, a psychological vein is still running throughout the whole hymn, and among other things, the reference to the "two birds," namely the individual and the universal soul, makes it unmistakable that the poet is darkly expressing, in his own metaphorical way, his ideas about the nature of soul, and the relation between the individual and the universal soul. For example, the poet asks us who has ever seen the precise mode in which the boneless soul, the very life-blood and informing spirit of the earth, comes to inhabit a bony tenement? And if a man did not know this himself, who has ever moved out of himself and gone to the wise man to receive illumination on it ?[*] Then the seer says categorically that this breathing, speedful, moving life-principle is firmly established inside these tenements of clay.[†] Moreover he tells us that the immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal one, moves backward and forward by virtue of its natural strength; but the wonder of it is, the poet goes on to say, that the mortal and immortal elements keep moving ceaselessly in opposite directions, with the result that people are able to see the one but are unable to see the other.[§] These two last verses were regarded by Roth and Böhtlingk and Gelder as against Oldenberg to have supplied sufficient evidence as to the proof of the existence of the idea of transmigration in the Ṛigveda, as they rightly thought that the verses tell us that the soul is a moving speedful life-principle which comes and goes, moves backward and forward, comes in contact with the body and then moves from it in an opposite direction. Oldenberg is evidently wrong when he understands verse 38 to refer to the morning and evening stars, as he must acknowledge that the verse speaks of the mortal and immortal principles. But the culminating point of the whole doctrine is reached when the poet tells us that he himself saw (probably with his mind's eye) the guardian of the body, moving unerringly by backward and forward paths, clothed in gathered and diffusive splendour, and that it kept on *returning frequently* inside the mundane regions.[*] That this "guardian" is no other than the soul may be seen from the way in which verse 31 follows immediately on verse 30 which mentions the "breathing, speedful, moving life-principle"; moreover, the frequentative (*varīvarti*) tells us the *frequence* of the soul's return to this world. It was with this idea uppermost in his mind that the poet talks, in Herakleitean fashion, of those who come hither as those who are moving away, and those who are moving back as already returning hither,[†] as Herakleitos should talk of the gods being mortals and the men immortals, θεοὶ θνητοί ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι.

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[*] य ईं चकार न सोऽस्य वेद । ऋ. I.164.32.

[†] कविर्यः पुत्रः स ईमा चिकेत यस्ता विजानात् स पितुष्पितासत् । ऋ. I.164.16.

[‡] एकं सद्विप्रा वहुधा वदंति अग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ॥ ऋ. I.164.46.

[§] यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजंत देवास्तानि धर्माणि प्रथमान्यासन् । ऋ. I.164.59.

[¶] द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्न्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ ऋ. I.164.17.

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[*] को ददर्श प्रथमं जायमानमस्थन्वंतं यदनस्था बिभर्ति ।
भूम्या असुरसृगात्मा कस्वित् को विद्वांसमुपगात् प्रष्टुमेतत् ॥ ऋ. I. 164.4.

[†] अनच्छये तुरगातु जीवमेजद् ध्रुवं मध्य आ पस्त्यानाम् । ऋ. I. 164.30.

[§] अपाङ् प्राङेति स्वधया गृभीतोऽमर्त्यो मर्त्येना सयोनिः
ता शश्वन्ता विषूचीना वियन्ता न्यन्यं चिक्युर्न निचिक्युरन्यम् ॥ ऋ. I. 164.38.

We have been obliged to make this long survey of the Vedic idea of life after death only in order to prove that the three chief moments in the idea of transmigration, namely the passage of the soul from the body, its habitation in other forms of existence like the plants or the waters, and even its return to the human form, are all implicitly found even so far back as the times of the Ṛigveda; and when these are coupled with the incipient idea of the quality of action (*dharma*) which determines a future existence, we see that there is no reason why we should persist in saying that the idea of transmigration is an un-Aryan idea, that the Indians borrowed it from the non-Aryan aborigines of India, and that in some inexplicable way the idea found entrance in other countries and cults beyond India. On the principles of ethno-psychology, almost every nation contains within it the possibility of arriving at the idea of transmigration from within its own proper psychological development; and there is no more reason why we should say that Greece borrowed the idea of transmigration from India than we might say that Egypt herself borrowed it from India. If Prof. Keith* acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves believed in the possibility of a dead man "returning to wander on earth, visiting the places he had loved in life, or again changing himself into a heron, a swallow, a snake, a crocodile or a girl," there is no justification for saying as he does that "this is indeed transmigration, but a different transmigration from either that of Greece or India". Wherever there is recognised the possibility of the soul coming to inhabit a body as a god-like principle from without, wherever it is supposed that the soul could likewise part from the body as it came, wherever it is even thought that the soul after parting from the body could lead a life of disembodied existence, and wherever it is supposed to return again to the earth and inhabit any form of existence whatsoever, there is a kind of undying life conceived for the soul from which the step to actual transmigration is not very far removed; while the crowning idea in transmigration, namely that of ἀνα'μνησις is a product of very late growth, and even though it is found in Pythagoras and Plato and the Indian system of Yoga, we have no reason to attribute it definitely to the Vedic seers or to the Upanishadic philosophers, unless perhaps we scent it in the rather unconscious utterance of the sage Vāmadeva that he was in a former life "Manu or the Sun."†

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[*] अपश्यं गोपामनिपद्यमानं आ च परा च पथिभिश्चरंतम् ।
स सध्रीचीः स विषूचीर्वसान आ वरीवर्ति भुवनेष्वन्तरिति ॥ ऋ. I. 164.31.

[†] येऽर्वाञ्चस्ताँ उ पराच आहुर्ये पराञ्चस्ताँ उ अर्वाच आहुः ॥ ऋ. I. 164.19.

We now come to deal with the question of the idea of transmigration in the Upanishads themselves. We have already tried to prove that the idea of transmigration has been partly adumbrated in the great riddle-hymn of the Ṛigveda. In the Upanishads, on the other hand, the idea has been most explicitly advanced. When the father of Nachiketas told him that he had made him over to the God of death, Nachiketas replied by saying that it was no uncommon fate that was befalling him: "I indeed go at the head of many to the other world; but I also go in the midst of many. What is the God of death going to do to me? Look back at our predecessors (who have already gone); look also at those who have succeeded them. Man ripens like corn, and like corn he is born again" (S. 21. a). Nachiketas is saying more than the gospel of St. John: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."* The gospel never says that the corn of wheat is reborn; but Nachiketas says that just as a corn of grain ripens and perishes and is born again, so does a man die to be born again.

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* *R. A. S. Journal* 1909 p. 569 seq: "Pythagoras and transmigration."

† अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च । बृ. I. 4·10.

The *locus classicus*, however, of the idea of transmigration is to be found in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, which goes into great details over the manner in which a man dies and is born again. We are first told how at the time of birth all the elements wait upon the approaching soul, their lord and king; and then we are told, how these wait again upon the soul to give him a send-off when he is about to depart: "And as on the approach of a king, the policemen, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns wait upon him with food, and drink, and tents, saying 'he comes, he approaches', similarly do all these elements wait on the conscious self, saying this Brahman comes, this Brahman approaches; and again, as at the time of the king's departure, the policemen, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns gather round him, similarly do all the vital airs gather round the soul at the time of death" (S. 21 b). Then follows a very realistic description of the actual manner of death: "When the vital airs are gathered around him, the soul collecting together all the portions of light moves down into the heart; and when the 'person in the eye' has turned away, then he ceases to know any forms. He becomes concentred in himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to see; he becomes at one with himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to speak or hear or know. Then the tip of his heart is filled with light, and through that light the soul moves out either by the way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the body. As the soul moves out, life moves after it; and as the life moves, the various vital airs depart after it. Him follow* his knowledge, his works, and his former consciousness" (S. 21. c). It is important to notice that in this last sentence a doctrine of *karma* is being already advanced which becomes still more explicit almost immediately: "And as a caterpillar, after reaching the end of a blade of grass, finds another place of support and then draws itself towards it, similarly this soul, after reaching the end of this body, finds another place of support, and then draws himself towards it. And as a goldsmith, after taking a piece of gold, gives it another newer and more beautiful shape, similarly does this soul, after having thrown off this body and dispelled ignorance, take on another, newer, and more beautiful form, whether it be of one of the Manes, or Demi-gods, or Gods, or of Prajāpati, or Brahman, or of any other beings. This soul, then, as his conduct and behaviour has been, so does he become. He whose works have been good becomes good; he whose works have been evil becomes evil. By holy works, he becomes holy; by sinful works, sinful. It is for this reason that they say that a person consists merely of desires; as his desire is, so is his will; as his will, so his work; as his work, so his reward" (S. 21. d). This passage is important from various points of view. It tells us in the first place that a soul finds out its future body before it leaves its former one: in fact, it seems that the passage calls in question a "disembodied" existence. Then again, it tells us that the soul is a creative entity, and in Aristotelian fashion, creates a body as a goldsmith creates an ornament of gold. Then again, the passage tells us that the soul is like a Phœnix which at every change of body takes on a newer and more beautiful form. And, finally, it regards the soul as amenable at every remove to the law of *karma,* and says it receives a holy body if its actions have been good, and a sinful body if its actions have been sinful. Further, the same passage tells us that "as to the man who has no desires left in him, who is desireless because he has all his desires fulfilled, his desires being centred only in the Self, the vital airs do not depart: such a man being Brahman (while he lived) goes to Brahman (after his death). Of that import is this verse: 'when a man becomes free of all the desires that are in his heart, mortal as he is, he nevertheless becomes immortal and obtains Brahman'. And as the slough of a snake might lie on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, even so does his body lie. Being verily bodiless he becomes immortal; his vital spirits are (merged in) Brahman and become pure light" (S. 21. e).

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* St. John 12.24.

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* The verb *anvār abh* is understood by Max Müller and Deussen as meaning "take hold of"; *e.g.* Deussen translates "Dann nehmen ihn das Wissen und die Werke bei der Hand und seine vormalige Erfahrung"—*Sechzig Upanishad's* p. 475.

Of this immortal existence, however, we shall have occasion to speak presently. Before we do this, however, we must explain what was regarded by the Upanishadic philosophers to be the fate of the ordinary soul, and especially of the bad soul. To speak of the latter first, there are various passages in the Upanishads, for example in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Īśa, and Kaṭha Upanishads, which tell us that the Upanishadic philosophers believed that the wicked soul was destined to go to a "joyless" "demonic" region which was "enveloped in darkness." This conception—the belief in a Hades—the Upanishadic philosophers share with many other sections of the Aryan race. There is, however, nothing on record in the Upanishads to show whether these bad souls had to suffer eternal damnation in this sunless region, or whether their stay in that

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region was only temporary. "Joyless indeed are the regions" says the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* "and also enveloped in pitchy darkness, where the ignorant and unenlightened men have to go after death." "Demonic* are the regions" says the *Īs'a Upanishad* "and also enveloped in pitchy darkness, where those who have destroyed their souls are obliged to go." This same Upanishad adds that "those who worship what is not real knowledge enter into gloomy darkness," which idea is also elsewhere expressed by the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad.* While the *Kaṭha Upanishad* tells us that "those who make a gift of barren cows which have drunk water, and eaten hay, and given their milk, themselves go to the joyless regions" (S. 22). These passages show us that the Upanishadic philosophers believed in a sunless region where the ignorant, the unenlightened, the self-murdering, and the pseudo-charitable persons were obliged to go after death.

As regard the other souls, a passage in the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad,* which seems to be the oldest passage of the kind, tells us that a soul after death ascends through the regions of the wind and the sun and the moon, and comes at last to a region which is like the Platonic "Isles of the Blessed", being free from grief and snow, and there dwells through eternity : "When a man goes away from this world, he comes to the wind. There the wind opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he moves upward and comes to the sun. There the sun opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a Lambara (Ḍambara). Through it he moves upward and comes to the moon. There the moon opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends and comes to a world which is sorrowless and snowless and there remains for aye" (S. 23). This passage must be regarded as one of the oldest of eschatological passages in the Upanishads. In the first place, the passage, in itself or in its context, does not make it clear whether such a fate is reserved for all souls or for the good souls only: it speaks of souls without distinction. The eschatological passages in the Chhāndogya Upanishad, which we shall quote presently, must be regarded as of a later date, because that Upanishad goes into very great details over the respective fates of the ascetic or the householder, and consigns the one to the way of the Gods, and the other to the way of the Fathers. In fact, we find in that Upanishad a very great differentiation of the eschatological idea, which is advanced in the passage from the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad which we have already quoted. Then again, it is remarkable that, as in the Upanishads generally, the world of the moon is, in the above passage, regarded as situated at a greater distance than the world of the sun. Then, it is to be noticed that the Region of the Blessed of which the passage speaks is a region "without snow." Does this mean that the Upanishadic philosopher was tormented by too much cold in the region where he lived? And finally, the idea of "eternity" is already introduced in that important passage, and we are told that such a soul lives in these blessed regions for ever and ever.

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* Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar in a very important forth-coming article in the B. B. R. A. S. Journal makes the following interesting suggestion. The Sanskrit equivalent of the word demonic viz. "Asurya" may here refer to the Assyrian country, "Assyrian" and "Assuryan" being philologically identical, the *y* and the *u* being interchangeable as in Greek.

In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, on the other hand, as we have pointed out, the eschatological idea undergoes a great deal of transformation. There we are told that there are two ways open to mortals, the bright way and the dark way, the "archirmārga" and the "dhūmamārga," the "devayāna" and the "pitṛiyāṇa," the Way of the Gods, and the Way of the Fathers. It is these two paths which were later immortalised in the Bhagavadgītā* as they are

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* अग्निर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्लः षण्मासा उत्तरायणम् ।
तत्र प्रयाता गच्छंति ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदो जनाः ॥
धूमो रात्रिस्तथा कृष्णः षण्मासा दक्षिणायनम् ।
तत्र चांद्रमसं ज्योतिर्योगी प्राप्य निवर्तते ॥
शुक्लकृष्णे गती ह्येते जगतः शाश्वते मते ।
एकया यात्यनावृत्तिमन्ययाऽऽवर्तते पुनः ॥ भ. गी. VIII. 24-26.

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already adumbrated in the hymns of the Ṛigveda*. As regards those who practise penance and faith in a forest, says the Upanishad, whether after their death people perform their obsequies or not, their souls enter the path of light, and they move successively "from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the north, from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, and from the moon to the lightning. There is a person not-human who carries them to Brahman. This path is known as the path of the Gods, or the path of Brahman. Those who proceed on this path never return to the cycle of human existence, yea never return" (S. 24. a). Over against this path, there is according to the same Upanishad another path reserved for those, who, living in towns, lead a life of charitable deeds and perform works of public utility. Such people do not indeed travel by the path of the Gods which is reserved only for the penance-performing ascetics of the forest. They travel by the path of smoke, "from smoke they go to the night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the south, but they do not reach the year. From these months, they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the sky, from the sky to the moon. There they dwell till the time comes for them to fall down. Thence they descend by this road : from the moon they come down to the sky, from the sky to the wind. Having become wind they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist, having become mist they become a cloud, having become a cloud, they rain down. Then they are born as either rice or barley, herbs or trees, sesamum or beans. At this stage, verily, the path is difficult to follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the semen, like unto him do they become" (S. 24. b).

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* The Devayāna which is mentioned in Rigveda X. 18. 1 has the same meaning as in the Upanishads:

परं मृत्यो अनु परेहि पंथां यस्ते स्व इतरो देवयानात् .

The path which in the above verse is regarded as "different from" the Way of the Gods must be only the Way of the Fathers—Pitṛiyāṇa. The word Pitṛiyāṇa, however, in the Ṛigveda is often used with a sacrificial instead of a funeral connotation : cf:

पंथामनु प्रविद्वान् पितृयाणं द्युमदग्ने समिधानो विभाहि । ऋ. X. 2. 7.

It is not difficult to understand that these so-called paths are merely imaginary ways in which the primeval human mind tried to express itself in regard to the eschatological idea; but they were not so understood for a great length of time, and dogmatic systematisers tried to justify them in one way or another, the most reasonable of these justifications being that the Sun and the Moon and the Smoke and the Night were regarded as presiding deities, and therefore the soul was understood as being given over in the charge of these deities who sent him whither he deserved. It is not difficult to see that the two paths which are spoken of in the above passage are merely mythological explanations of an insoluble problem. The great Rāmdāsa, the patron saint of the Deccan, said in his *Dāsabodha* that one does not need to believe in the two paths.* What becomes of the soul after death we may not understand; and if any credit is to be given to the passage in question, it is not for having solved the problem but for having attempted the solution. Philosophically speaking, we are not much concerned with the actual stages of the ascent or descent of the soul, but only with the ideas of ascent or descent. And looking at the problem in this way, one is filled with a great deal of surprise and admiration when one sees that the ideas of ascent or descent were placed on no less than a moral foundation. "According as a man's works are, so does he become." It is this moral backbone of the Upanishadic eschatology that gives it a great philosophical value. In the passage of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* just next to the one we have discussed, we are told that those who have been of a "beautiful" character quickly attain to a covetable birth, that of a Brāhmaṇa or Kshatriya or Vais'ya, and those who have been of an "ugly" character speedily attain to a miserable birth, as that of a dog or swine or pariah (S. 24 c), which statement is made still more definite in the *Kaushītakī Upanishad* where the law of *karma* is explicitly mentioned, and a soul is said to take on the body of "a worm or a moth, a fish or a bird, a leopard or a lion, a serpent or a man, or any of these other creatures, according to its *karma* and knowledge" (S. 24. d).

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* उत्तरायेण त उत्तम । दक्षणायेन तें अधम । हा संदेहीं वसे भ्रम । साधु तो निःसंदेह ॥ १३ ॥ शुक्लपक्ष उत्तरायेण । गृहीं दीप दिवा मरण । अंतीं राहावें स्मरण । गती कारणें ॥ १४ ॥ इतकें नलगे योगियासी । तो जीतचि मुक्त पुण्यराशी । तिळांजुळी पापपुण्यासी । दिधली तेणें ॥ १५ ॥ दा० VII. 10.13–15.

We have seen hitherto that the philosophers of the Upanishads believed in a region like the Platonic Hades in which the incurables were possibly confined for ever; we have seen that they believed in a region like the Islands of the Blest, differing however from Plato inasmuch as they regarded life in this region as absolutely eternal; we have seen that they believed in the Path of the Gods which led stage by stage to the world of Brahman, whence they supposed there was no back-turning; while they also believed in the Path of the Fathers, which led the soul to supramundane regions where it lived so long as its merit was not exhausted, but when this came to end, the soul had to descend in the shape of rain-drops and take on a body according to the remnant of its works. On the other hand, we do not find that anything like the conception of the Tartarus of Plato or the Purgatory of Dante was present to the mind of the Upanishadic philosophers. This could be explained on the simple hypothesis that to the Upanishadic seers, as to the later Indian philosophers, the world itself was a grand purgatory where the effects of sin were to be wiped out by good action. On the other hand we find that creatures low in the scale of evolution were "sundered as with a hatchet" from the rest of creation; to them the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* denies the right to enter on the path of liberation, ordaining that they must for ever be fixed in the round of births and deaths. Neither on the path of the gods, nor on the path of the fathers, are these base creatures allowed to tread. They must keep up the round of coming and going: their rule is not "die to live" but "live to die". And it is wonderful that the Upanishad includes even "a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar," in the same category with "a worm or a moth, a gnat or a mosquito" (S. 24. e).

There is, however, a later phase in the development of the conception of the Path of the Gods which we must not fail to notice. The *Kaushītakī Upanishad* makes a curious development in the conception of the Path of the Gods. It tells us that when a soul comes to the Path of the Gods, "he first goes to the world of Fire, then to the world of Wind, then to the world of Varuṇa, then to the world of the Sun, then to the world of Indra, then to the world of Prajāpati, and finally to the world of Brahman." It does away with the relays recognised in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad or the Chhāndogya Upanishad and substitutes new ones. Instead of such unmeaning conceptions as the "world of day," or "the world of the bright half of the month," or "the world of the six months during which the sun is moving towards the summer solstice," or finally "the world of the year," it substitutes "the worlds of deities" which are recognised all over as properly deities. Then it tells us, that "when such a soul has reached the world of Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run towards the soul and receive him with all the glory which is due to himself alone. He says that as the soul has reached the Ageless river, he can never become old. Upon the command, five hundred celestial damsels move towards the soul: a hundred with fruits, a hundred with ointments, a hundred with garlands, a hundred with clothes, and a hundred with perfumes: and they decorate the soul with all the ornaments which are due to Brahman. Being so decorated, the soul knowing the Brahman, moves towards Brahman. He comes to the Ageless river which he crosses merely by a motion of the mind. He then shakes off his good deeds as well as his bad deeds. His beloved relatives partake of the good deeds, and unbeloved of the bad deeds. And as a man driving fast in a chariot looks down on the revolving wheels, so does the soul look at day and night, good and bad, and all the contrary pairs. Being free from good and being free from evil, knowing Brahman, he moves towards Brahman (S. 24. f).

The culminating point, however, of the Upanishadic psychology, is reached when we come to the treatment of the idea of Immortal Life. This is one of the crucial points in the interpretation of Upanishadic doctrine, and expert opinion has been divided on this point for the simple reason that every dogmatic philosopher wishes to find nothing but his own doctrine in the Upanishads. We, who stand for no dogma in particular, know how to understand the Upanishadic passages on this head, because we want to take a mere historical survey of the doctrine and not to press the passages into the service of any particular view to which we may be committed. Looking at the Upanishads from this point of view, we see that there is a systematic evolution that could be traced through them of the ideas that were held on the subject of Immortality. We are told in a passage of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* that the best kind of eternal life that may be conceived for anybody is that he should be " lifted to the region of the deity " whom he loved and worshipped during life, and that he should partake of all the happiness that is possible in that region (S. 25. a). Another passage from the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the "companionship " of the highest God with whom the soul should be liberated at the time of the great end (S. 25. b). Not satisfied with a mere companionship another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute " likeness " of God and enjoying a life of personal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in the theology of Rāmānuja (S. 25. c). On the other hand, S'ankarāchārya would be satisfied with nothing short of an "absorption in divinity" and a life of impersonal immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disappear in the mighty waters and lose their name and form, even so the wise soul becomes absorbed in the transcendent Person and loses its name and form. As when honey is prepared by the collection of various juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree they came, even so when the souls are merged in the Real, they cannot discriminate from which body they came. This is nothing short of a doctrine of impersonal immortality (S. 25. d). Finally, an important passage from the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* tells us that the soul of a man who has come to self-consciousness becomes mingled after death with the whole Universe (S. 25. e). Such a soul becomes a great diffusive power, whose voice is on the rolling air and who stands in the rising sun and who may be seen in star or flower or wherever the eye may be cast *. Or else to express it in the words of a poet of rare imagination :

"He is made one with Nature : there is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan
Of thunder to the song of the night's sweet bird ;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being to its own ;
Which wields the world with never wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above"†.

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* Tennyson, *In Memoriam* CXXX.

† Shelley, *Adonais* XLII.

21 (*a*) बहूनामेमि प्रथमो बहूनामेमि मध्यमः ।
किंस्विद्यमस्य कर्तव्यं यन्मयाद्य करिष्यति ॥
अनुपश्य यथा पूर्वे प्रतिपश्य तथा परे ।
सस्यमिव मर्त्यः पच्यते सस्यमिवाजायते पुनः ॥ क० I. 1. 5-6.

(*b*) तद्यथा राजानमायांतमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्रामण्योऽन्नैः पानैरावसथैः प्रतिकल्पंतेऽयमायात्ययमागच्छतीत्येवं हैवंविदं सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिकल्पंत इदं ब्रह्मायातीदमागच्छतीति । तद्यथा राजानं प्रतियियासंतमुग्राः प्रत्येनसः सूतग्रामण्योऽभिसमायन्त्येवमेवेममात्मानमंतकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति । बृ० IV. 3. 37–38.

(*c*) स यत्रायमात्माऽऽबल्यं न्येत्य संमोहमिव न्येत्यथैनमेते प्राणा अभिसमायंति, स एतास्तेजोमात्राः समभ्याददानो हृदयमेवान्ववक्रामति, स यत्रैष चाक्षुषः पुरुषः पराङ् पर्यावर्ततेऽथारूपज्ञो भवति । एकीभवति न पश्यतीत्याहुः...... एकीभवति न वदतीत्याहुरेकीभवति न शृणोतीत्याहुः......एकीभवति न विजानातीत्याहुस्तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति चक्षुष्टो वा मूर्ध्नो वाऽन्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः, तमुत्क्रामंतं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति, प्राणमनूत्क्रामन्तं सर्वे प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति......तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च । बृ० IV. 4. 1–2.

(*d*) तद्यथा तृणजलायुका तृणस्यांतं गत्वाऽन्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरत्येवमेवायमात्मा इदं शरीरं निहत्य......अन्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरति । तद्यथा पेशस्कारी पेशसो मात्रामुपादायान्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं तनुत एवमेवायमात्मा इदं शरीरं निहत्य अविद्यां गमयित्वाऽन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते, पित्र्यं वा गान्धर्वं वा दैवं वा प्राजापत्यं वा ब्राह्मं वाऽन्येषां वा भूतानाम् । स वा अयमात्मा......यथाकारी यथाचारी तथा भवति साधुकारी साधुर्भवति पापकारी पापो भवति पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन । अथो खल्वाहुः काममय एवायं पुरुष इति स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतुर्भवति, यत्क्रतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते, यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसंपद्यते । बृ० IV. 4. 3–5.

(*e*) अथाकामयमानो, योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामंति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति । तदेष श्लोको भवति ।

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यंते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुत इति ॥

तद्यथाऽहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत, एवमेवेदं शरीरं शेतेऽथ अयमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव । बृ० IV. 4. 6–7.

22 अनंदा नाम ते लोका अंधेन तमसावृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंत्यविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः ॥ बृ० IV. 4. 11.
असुर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ॥ ई० 3.

अंधं तमः प्रविशंति येऽविद्यामुपासते ॥ ई० 9 and बृ० IV. 4. 10.
पीतोदका जग्धतृणा दुग्धदोहा निरिंद्रियाः ।
अनन्दा नाम ते लोकास्तान्स गच्छति ता ददत् ॥ क० I. 1. 3.

23 यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचक्रस्य खं तेन स उर्ध्वं आक्रमते, स आदित्यमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा लम्बरस्य खं तेन स ऊर्ध्वं आक्रमते, स चन्द्रमसमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा दुन्दुभेः खं तेन ऊर्ध्वं आक्रमते, स लोकमागच्छत्यशोकमहिमं तस्मिन्वसति शाश्वतीः समाः । बृ० V. 10. 1.

24 (*a*) अथ यदु चैवास्मिञ्छव्यं कुर्वन्ति यदि च न, अर्चिषमेवाभिसंभवन्ति, अर्चिषोऽहः, अह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षं, आपूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान् षड्उदङ्ङेति मासांस्तान्, मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं, संवत्सरादादित्यं, आदित्याच्चन्द्रमसं, चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवपथो ब्रह्मपथ एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते नावर्तन्ते । छां० IV. 15. 5–6.

(*b*) तद्य इत्थं विदुर्ये चेमेऽरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसंभवन्ति....

........स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवयानः पन्था इति । अथ य इमे ग्राम इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासत ते धूममभिसंभवंति, धूमाद्रात्रिं, रात्रेरपरपक्षं, अपरपक्षाद्यान् षड् दक्षिणैति मासांस्तान्, नैते संवत्सरमभिप्राप्नुवंति । मासेभ्यः पितृलोकं, पितृलोकादाकाशं, आकाशाच्चन्द्रमसं,......तस्मिन् यावत्संपातमुषित्वा अथ एतमेवाध्वानं पुनर्निवर्तन्ते, यथेतमाकाशमाकाशाद्वायुं, वायुर्भूत्वा धूमो भवति, धूमो भूत्वाऽभ्रं भवति, अभ्रं भूत्वा मेघो भवति, मेघो भूत्वा प्रवर्षति, त इह व्रीहियवा ओषधिवनस्पतयस्तिलमाषा इति जायन्तेऽतो वै खलु दुर्निष्प्रपतरं यो यो ह्यन्नमत्ति यो रेतः सिंचति तद् भूय एव भवति । छां० V . 10. 1–6.

(*c*) तद्य इह रमणीयचरणा अभ्याशो ह यत्ते रमणीयां योनिमापद्येरन् ब्राह्मणयोनिं वा क्षत्रिययोनिं वा वैश्ययोनिं वा अथ य इह कपूयचरणा अभ्याशो ह यत्ते कपूयां योनिमापद्येरन् श्वयोनिं वा सूकरयोनिं वा चांडालयोनिं वा । छां० V. 10. 7.

(*d*) ये वै केचास्माल्लोकात् प्रयंति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति......एतद्वै स्वर्गस्य द्वारं यच्चन्द्रमाः । तं यत्प्रत्याह तमतिसृजते य एनं प्रत्याह तमिह वृष्टिर्भूत्वा वर्षति, स इह कीटो वा पतंगो वा मत्स्यो वा शकुनिर्वा शार्दूलो वा सिंहो वा परश्वान् वा पुरुषो वाऽन्यो वैतेषु स्थानेषु प्रत्याजायते यथाकर्म यथाविद्यम् । कौ० 1. 2.

(*e*) अथैतयोः पथोर्न कतरेण चन तानीमानि क्षुद्राण्यसकृदावर्तीनि भूतानि भवन्ति । जायस्व म्रियस्वेत्येतत्तृतीयं स्थानं, तेनासौ लोको न संपूर्यते तस्माज्जुगुप्सेत । छां० V. 10. 8.

त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवंति तदाभवंति । छां० VI. 9. 3.

(*f*) स एतं देवयानं पंथानमासाद्य अग्निलोकमागच्छति, स वायुलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स आदित्यलोकं, स इंद्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं, स ब्रह्मलोकं ...तं ब्रह्म आह अभिधावत मम यशसा, विरजां वायं नदीं प्रापत्, न वाऽयं जिगीष्यतीति । तं पंचशतान्यप्सरसां प्रतियंति शतं फलहस्ताः, शतं आंजनहस्ताः, शतं माल्यहस्ताः, शतं वासोहस्ताः, शतं चूर्णहस्ताः...तं ब्रह्मालंकारेणालंकुर्वंति । स ब्रह्मालंकारेणालंकृतो ब्रह्म विद्वान् ब्रह्माभिप्रैति...स आगच्छति विजरां नदीं तां मनसैवात्येति, तत्सुकृतदुष्कृते धूनुते । तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयंत्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम् । तद्यथा रथेन धावयन् रथचक्रे पर्यवेक्षेत एवमहोरात्रे पर्यवेक्षत एवं सुकृतदुष्कृते सर्वाणि च द्वंद्वानि । स एष विसुकृतो विदुष्कृतो ब्रह्म विद्वान् ब्रह्मैवाभिप्रैति । कौ० I. 4.

25 (*a*) स य एवमेतद्राजनं देवतासु प्रोतं वेद एतासामेव देवतानां सलोकतां सार्ष्टितां सायुज्यं गच्छति । छां० II.20.2.

(*b*) वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परांतकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यंति सर्वे ॥ मुं० III.2.6.

(*c*) यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् ।
तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरंजनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥ मुं० III.1.3.

(*d*) गताः कलाः पंचदश प्रतिष्ठा देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु ।
कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवंति ॥
यथा नद्यः स्यंदमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छंति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥ मुं० III.2.7-8.

स यथेमाः नद्यः स्यंदमानाः समुद्रायणाः समुद्रं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छंति भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे समुद्र इत्येवं प्रोच्यते एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाः षोडशकलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छंति भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते स एषोऽकलोऽमृतो भवति । प्र० VI. 5.

यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृतो निस्तिष्ठंति नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणां रसान् समवहारमेकतां रसं गमयंति ते यथा तत्र न विवेकं लभंतेऽमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्यमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मीत्येवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति ।...इमाः सोम्य नद्यः पुरस्तात्प्राच्यः स्यंदंते पश्चात्प्रतीच्यस्ताः समुद्रात् समुद्रमेवापियंति समुद्र एव भवति ता यथा तत्र न विदुरियमहमस्मीति । छां० VI.9–10.

(*e*) संप्राप्यैनमृषयो ज्ञानतृप्ताः कृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशांताः ।
ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्तात्मानः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति ॥ मुं० III.2.5.

XX

THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

*A Historico-critical Study. I.**

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

There cannot be much doubt that philosophy originated to a very large extent in the desire for and the effort to find grounds for satisfying answers to questions raised through the presence of religious needs. The history of thought shows, however, that this general problem has not always been raised in the same way. The form of the problem and the form of the solution proposed are always closely related to the general culture of the age in which they arise. Yet, as it has been fundamentally the same problem that has continually arisen in the past, so the answers have always presented the same broad divisions which they do now. An exhaustive account of the attitudes of philosophers and philosophies to the question how far the satisfaction of needs is a justification of religious beliefs, independently of or even in opposition to reason, would necessitate a consideration of much of the ancient thought of the East and of the West. Such a treatment is impossible here. Incidentally it may be noticed that amongst the Christian Scholastics a distrust of reason for the establishment of some religious beliefs was frequent, notably so with Duns Scotus and his followers. The theory of "double truths" propounded later by William of Occam, according to which truths of religion might be false in philosophy, suggests similar distinctions made by some quite recent Western thinkers. The present survey will begin with Kant from whom the positions of many, especially of the theological writers to whom reference must be made, are ultimately derived.

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* Historico-critical portions of a Critical Essay on : "*The Justification of Religious Beliefs on the Ground of their Satisfaction of Religious Needs*," which divided the Burney Prize at Cambridge in 1909. A section giving a psychological and metaphysical discussion has been printed in Vol. IX. of Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, under the heading "*Needs.*"

Kant's attitude towards the establishment of the fundamental beliefs of religion depends upon his view of a dualism in reason, giving us on the one hand the "theoretic or pure" reason and on the other the "practical" reason. By means of the theoretic reason we can know nothing but what we can perceive in space and time, or develop through certain forms of our understanding in relation to things as they appear to us. With this limitation of knowledge Kant's attitude to religious beliefs is that of theoretic Agnosticism. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that though theoretic reason is of no value in giving positive grounds for these beliefs it is useful in the criticism of views antagonistic to religion. For Kant was convinced of the importance of religious beliefs: he says, "It is unquestionably necessary to be convinced of God's existence; though it is not so necessary to demonstrate it."

The Kantian conception of the theoretic reason implies the relativity of knowledge. But the statement of mere relativity involves a contradiction, and it cannot be accepted as a point of view from which all knowledge is to be regarded. To carry any implication valid of all knowledge the statement of the relativity of knowledge must itself be absolute. If the statement is itself relative, we are in endless relativity and the implication of the statement may itself be doubted. In asserting that knowledge is limited to phenomena, either phenomena is all there is—then the phenomenal is absolute; or it is known that mere phenomena is not all there is, then mere phenomena have been transcended, and knowledge is not merely relative. It does not seem possible to hold consistently the view of a thorough-going relativity: that there is something absolute in knowledge must be admitted.

The beliefs in God, immortality, and freedom, which Kant, with 18th Century Rationalism generally, conceived as essential for religion, though unsupported on grounds of theoretic reason are called by him necessities of the practical reason which affirms them by an act of moral faith. "Conscience affirms God, the intellect is powerless to deny him."

Beliefs are justified by their satisfying certain moral needs or needs arising from the implications of the moral life. The postulate of the existence of God is made by Kant in order to satisfy the felt need for the ultimate co-incidence of happiness and virtue. Whether in this he was consistent with his rigid ethical theory of duty for duty's sake it is not necessary for us to decide. But two other matters must be noticed. The inquiry of Hume as to why we should hold that there *is* another 'state' where justice and happiness are harmonised, when there is so much inequality here is not answered by Kant. It also seems a fair criticism to say that he tends to represent religion as an appendage of morality rather than as its goal and completion. The God whose existence according to him is not supported by speculative reason is, it should be noted, the 'external' God of the Deist, but hardly the God of the Theist or of the later Idealism. The argument based on the practical reason is not stated as a general method applicable to justify all beliefs which satisfy religious or moral needs. It is simply used for the three ideas mentioned, which are denominated 'regulative' ideas. For this limitation there is little justification in Kant's published works.

Since Kant it has been the effort of most Idealist thinkers to give a consistent account of the unity of consciousness which shall do justice to the dualities of experience. The general criticism of Kant, that there is no dualism in reason of the nature he expounds seems valid. Experience and a consideration of Kant's use of his own theory show that such a dualism is not present. The reason he uses to pass from his ethical experience to the postulates of God, immortality and freedom, is theoretical as much as in any other passage of his thought, in so far as with certain assumptions and certain stated facts, inference is made to a conclusion. A mere act of the moral will cannot as such apart from theoretical consideration postulate a metaphysical entity, God, or the metaphysical reality of immortality or of freedom. These are concepts in the mind implying an objectivity which is not affirmed by a feeling or act of moral will. "What is often forgotten" says Mr. Bradley, "is that certainty belongs to feeling only as that is actually felt." The possibility of assumption and error arises as soon as there is a passage from the experience as such to intellectual statements in regard to it. As consciousness is a unity containing differentiations, reason is one aspect or function which reflects upon the differentiations, e. g. upon what are called the 'material' and what are called the 'ethical' aspects of experience. The distinction between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' reason is little other than that of the aspects of experience considered. If the *concepts* God, immortality, and freedom are used they must be recognised as arrived at—in the only way possible for them to be arrived at—by thought and reflection on the part of someone. The valuable element of Kant's work here is his emphasis on the reality of the ethical aspects of experience, and in his effort to give an independent examination of the problem of value as distinct from the problem of knowledge. The attention now given to the value judgment is a tendency ultimately derived for modern philosophy, from Kant: his view of human beings as possessing 'intrinsic dignity or worth,' as being 'ends in themselves' strengthened his influence in this direction.

Kant had insisted on the activity of the moral will; Schleiermacher is the classical post-Kantian example of a writer regarding religion almost entirely as feeling. The essence of religion, in his view, is the feeling of dependence, and the justification of religious beliefs rests ultimately on the satisfaction of feeling rather than on the theoretic reason. He seems to neglect the fact that beliefs are held to involve objective implication and truth. Ideas and beliefs are not of much moment: "Religious ideas are reflections on religious feeling."[2] Religion itself is life in the Infinite Spirit. "Religion by its own nature," says Schleiermacher himself, "is as far removed from all that is systematic, as philosophy is

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1. Mind. October 1909.
2. Dr. Oman in "*Schleiermacher, on Religion*," London 1893 P. 43.

disposed to it."[3] God is known by immediate intuition, and thus belief in him is justified. Schleiermacher's view is essentially one of mystical emotion, though in his later writings he tended to give greater recognition to thought and action. Further, as Professor Ladd points out[4] Schleiermacher not only neglects the intellectual and rational factors but also some of the emotional elements of religion. In spite of his inadequate recognition of the place of thought his conception of a "Weltgeist" (a Universal Spirit) is an elaborate product of the reason. The chief defect in his position is its inadequacy in reference to the complexity of the religious consciousness and man's intellectual needs. The influence of Schleiermacher on later religious and theological writers it would be difficult to overestimate. The influence, both in regard to emphasis on feeling, and in his view of religious ideas being products of religious experience constitutes the importance of his mention in this survey.[5]

Though contemporary in time with Schleiermacher, Hegel was a little later in the history of thought. As previously suggested the effort of most Post-Kantian European philosophers has been to give an account of experience which would avoid the Kantian dualism and bring the world of ideals and the world of phenomena into the relationship of a consistent whole in thought. Kant himself had pointed out the way—the way of Idealism. Schleiermacher had insisted on the unity of consciousness in feeling. But it was Hegel who was the first great constructive Idealist in modern philosophy. Working out the boldest and most embracing system he conceived of God as the perfect rational synthesis of which every consciousness is the potential form. According to Hegel, reason is immanent in the structure of Reality, and in and through reason we have real though incomplete knowledge, of God. Thought is constructive and divine. Beliefs, therefore,

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3. *Ibid* p. 17.

4. "*The Philosophy of Religion*," Vol. I. p. 269

5. For an estimation of Schleiermacher see A. J. C. Allen "*The Continuity of Christian Thought*" and Pfleiderer O, "*Philosophy of Religion.*" Eng, trs, 1886, Vol 1. pp. 302—340.

are not justified simply in satisfying needs, but in being rational. "It is the fact that man is a rational thinking spirit" says Dr, Ladd, "which creates for him the possibility of religion and makes him capable of religious value-judgments, or of judgments of any kind. Only such a being is capable of rising to the idea of God, or of so much as conceiving of eternity, immortality and duty. It is man's rationality, therefore, which is the root fact of his capacity for religion. Hegel was undoubtedly right in this at least."[6] The importance of Hegel for us is that the strength of present day Idealism, however much that may differ from his position, is mainly due to his influence. Though he does show evidence of appreciation of other factors of consciousness besides thought his emphasis on thought and reason led to opposition.

Feuerbach, for example, contended that the religious life centred around the needs of the heart. For him, God, as the object of religion is essentially the outcome of feeling, not of the intellect, "of the heart's necessity not of the mind's freedom; in short, an object which is the reflex not of the theoretical but of the practical tendency in man." Most of the writers we have to consider later show a lamentable neglect of an adequate consideration of Idealism; yet it is in some form of Idealism, or Spiritualism, if at all, that ground is to be found for a satisfactory view of the relationship between needs and the justification of beliefs.

The philosophical position of Hermann Lotze, who in my opinion has had the greatest effect on philosophy, and through Ritschl also on theology since Hegel, is from one point of view to be regarded as a critical and constructive reaction from Hegel's extreme Rationalism. For Lotze Reality is richer than thought, a complex and concrete. Thought may interpret Reality. He does not give to thought the place that Hegel does because his view of thought differs from that of Hegel, being more purely formal. In the main his aim is to formulate a philosophy which will do justice to all aspects of personality, in its complexity. Reason is an aspect of personality, and is involved in the acquiring of truth ; and thus while thought does not predominate in his system he nowhere regards it as unimportant and nowhere lays himself open to a fair charge of anti-intellectualism. Thought can be valid of things, though it does not correspond to them in the sense of copying. This validity is due chiefly to the fact that thought depends for its activity upon an external stimulus. Lotze appears to have believed that ultimately faith in a Personal World-Ground justifies the acceptance of the validity of thought, but this would have to rest upon the value judgment that the World-Ground is good. Descartes raised the difficulty that the external stimulus—the Other—may be deceiving us; but nowhere does Lotze discuss the difficulty. Thus, though thought is recognised the trust in it is based ultimately upon a value-judgment. Lotze himself almost explicitly avows this when he says that "In the immediate assurance which we feel of the worth of the world and of the world-order, lies the security of our knowledge."

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[6] *Ibid.*

While the intellect can support Theistic belief, the *content* of the idea of God so far as it appeals to the religious nature of man can only be obtained with the aid of value-judgments. Judgments of value for Lotze are chiefly the deliverances of the moral consciousness. It is from these judgments, relating as they do, to moral needs, that he seeks justification for a satisfactory view of life. It is primarily in the ethical rather than in the merely rational that satisfaction is to be obtained. "I admit" says Lotze, "that the expression is not exact, but still I feel certain of being on the right track when I seek in that which *should be* the ground of that which *is*" [7] The ethical motive, in fact, underlies all his speculative effort; and he turns to the 'practical' reason to confirm his speculations. But the fundamental question is : How far does the metaphysical construction of the universe correspond with the ethical one?

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[7] *Metaphysic* Eng. Trs. 1887, vol. ii, p. 319.

Lotze's profession of faith is that Reality is fundamentally teleological and ethical. Though his general attitude can rightly be regarded as an argument from needs to their satisfaction, and though he tended to make feeling predominate, he recognises to the full the necessity of the speculative examination of religious beliefs, and his has been one of the most successful attempts to justify religious beliefs in relation to the complex nature of personality. Though the increased attention to the value-judgment may be traced back to Kant, it seems true that the Lotzian criticism of Hegel and of the Naturalism of the middle of the 19th century was its immediate starting-point. Lotze's attitude towards philosophical effort differs much from that of many later writers, often anti-intellectualist, who have professed to follow him.

The influence of Albrecht Ritschl upon theology has been and still is great. It may sound strange to students of his works, but it is nevertheless correct to say that he never seriously considered the epistemological problem, the difficulty of which he practically ignores. He states his dissent from Kant[8] and his acceptance of a Lotzian epistemology. Sometimes we do find suggestion of a knowledge of a 'thing' or 'being for self' as in Lotze. But Ritschl's exposition is not consistent, and both he and most of his followers are much nearer the Kantian Agnosticism than to Lotze[9]. Marked evidences of the Kantian dualism, and of the primacy of the 'practical' reason are found. The theoretical activities of the mind cannot attain a real knowledge of God. Man is able to deal intellectually only with matters of phenomenal experience and hence Ritschl is led to abjure metaphysics. Theoretical judgments have no place in the sphere of religion; religious beliefs cannot be justified by metaphysics if only because there is nothing religious in investigations of the kind. Nevertheless neither Ritschl nor his followers succeed in freeing themselves from metaphysical construction. The standard of valuation on which they rely has been elaborated by thought out of experience and is not given immediately in experience. In this and in other ways they are as a school inconsistent with their statements of the relationship between metaphysics and theology. Certain conceptions of a metaphysical and ethical nature are involved in their positive statements, but little is done to justify them: as e. g. God, with the character of Father; the immortality and the infinite worth of the individual soul.

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[8] Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*. Eng. Trs. p. 19 Criticism of Ritschl's Kantianism is not necessary here.

[9] Dr. A. E. Garvie appears to hold that R. is nearer Lotze: see Hibbert Journal, Vol III, 833 ff.

The opposition of Ritschlianism to mysticism and its rejection of the intellectual as a source of religious knowledge are the natural correlates of the emphasis on the moral will, with which, according to Ritschl, again following Kant, we come into touch with Reality. "To accept the idea of God in this way is, as Kant observes, practical faith and not theoretical cognition."[10] In other places he says "God and the world for religious thought are objects of the intuitive imagination "[11] and " that in religion the thought of God is given." Throughout, the purposive aspects of experience are recognised. The complex nature of religion in involving the whole nature of consciousness is admitted, though it is contended that feeling is the basal function of the mind, in as much as in it "the Ego is originally present to itself."

Religion gives a " solution of the condition in which man finds himself both as a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming dominion over nature."[12] The knowledge of God can be demonstrated as religious only when it is conceived as securing to the believer such a position in the world as more than balances its restrictions; and apart from this value-judgment of faith there exists no knowledge of God worthy of this content. It is the duty of theology he contends "to conserve the special characteristic of the conception of God, namely, that it can only be represented in value-judgments." The whole weight of justification of religious beliefs is thus thrown upon value-judgments and revelation. This emphasis upon the value-judgment is common to all the Ritschlians. One difference between theoretical and value-judgments is that the former are concerned with causes, the latter with purposes; the former relate each 'object' to its conditions in the world-whole, the latter relate it to the ends which man sets before himself.[13] A distinction between concomitant and independent judgments of worth is also made by Ritschl. The former are the aspects of feeling which accompany judgments even of a scientific kind. Independent judgments of worth are moral and religious, though, "the peculiar nature of religious value-judgments is less clear in the case of religions of an explicitly ethical character." Every cognition of a religious kind is a direct judgment of value. "Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments which relate to man's attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain in which man enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed to him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end".[14]

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[10] Ritschl, *ibid* p. 225. [11] p. 207.
[12] Ritschl, p. 199.

The chief modern efforts to justify beliefs by their satisfaction of needs have assumed this form of justification through value-judgments. Value depends very largely upon needs: what satisfies needs is in so far as it satisfies them, valuable. The question is whether value-judgments can be validly used for the establishment of beliefs apart from metaphysical enquiry. Beliefs cannot be justified merely by immediate experience apart from thought: immediate experience is simply immediate experience, and apart from the interpretation of thought that is all that can be said about it. The beliefs with which we are concerned are, on the contrary, of the nature of ultimate conceptual interpretations.

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[13] Dr. Garvie, "*The Ritschlian Theology*", *p*, 175,

[14] Ritschl,

Value cannot be known and value judgments cannot be made unless some value has been or is being actually experienced. Some relation to immediate experience, some objective reference, must be admitted in all value judgments. Though the subjective is present in the appreciation of value, so is the objective. The Ritschlians protest against a separation of value-judgments and existential implications. They mean to imply the existence of the "object" or "relationship" involved in the value judgment just as in theoretical judgments. But this is to go too far and is to omit the consideration of an important distinction. This distinction is that between a value-judgment upon a conceptual construction and a value-judgment upon an actual experience or an actual object within our knowledge. As a concept is a product of thought reflecting on experience, so value-judgments upon concepts arise from previous actual experience of value. Every concept has some basis in experience, but every concept does not necessarily imply the existence of a reality in accordance with it. Thought abstracts aspects from the objects of actual experience and constructs new conceptual wholes: some of our most important concepts are of this character. All fiction is but the placing together of aspects which have been otherwise experienced in actual life; it is a conceptual construction which has a basis in actual experience for the elements out of which the concepts are formed. We *live into* a well written novel, feeling as though the characters are real, and while under their spell we pass judgments of value on them and their actions. But though value-judgments are passed on these conceptual constructions there seems to be an underlying implication "if they were real." The power of thought and its importance in this question may be seen in any example of constructive imagination. The conception of a perfect being, having perfect knowledge, being perfectly good and loving, in short, the conception of a Personal God—might conceivably be developed by this activity of thought taking elements from experience. Such a construction is the subject of a value-judgment. But this value-judgment is found on analysis to be itself the result of thought construction : it is a synthesis of aspects of actual experiences of values, a synthesis which is then elaborated by thought. A value-judgment therefore, while it always has objective reference does not necessarily imply the objective reality of the "something" or "someone" corresponding to the conception upon which the value-judgment happens to be made.

Reference has been made, especially in the discussion of Kant's position, to the emphasis on "moral activity." Some conceptual constructions implying value may be realised in actuality by activity as *e.g.*, the plans of an architect. But some conceptions of "objects" or "conditions" which would be valuable "if real" cannot be produced by any kind of effort of ours. Religious "objects" are in part of this kind. The conclusion is thus reached that religious beliefs cannot be justified by value-judgments apart from metaphysical considerations.

A glance at Ritschl's chief use of the argument from value-judgments is instructive. He seems to imply that the values are "objectively given in history." "In Christianity," he says, "revelation through God's son is the *punctum stans* of all knowledge and religious conduct"[15]. "Whatever content may have been ascribed to this word 'blessedness' it expressly denotes a goal, the knowledge of which is unattainable by philosophy, and the realisation of which cannot be secured by the natural means at the command of men, but depends upon the positive character of Christianity".[16] "Man needs the idea of the oneness of God and of the consummation of the world in an end which for man is both knowable and realisable : but this is fulfilled in Christianity alone".[17] For Ritschl, therefore, the revelation, that is, the historic Christ is all important. The belief in Christ is justified by the impression he makes on the individual, by the satisfaction and moral response which arises from the apprehension of that personality.

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[15] *ibid*, p. 202. [16] p. 193. [17] p. 202.

Ritschl thus uses the value-judgment as a means to justify certain Christian doctrines. Christ calls forth the value-judgment which honours him as God. The Godhead of Christ must be understood as an attribute revealed to us in his saving influence upon ourselves. " The truth is that we know the nature of God and of Christ only in their worth for us ".[18] Consideration of this value-judgment upon Christ will show the necessity of some other grounds besides value-judgments in order to justify beliefs. A conceptual idealised Christ is possible, and such would call forth a value-judgment. But this would involve, though not necessarily explicitly, the implication "if it be true ". The value-judgment might predicate the highest value to a being corresponding to such a conception. And the conception of an ideal Christ might have had some basis in a historical figure, but factors and attributes may have been added so that the value-judgment having reference to the ideal Christ may be greater in implication than one having reference to the original historical figure. The conception of the ideal Christ as known today may be the result of a very gradual evolution: it may be the concept in which in the course, especially of Western history, ideals have come to be enshrined. The value-judgment gives us no ground for believing that the historical Jesus was identical with this conception. The judgment of value defines the "object" or "concept" as it affects the subject. Inference from the "good" to the actual is not valid: the "good" is not always known to be actual, and it may not be actual. Neither is inference from the actual to the "good" valid, for the actual sometimes at least appears not good. As the actuality of an existent is something different from its value, it is not possible to justify beliefs by value-judgments alone. Objective historical evidence is necessary to justify the ordinary Christian view of Christ.

On this question the followers of Ritschl are sufficiently alike to be regarded as a school of theology. The briefest reference to a few of the more important will suffice for our purpose. Harnack[19] says: "in the world of knowable objects" God has no place. Neither the meaning of life, nor the great reality by which our lives ought to be directed can be shown by knowledge. "It is by the will not by knowledge that we come into relation with God". Hermann is a pronounced Kantian, but follows Ritschl especially in his opposition to mysticism. Value-judgments constitute a form of knowledge superior to that of theoretical judgments: emphasis is to be placed on an *a priori* moral law and on the impression Christ makes on us. Kaftan, a later writer, seeking more positive relations between faith and knowledge, leans towards an empirical theory of cognition. He maintains that religious beliefs are theoretic; "The fact itself of the theoretic character of the propositions of faith lies clear before our eyes".[20] But these propositions are based upon value-judgments. This implies an inference from the value-judgment to an objective reality involved in the theoretical judgment which expresses the inference, and would appear to be an effort to give a more objective character to the implication of the value-judgment.

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[18] p. 212.

The evidence of Ritschlian influence in France both amongst the Modernist Catholics and the Liberal Protestants is largely due to the "Paris School of Protestant Theology", of which the foremost thinkers were Auguste Sabatier and Edouard Ménégoz. Their movement received the name of *Symbolo-Fidéisme*, which adequately represents its positive character. The uncertain epistemology of Ritschl gives way to a definitely stated Kantian agnosticism in Sabatier. For knowledge of the empirical order, for the use of reason in the Natural Sciences, he has the greatest admiration and respect. "Religion", he says, "will call forth and maintain within the heart of the scientist the sacred, that is to say, the absolute love of truth".[21] He quotes approvingly the words of Pascal; "The first of Christian truths is that truth must be loved before all else." But religious truth is different in nature from that of science: "the scientific knowledge of God, even if it were possible, would not be religious knowledge, for to know Him religiously is to know Him in relation to us".[22] Theoretical knowledge of God, is however not possible. From the conviction that speculative judgments are inadequate for religious purposes and from the necessity of obedience to and communion with God, both Sabatier and Ménégoz were led to deny the value of the speculative judgment altogether. Metaphysics is of no value in the consideration of religious beliefs: theological dogmas are not metaphysical or speculative. The religious consciousness and the natural reason deal with diverse orders of things. Science springs from sensation; religious doctrine springs from piety.

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[19] *What is Christianity?* Eng. trans. Crown Theological Library pp. 151, 163, 300, 301, etc.

[20] J. Orr: *Ritschlianism: Critical and Expository Essays.* p. 59.

The importance of ideas in the religious experience Sabatier was far from denying "Religious faith is a phenomenon of consciousness; God himself is its author and cause: but it has for psychological factors all the elements of consciousness:—feeling, volition, ideas".[23] "Piety is only conscious for us and discernible by others when incarnate in its expression or intellectual image. A religion without doctrine, a piety without thought, a feeling without expression, these are things essentially contradictory".[24] Both history and psychology taught him that doctrines are an essential element of the religious consciousness. The ideas or "dogmas" depend upon the subjective religious experience of the individual. At times he endeavours to avoid pure subjectivity by reference to the religious spirit of the community. Psychology and history take the place of metaphysics. They show that there is a constant change in the "dogmas" of religion. With his Kantian epistemology it is easy for Sabatier to pass to the view that dogmas are purely symbolic and in constant flux. "The object of religion" he says "is transcendent ; it is not a phenomenon. Now in order to express that object our imagination has nothing at its disposal but phenomenal images and our understanding logical categories which do not go beyond space and time. Religious knowledge is therefore obliged to express the invisible by the visible, the eternal by the temporal, spiritual realities by sensible images ; it can only speak in parables. The theory of religious knowledge requires for its completion a theory of symbols and symbolism".[25] "The intellectual form which is renewed with each successive century will not allow our granting to the traditional dogmatic formulas any but a relative and symbolic value'".[26] Thus "in dogmas there is nothing absolute ; dogmas are as all living things, in a state of constant flux and evolution" and "the intellectual will be the varying element in dogma." Sabatier will give to dogmas none but a passing worth ; as it has been appropriately said "his decisive dogma is the perpetual flux of dogma".

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[21] Sabatier, *Modern Culture.* Eng. trs. C. T. Library, p. 212.

[22] Sabatier, *Philosophy of Religion.* Eng. trans. A. Seed, p. 309.

[23] *ibid.* p. 240. [24] p. 336.

Subtly though it may be hidden, underlying Sabatier's exposition is the attempt to justify beliefs from their satisfaction of needs. It is the conflict of the theoretic reason and the practical reason which eternally engenders religion in the heart of man. The inner contradiction in consciousness is solved and the feeling of dependence is satisfied in entering upon the religious experience of communion with and prayer to God. The recognition of the contradiction in consciousness makes us rise to a "tertium quid". The immediate experience of piety gives a religious knowledge of God. Here Sabatier manifests a fundamental inconsistency. For, according to him it is in religious experience that God is known, and yet the acceptance of the belief in God is presupposed in rising to the religious experience. After an epistemological theory which disowns the validity of inference of thought to go beyond phenomena, the assumption of an immediate experience of God is not justifiable, unless by "God" is simply meant a name for the immediate experience itself, and does not imply any objective Being. This does not seem to be Sabatier's view, for he talks of prayer to and communion with God. His view presupposes the nature of God as Father and the sonship of man, as well as the personal relation thus implied. He will accept no conception of God but that of an Immanent Spirit who is omnipresent and ceaselessly active, in this he differs from Kant. He rules out materialism, deism, and other positions, but he makes no effort to give the objective justification for the adoption of the conceptions he requires.

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[25] p. 322. [26] *Modern Culture* p. 201.

Most of the criticism we urged against Kantianism is valid here. As applied to the theory of symbols the consequence of that criticism is to maintain that dogmas, if at all justified, contain something absolute in them. Only thus can Sabatier be consistent with his conviction of the validity of the theory of evolution: once admit something absolute in dogmas and the theory of their development is intelligible. At times he does seem to recognise something absolute and objective in them, but his Kantian relativism is too strong for this to have any marked effect on his general position. Much of what he says about the subjective power and value of symbols is undeniable, but even from the psychological point of view his theory is an inadequate substitute for the place of thought concerning religious beliefs, which are actually regarded by the believer as true. The importance of this objective reference which is ascribed to religious beliefs Sabatier does not appear to have grasped, nor did he attend sufficiently to the particular ideas involved in his own account of religion. From his position there is no way of comparing the symbol or belief evolved from our subjective need with a reality and of testing how far they are in accordance. "The key to Sabatier's theory" says Dr. Orr, "is to be found in the continuous struggle in his nature between heart and reason, between religious need and the claim of the intellect, of a scientific view of the world of which latter he finds continuous unbroken evolution the ruling idea".[27] Occasionally Sabatier sees that a higher unity is needed, and he states his belief—something like Kant and Lotze—that in a teleological view of the world, the ground for such a unity may be found. He says: "While developing themselves on parallel lines, can science and faith remain isolated? Man is one, and his scientific activity like his religious activity tends to synthesis. The synthesis will be found in a teleological consideration of the universe. This universal teleology, faith predicts, and science labours to realise. It can only be established by this twofold occurrence."[28]

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27 *op. cit.* 28. *Philosophy of Religion* p. 82.

SŪFĪISM*

I. Goldziher.

Under Indian influence Sufi concepts suffered many a modification. The pantheistic idea was carried to greater extremes than it assumed in Neo-platonism. The most prominent idea was that of the absorption of the personality, as it was ultimately reached in the conception of the *Atman,* though that conception was not attained to completely. The Sufis called the condition of absorption *fanā*[14](destruction) *maḥwa* (erasing), *estihlak* (annihilation) an almost indefinable aim, of the nature of which they asserted that no single definition suffices. It may become known as intuitive knowledge, and may evade all logical comprehension.

> "When the temporal is brought into intimate relationship with the eternal, the former no longer exists. Thou hearest and seest nothing but Allah when thou reachest the conviction that besides Allah nothing exists, when thou recognisest that thou thyself art He, that thou art identical with Him ; there is nothing in existence besides Him."

The cessation of the existence of the individual self is the condition of union with God.

> "Let me become non-existent, for non-existence proclaims to me in organ-like tones that 'to Him we return'".[15]

Individual being is completely lost in the universal being of the Godhead. Neither space nor time, nor even the modalities of existence limit its infinity: man raises himself to complete identity with the ground of all being, the comprehension of which lies beyond all intellectual recognition.

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* Continued from page 169 October issue.

[14] To distinguish this from physical death, "the great *fanā* (*al fana al-akbar*)" they call this state "the small *fana* (*al-fanā al-asghar*)". Concerning the relation of the conception of *fanā* to nirvana see the noteworthy remarks by Graf. E. Y. Mulinen in G. Jacob's *Turkische Bibliothek XI* 70.

[15] *Masnavi*, Edition, E. Whinfield, 159.

As in Buddhism one gradually attains to the highest degree of annihilation of individuality by a noble eightfold path, so Sufiism also has its *ṭariqa,* its way with many stages and degrees of perfection: those who are on this path are the way-farers (*as-sālikūna, ahl us-sulūk*). Even though the details of the paths differ they nevertheless agree in principle, as also in both an important place, as a preparatory step towards perfection, is ascribed in Sufiism to *murākaba* and in Buddhism to *dhyana i. e.,* meditation, "When the one who meditates and the object of meditation become completely one."

This is the goal of the Sūfī *taùḥīd,* the inner experience of unity. It is fundamentally different from the usual Islamic monotheistic faith in God. A Sūfī goes so far as to say that it is *shirk* to assert "I know God", for in this proposition the duality of the knowing subject and the object known is maintained. This also is Indian theosophy.[16]

In outer life Sūfīism was realised as an institution in the different Sūfī societies and orders, the members of which professed the Sufi view of the world and of religion. From about 150 A. H. (770 A.D.) these people lived more and more together in their own houses and monasteries, in which far from the bustle of the world they lived their inner life and in common performed the practices leading to their goal. In relation to the development of this monastic life also Indian influences cannot remain unnoticed; and the beggar life of the Sufis outside the monasteries presents to us a copy of that of the Indian beggar monks (saddhus). For the explanation of this practical manifestation of Sūfī-asceticism Neo-platonic influences alone do not suffice. The admission of the adept into the Sufi society is marked by the adoption of the *khirqa,* the cloak, which symbolises poverty and flight from the world. In their fashion the Sūfī legends trace the origin of the *khirqa* back to the Prophet himself; [17] nevertheless it is hardly mistakable that this symbol of admission is similar to the admission into the society of the *bhikshus* by "*the receiving of the garment and the rules*". Many of the forms of the religious practices of *Dhikr* in the Sufī societies, as also the means which they employ to bring about ecstasy and the loss of self (the practice of holding the breath) have been studied by Kremer with reference to their Indian prototypes proving the dependence on them.

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[16] 'Attar. *Tadkirat al-auliya* II 184, 8 cf. Oltramare. *L 'Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l' Inde.* I. 16. "To know Brahman intellectually is an absurd contention; for all knowledge involves a duality since in all knowledge there is the subject who knows and the object which is known."

One of these aids to devotion soon found acceptance beyond the limits of Sūfī circles—the rosary, the use of which in Islam since the ninth century may be proved to be undoubtedly derived from India, and indeed first in eastern Islam in the regions in which Indian influences were felt by the Sūfī societies. As everything novel this usage had for long to defend itself against those who opposed all intruders into religion. Even in the fifteenth century Al-Suyuti had to compose an apology for the use of the rosary which had been for long already an object of great favour.[17a]

Thus, in a historical appreciation of Sufīism there must always be brought into consideration, the Indian influence which contributed to the elaboration of this religious system which had grown up out of Neo-platonism. Snouk Hurgronje in his inaugural lecture [18] at Leyden has rightly put forward among his proofs for the Indian origin of East Indian Islam that in those lands Sūfī ideas are the very kernel and ground of the popular religious conceptions.

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[17] See *Muhammedische Studien* II 385 and Ibn Teymiyya *Rasā'il* II 282.

[17a] See. I. Goldzieher. *Le Rosaire dans Islam* in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1890. XXI 295 ff.

[18] See *Arabië en Oost Indië* (Leyden 1907) 16. and *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 1908, LVII, 71.

In our previous account of Sūfī philosophy we have brought forward the general views which express themselves in Sūfīism at the height of its development. They were reached along a line of historical evolution, which we have not endeavoured to describe here as we may shortly expect an account from the recognised authority on the history of Sūfīism, Reynold A. Nicholson[19]. Further than this Sūfīism presents no uniform, closed system either in its theories or in its practical manifestation. Even in the definition of the general aims there is no exact agreement, and in the details of thought there are manifold differences. Apart from the inner development the external and historical influences which were dominant in different spheres of the Sufī world led to many modifications and differences in the theoretical elaboration of the system.

This manysidedness is manifested even in the interpretations of the concept of Sūfīism. In a survey of the stages of development of Sūfīism[20] Nicholson has been able to collect seventy-eight different definitions of the concept of Sūfīism (*tasawwuf*) from the literary sources up to the fifth century A. H. Even then the table of definitions does not seem to be exhausted. A Scholar of Nishapur, Abu Mansur Abd al Khair al Bagdadi (d. A. H. 429 A.D. 1037) teaching in Bagdad, who occupies himself in his writings predominantly with the dogmatic branch of Islam has collected in alphabetical order from the writings of the authorities of Sūfīism a thousand definitions of the conceptions of Sūfī. *Tasawwuf*[21]. To this differentiation of the fundamental idea naturally correspond differences in details.

In the various Sūfī orders different theories diverging from one another have arisen according to the teachings of the founder whom the adherents regarded as their master. The ascetic practices and usages in which the Sūfī life expressed itself practically showed many formal differences: the organisations of the many Sūfī brotherhoods which are spread over the whole Muslim world depend upon rules diverging from one another in different directions.

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[19] Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, I 293, ff.

[20] JRAS, 1906, 303-348. *A historical enquiry concerning the Origin and Development of Sufiism.*

[21] Subkī. *Tabakāt* III 239 ult.

The relation to traditional Islam marks a fundamental difference. The first patriarchs of the Sūfī view of religion had indeed as they said, put "the works of the heart" before the formal fulfilment of the law of Islam, "the action of the body" without, however, declaring the latter to be worthless or superfluous. But they receive their value and meaning only if accompanied by the former. Not limbs but hearts should be recognised as the organs of religion. In this sense there were always adherents of Sūfīism following the nomistic tendency, demanding that one should remain in unison with formal traditional Islam, but that one should find the soul of the life of the law in the spiritualising of the formal acts. Along with these were others who, without denying the relative worth of the traditional externals saw in them parables and symbols. Still others declared themselves completely liberated from the mere forms of Islam. The chains of the law did not bind those who knew. In fact, not merely isolated adepts but whole orders of dervishes (one need only think of the Baghtashi order) proclaimed themselves without scruples with regard to the traditional code of Islam.[22] There were not lacking men who took up this attitude of freedom not only to the ritual laws but who also conceived of all laws of conventional morality and social custom as not binding on the Sūfī, feeling themselves to be "beyond good and evil". In this they had their prototypes in the Indian yogis and the Christian gnostics, as they have also a parallel in western mysticism, as for example, the followers of Amalrich with their libertine principles of life, which just as the Muslim Sufis they derived from a pantheistic conception of the world. As in the eyes of these Sūfīs the world of appearance possessed no reality, they met all attributes of this untrue appearance with direct denial. The demands of this unreal life were quite indifferent to them.

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[22] Jacob, *Türkische Bibliothek* IX, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Ordens der Bektaschis.* And recently *Die Bektashiyya in ihrem Verhältnis zu Verwandten Erscheinungen* Munchen, 1909.

With reference to their relation to the law the Sufīs have been divided into two groups, the *nomistic* (adhering to the law) and the *anomistic* (without law). This dualism may remind us of a contrast which is recorded for us by Clement[23] of Alexandria as existing among the gnostic hermits of antiquity. In their attitudes to the law they expressed two different views: one taught a life indifferent to or free from the law ἀδιαφόρως ςῆν; the others exaggerated continency and advocated a wandering life of renunciation ἐγκράτειαν καταγγέλουσι. A similar account is valid of the differences of the Sūfī systems.

Some who share in the mode of life of the Sufīs are called dervishes. But the earnest adepts of the love of God and of ecstatic enthusiasm, who in a life of renunciation and of meditation strive for the perfection of their souls, must be distinguished from the wandering dervishes who in a free undisciplined beggar-life use the profession of Sūfīism as a cloak for their idleness and as a means of imposing upon the masses, or those indolent brethren of the monasteries who misuse the outer forms of the Sūfī life in order to obtain an existence without anxiety and free from care. From these also we hear talk of the love of God, and they declare that they "tread the path." But earnest Sufīs can hardly be identified with them.

> "The dervish who dispenses the mysteries of the world gives each moment an entire kingdom without remuneration. He is not a dervish who begs for bread, but he who gives up his soul."[24]

The true dervish is not the wandering beggar and parasite. Nevertheless even this life of vagrancy reveals many a fragment of ethical world-conception which may interest us in relation with the history of religion. From this point of view we wish to mention only one type of these free dervishes.

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[23] *Stromata* III 5.

[24] Jalal al-din Rumi.

These are the so-called *malāmatiyya*[25], literally "people of blame" a designation which indeed is claimed not only by wandering dervishes but is also employed in the description of earnest domiciled Sūfīs on account of the peculiarity of their way of life. The attitude of these people, who have been compared with the Cynics is that of indifference carried to an extreme towards external appearances. They place value on arousing anger through their conduct and on drawing on themselves the disapproval of men. They give themselves up to the most shameless acts only in order to put into practice their principle of "spenere sperni": they wish to be considered as going beyond the law even when this is not in reality the case. They desire to call forth the contempt of men only to show themselves entirely indifferent towards their judgment. In this they exaggerate a general Sufī rule which Jalal al-din Rumi expresses in the following saying:

> " Leave thy sect and be the object of contempt.
> Cast from thee name and fame and seek disfavour."[26]

These dervishes are to be found over the whole extent of Islam; Al-Kettānī who wrote a monograph concerning the saints of Fez emphasises this character in many of his heroes. The best type of *malāmat* Dervishes has been represented in central Asiatic Islam in the legend of the *Sheikh Mashrab* " of the wise fool and the pious heretic. "[27] In these people there is something characteristic which, as Reitzenstein [28] has recently proved, is to be traced back to the Cynicism of the old monasticism for which "shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) is a requirement of religion."

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[25] Compare an example by Sprenger. *Mohamad* III. CLXXIX Anm. (Shibli) The *Malamati* should not be confused with the brotherhood of *Malami* widely spread through Turkey, concerning whom Martin Hartmann has recently given important information. *Der islamisehc Orient* III. (Index s. v.)

[26] *Masnavi* (Whinfield) 91,

[27] Hartmann *Der islamische Orient* I 156 ff.

[28] *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen* 65 ff,

Sūfīism very soon put forth deep roots in the theological literature of Islam and it also attracted wide circles of the confessors of Islam by its popular expressions. In its quiet working it proved to be a mighty movement producing a lasting influence on the conception and the direction of religion in Islam. Sūfīism has become a factor which has played a great rôle in the distinctive formation of the religious attitudes and ideas of Islam.

Let us however consider first its position with reference to the ruling tendencies within Islam fighting against it for their unmodified form.

In relation to the ritual and dogma of traditional Islam as the orthodox theologians and Mutakallimun had developed it, it appeared first as an important spiritual liberation, as a widening of the narrowed religious outlook. In place of punctilious, blind obedience came self-education through asceticism; in place of hairsplitting scholastic syllogisms came mystical absorption in the essence of the soul and its liberation from the bonds of materiality. The love of God as the motive for asceticism, the overcoming of self, and knowledge, came into the foreground. The worship of God was conceived as a cult of the heart and, with a clear consciousness of the contrast, was placed over against the cult of the limbs. In similar manner the book knowledge of the theologians was set in contrast with the knowledge of the heart and speculation was contrasted with intuition. The law (*sharīá*) according to the "way" of the Sūfī is a pedagogic step, it leads towards the higher path (*tarīqa*), the troubles of which are rewarded with the attainment of truth and the goal of which, with the acquisition of knowledge (*ma'rifa*), has not yet been once completely reached. For now the wanderer is only ready to strive towards certainty (*'ilm al yaqīn*). Only by the concentration of inner intuition on the one real existence can he rise to the immediate inner experience of real certainty (*ăin al-yaqīn*). At this stage the dependence of the adept on tradition and instruction entirely ceases. For the knowledge of the preceding steps man was guided by the prophets: divine knowledge of the highest stage of perfection streams without any mediation into the soul of the seeker. And even beyond this there is a stage still higher, the highest of all, (*haqq al yaqīn*), the truth of certainty which no longer lies along the path of Sūfī self-education.

Ultimately this development leads to the knowledge of the indifference of confessions of sectarian faith as compared with the sacred truth which is to be striven for.

> "I am neither Christian, nor Jew, nor Muslim".[29]

The variety of churches, formulas of belief, and religious practices loses all significance in the soul of one who seeks union with the Godhead; to him all is a veil which hides reality, which comprehending he tears off when he has pressed forward to the one true reality. However much they may have taken care to estimate orthodox Islam highly the tendency to eradicate the dividing limitations of creeds is common. All the creeds have the same relative worth in relation to the goal to be reached, and the same uselessness if they do not lead to the love of God. That alone can be the standard by which to evaluate religions. It is loudly proclaimed that in the knowledge of the unity of God a unifying element is given to men, while formal laws produce division.[30]

Jalal al-din Rumi, puts forward the following as though in a revelation of God to Moses,

> "Those who prefer rites are one class, and those whose hearts and souls glow with love are another" [31].

And Muhji al-din ibn 'Arabi says

> "There was a time when I blamed my fellowman if his religion was not like mine; but now my heart assumes every form: it is a meadow for gazelles, a monastery for monks, a temple for images and a Ka'ba for the pilgrim, the tables for the Thora and the holy book of the Quran. Love alone is my religion, and wherever its steeds take me, that is my religion and my faith".

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[29] Shamsi Tebrīz 124.

[30] Attar *Tadkirat al-auliyā* II 159,12. Ibn Teymiyya l.c. I 148. mentions Sūfīs who bore a genuine hatred towards the prophets, especially Muhammed, because he "brought division (*fark*) between men and punished him who did not confess himself in agreement."

[31] *Masnavi* (Whinfield) 83.

And Jalal al-din Rumi again:

> "If the figure of our beloved is in the temple of the idols it is an absolute error to circulate round the Ka'ba, and if the Ka'ba lacks its good repute, it is a synagogue. And if in the synagogue we feel the good feeling of unity with him, it is our Ka'ba."

As we see, Islam is not excluded from this indifference to sectarian confessions of faith. To Tilimsani, a pupil of Ibn Arabi the bold saying is ascribed: "The Quran is nothing but *shirk*. The confession of unity is only in our discourse (i. e. the Sufī position)."[32]

With these declarations of indifference towards the creeds as compared with the one goal to which religion should lead comes the tendency to the highest tolerance ("the ways to God are as many as the number of human souls")[33] and also an expression of the disturbing and hindering character of creeds. They are not the sources of truth: truth cannot be established by the conflict of creeds.

> "Never give your reflection to the seventy two sects, for they do not reveal the truth, rather they depend on foolish tales." (*Hāfiz.*)

The conviction which is expressed by the mystic Abu Sa'id abu-l-Khair the friend of the philosopher Avicenna, does not stand alone: "So long as Mosque and Madressah are not entirely destroyed the work of the Qatender (Derwishes) will not be achieved; so long as belief and disbelief are not mere matters of indifference not a single man will become a true Muslim".

In such ideas the Sufīs find themselves in agreement with Muslim free-lances, who came to the same results along other lines.

More than by the law regarded as an end in itself, which indeed could possess some worth as a means of ascetic discipline the genuine Sūfī was alienated by the dogmatism of the *kalam*: the demand for a knowledge of God based on speculation. His knowledge is not scholarship: it is not obtained from books or acquired by study. Jalal al din Rumi supports his position with the words of Mahomet: *Sura 102.*

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[32] See. Ibn Teymiyya. l. c. I 145.

[33] E. G. Browne. *A Literary History of Persia* II 268.

> "See in your heart the knowledge of the Prophet
> Without book, without doctrine, without instructor."[34]

They stood opposed to the usual theological book-learning. They felt themselves alien to the Ulama and the scholars of the Hadith; these, they said, merely confuse our age. What value for the knowledge of truth have the proofs so definitely demanded by the dogmatic theologians, on the knowledge of which so many of them even make faith depend?

> "There is no reliance on the faith of him who believes on the ground of proofs, says Ibn Arabi, for his faith is based on speculation and on this account is open to objections. Intuitive faith which is set in the heart and is impossible to refute is quite different. All knowledge resting on reflection and speculation is insecure against doubt and confusion."
>
> "In the community of those who love, another procedure holds sway; and the wine of love gives another intoxication. The knowledge which is acquired in the Madressa is one thing: love is another."[35]

The *tariqa* does not lead through "the dizzy mountain paths of dialectic", through the narrow portals of syllogisms, and the *yaqīn* is not to be reached by means of the subtle trains of argument of the Mutakallimun. Knowledge is brought from the depth of the heart and the way to it is by the self-contemplation of the soul. "The Sufis" says Qushairi "are men seeking union with God, *al-wisal* not men striving for proofs (*al-istidlal*) as are the ordinary theologians."[36] Even at an earlier time a mystic had arisen to the expression: "When truth is revealed, the reason (*ăkl*) withdraws. Reason is the instrument for the establishment of the relation of dependence of man on God (*ŭbūdiyya*) but not the instrument for the comprehension of the true nature of God's supremacy (*rubūbiyya*)."[37]

This is just the rejection of the doctrine of knowledge of those who followed the *Kalam* with its apotheosis of reason. How alien must the conflicts concerning the measure of the freedom of the will have been to those to whom, living in the infinite, the individual act of the will seemed a mere drop in the ocean of the world, a tiny ray from the brilliance of the absolute will of God. The man who in a spirit of renunciation has given up all initiative cannot indeed rightly listen to talk of the will and of self-determination. And how idle must the contention concerning the positive attributes of being have appeared, that if at all, they can only be grasped through negations! Thus at times we meet great mystics in theological environments who–from other points of view, of course–resolutely reject the *Kalam*: Abd al Qadir Gīlani and Abu Ismāīl-al-Herewī (Author of a treatise on Sufīism died A.H. 481. A.D. 1088) among the Han-balites, Ruwaim and Ibn Arabi among the Zāhirites related to these.

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[34] *Masnavi* (Whinfield). 53.

[35] Jalal al-din Rumi.

[36] *Risāla fi 'ilm al-tasawwuf* (to the end)

[37] Attar *Tadkirat al-auliyā* II 274.

The ideals of life also were presented to the Muslim in other ways than were approved by the dominant tendency, and in this manner the Sūfīs exerted influence on the people with whom they came into contact. They turned from the powerful figures of the fighters for the faith (the old martyrs are all to be found amongst the fighters) to the calm forms of the wanderer, the penitent and the monk. Even the ideal figures of earlier times had to assume the attributes of the new heroes; the sand was shaken from them, and they were clothed in the garb of the Sufī.

As one will naturally expect, the theological authorities were not favourably disposed towards the Sufīs. Very numerous are the ironical remarks which their followers make about the rough wool clothing (*Sūf.*) to the use of which the Sufīs owe their name. The philologist Al-Asma'i (died 216A.H. 831A.D.) tells of a contemporary theologian in whose presence someone spoke of the people who went about in the garments of penance: "I did not know before", observed the theologian, "that filth belongs to religion". From the nature of things it is quite intelligible that they should receive hard blows from the side of the champions of the traditional theology, on account of their teachings and perhaps also their religious attitude, their indifference to the positive law, which frequently went further to the rejection of all observation of it. They gave sufficient occasion to be considered by the scholastics as *Zindiqs*, a name which is a broad designation by which they grouped together all kinds of free thinkers who did not follow the well trodden path of tradition. These Sufīs conversed in a language which must have sounded quite alien to the ordinary theologians. They accused Abu Sa'id Charraz of unbelief on account of the following sentence which could be read in one of his books:

> "The Man who turns back to God, establishes himself in him (depends on him), who dwells near God, forgets himself and all except God; if thou askest him whence he comes and whither he would go he can answer nothing other than God."[38]

If such a sentence appeared open to suspicion, how the discourses concerning *fanā* and *baqā*, concerning the annihilation of the self and union with the Godhead, concerning God-intoxication, the worthlessness of the law, and other things brought frowns to the brows of the theologians; and how the practices of the Sufīs, which even in the earliest period included the mystic dance. When at the end of the IXth century the orthodox were ruling in Baghdad many a famous Sufī was subjected to painful inquisition. Characteristic of the spirit of the time is the saying of one of the most famous Sufīs of the old school: Al-Junaid (died A.H. 297, A.D. 909).

> "No one has attained the stage of truth so long as thousands of friends do not declare him to be a heretic."[39]

And if at that time one or other Sufī drew the consequences of union with the divine too definitely he might make the acquaintance of the executioner, as al-Hallāj and Shalmaghānī.

When we investigate the relation of Sufīism to official Islam there are two phenomena which especially attract our attention. Both signify a compromise between the oppositions which here present themselves, one from the side of the Sufīs, the other from the side of the orthodox. The former shows us that on the side of the Sufīs the need was felt to smooth over the opposition to Muslim law, even if only externally not to let Sufīism appear as an entire negation of Islam. The exaggerated anti-nomistic tendency which appeared among the Sufīs aroused deep misgiving in many less radical Sufī circles. Earnest advocates of this position complained of the low estimation and the actual rejection of Muslim law and declared these conditions to be the downfall of Sufīism. The *tarīqa* and *haqiqa* presuppose the law (*sharī'a*). Without this the Sufī "path" is meaningless; it is the gate which leads to the end of all. "Enter your houses then by their doors" (Sura 2 v 185.)

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[38] 'Attar II 40, 19.

[39] 'Attar II 48, 74.

The most important document which we possess of this reaction within Sufīism is a "letter" (*risala*) which the great Sufī *sheikh* Abd al-Karim b. Hawazin al-Qushairi sent to the Sufī societies in all lands. One must not think here of a pastoral letter: this "letter" is a voluminous book which in its Cairo edition takes up not less than 244 closely printed pages. It contains a description of the character of the most famous Sufī authorities, a selection of their sayings, as well as a compendium of the most important doctrines of Sufīism. Throughout the work runs the tendency to present and to prove a harmony between law and Sufīism, that the real authorities of this doctrine forbad contradiction with valid Islam, and that accordingly the true Sufī must be a true Muslim in the traditional sense. The necessity for such a work makes quite clear for the first time the glaring opposition which had developed between the two tendencies in the XIth century.

"Know"—so Qushairi addresses his *confrères*—"that those who knew the truth in our community are for the most part gone; only a trace of them remains amongst us. In our walk paralysis has set in; one might even say that the "path" has completely disappeared, for we have no *sheikhs* who serve us as a pattern and no rising generation which might let itself be guided by such patterns. Renunciation is no more; its carpet is rolled up: and instead worldly lusts have gained the upper hand. Hearts have forsaken respect for religious ordinances; rather they consider the low estimation of religious precepts as the strongest bond of union. They abandon the distinction between things allowed and things forbidden. . . . . They set little value on the performance of religious duties, of fasting and prayer; they speed along the course of neglect. . . . Not satisfied with that, they refer to the highest truths and states and claim to have attained freedom from the chains and bonds (of the law) through the truths of union (with God). To them the truths of the unity of being are revealed; therefore the laws of the body are not binding on them."

In order to remedy these conditions Qushairi wrote his book which produced a great effect in the Sufī world and helped to establish again the almost completely broken bridges between orthodoxy and Sufīism.

The next phenomenon which we have to mention is one of the most epoch-making facts in the history of Muslim science of religion. It made its appearance not long after Qushairi's and presented the converse of his effort. While he championed a reaction of ordinances against the nihilism of the mystics, we have now to speak of the permeation of orthodox Islam by mystical conceptions. It is associated with the name of one of the greatest teachers of Islam, that of Abu Hamid Muhammed al-Ghazali (died A.H.505 A.D.1111) the Abuhamet or Algazel of the mediaeval Scholastics. This man occupied himself profoundly with the nature of the religion of Islam as it had developed up to his time. The Muslim conception of religion was overgrown by the juristic casuistry of the legal and scholastic hair-splitting of its dogmatic study. Al Ghazali was himself a famous teacher and writer in both directions; indeed he was one of the ornaments of the recently founded Nizam's university in Baghdad. His works on law belong to the master-pieces of the Shafiite school. In the year A.D.1095 he overcame the crisis of his inner life by renouncing all scientific achievement and all personal honour which his brilliant academic position brought him, and withdrawing to a life of meditation and lonely contemplation in different cells of the mosques of Damascus and Jerusalem cast his critical glance over the dominant tendencies of the religious spirit, from which by his flight from the world he had just set himself externally free. The results of his liberation from the tendencies in which he recognised dangers for religion, both in research and in life, were systematic works in which in contrast to the broad well-trodden road of the self-satisfied theologians he formulated the methods which he desiderated for the building up of the science of Islam; and smaller pamphlets in which in an impressive manner he treated of particular points of religious thought.

In particular he saw these dangers embodied in two sides of theological activity, (according to his conviction the arch-fiend of the inner religious life): the subtleties of the dogmatic dialectic and the hairsplitting of religious casuistry which flooded the science of religion and destroyed public religious life. Though he had himself wandered in the paths of philosophy and could never quite free himself from the effect on his theological position, he declared merciless war against the peripatetic philosophy of Avicenna in a work famous in the philosophical literature of the Middle Ages "*Destructio philosophorum*" and placed his finger on its weaknesses and inconsistencies. Similarly he refers to the hair-splitting of the dogmatic *Kalam* as an idle waste of mental energy, in no way advantageous to the purity and immediacy of religious thought and feeling but rather harmful and a hindrance, especially when, according to the requirement of the Mutakallimum it was taken beyond the boundaries of their school walls into the heads of ordinary people in whom it could only produce confusion.

He attacked the lawyers and their legal casuistry still more forcibly. Here also he could call upon his own experience. He had fled to the solitude of a hermit's cell from the fame-bringing position of a professor of law in the most brilliant university of Islam and he had himself attained fame and respect in the literature of the discipline against which he now drew the sword. He allows that these researches have an interest in secular life, but he protests most strongly against confusing legal casuistry with the concerns of religion. There is nothing more secular, nothing which is more closely bound to the demands of worldliness than this activity of study, loudly applauded by its high-minded advocates as in the highest degree sacred. True happiness is not advanced by researches into the canon of civil law, into business affairs and questions of legacy, and all the hair-splitting which for centuries has been associated with these. Such reflections, in the religious reverence in which they have been clothed, show themselves rather as means of moral corruption of those who see in them the most important elements of the knowledge of God; they serve to increase their hollow pride and worldly ambition. It is especially the puerile researches and disputes concerning the ritual differences of the *madhib*, which he condemns in sharp words as an idle occupation harmful to the religious spirit.

> "In place of the dialectic and casuistic treatment of religion of the dogmatic theologians and the ritualists, Ghazali demanded the care of religions as an inner experience of the self. In the training of the intuitive life of the soul, the consciousness of human dependence, he finds the centre of religious life."

In this the love of God should be the leading motive. As in general he undertook the analysis of ethical feelings with the facility of a great master, so in his system he has given a profound treatment of the motive and the goal of religion and pointed out the way by which one must strive towards it.

By these doctrines Ghazali brought Sufiism from its position of isolation in relation to the ruling conception of religion and established it as a normal element in the religious life of Islam. He wished to spiritualise the petrified formalism of the ruling theology by means of conceptions which are associated with the mysticism of Sūfīism. That is why his activity is considered here. Ghazali had himself gone amongst the Sufīs and he adopted the Sufī mode of life. What separated him from them was the rejection of their pantheistic aims and of their low estimation of religious ordinances. He did not abandon the ground of orthodox Islam: only he wished to ennoble and elevate the spirit in which its teaching and law were operative in Muslim life, to bring them nearer the ideal which he set the religious life: "The heart not the body is that by which one strives to approach Allah: by heart I do not mean the piece of flesh which one may grasp with the senses but something divinely intimate which cannot be grasped by the senses".[40] In this spirit he treated the practice of the law in the great systematic work to which he gave the proud title "The Renewing of the Sciences of Religion" (*Ihyā 'Ulūm al-dīn*) in the conviction that it signified a reform, called to infuse new life into the withered limbs of Muslim theology.

After the manner of many reformers he has not the consciousness of establishing something new ; rather he is one who re-establishes the original teaching, falsified by later corruption. His glance turns longingly to the simple faith of early Islam. He supports his protest, as a rule, with examples from the time of the "companions." By this he felt that his teaching was in harmony with the "Sunna." In the religious atmosphere of the "companions" religion was nourished not with scholastic wisdom and juristic reflections. He wished to free the people from the accretions which stifled the religious spirit and to put forward the moral influence of the law recognised in its ideals.

Instead of the quiet powerless opposition which religiously minded Sufīs in union with submissive scholastics who had wandered from the broad path of orthodoxy, had raised against rigid formalism and dogmatism one now had from the mouth of Ghazali the loud protest of a respected teacher of orthodoxy against the corruption which Islam had suffered through occupation with the authorities of *Kalam* and *Fikh.*

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[40] *Ihyā 'ulūm al-dīn, I* 54, 17.

The respect which Ghazali enjoyed as orthodox teacher in all circles of Muslim believers greatly helped in the success of his efforts. Only in isolated cases from sides where persons were threatened with a loss of prestige in religious affairs was opposition raised against the action of the everywhere highly honoured teacher. The *Ihyā* saw in Spain the fires to which a group of *Fukaha* sent it, since their depreciation could not suppress it. This was only a transitory and in the long run unenduring opposition, which even in Spain itself was not everywhere approved. Such desperate attempts at self-defence could not prevent the *Ijmā* of Muslim orthodoxy shortly afterwards plainly adopting the teaching of Ghazali. His person was surrounded with the halo of sanctity; the recognition of later generations bestowed on him the title of a "Regenerator of Religion" (*muhyī al-dīn*), of a renewer (*mujaddid*) whom Allah had sent in view of the degeneration of Islam at the transition from the fifth to the sixth century to ensure its continuance. The *Renewing &c.* was regarded as the most excellent book on religion in Islam, containing real religious knowledge and was reverenced "almost as a Quran". Orthodox Islam held Ghazali to be the final authority. His name is a symbol of triumph in the conflicts against the tendencies inimical to the *Ijmā*. His work is one of the most significant milestones in the history of the development of Islam.

If with Muslims we may look upon Ghazali as the regenerator of Islam, along with the general conception of religion which he advocated and by means of which he made the points of view of Sufiism factors in religious life, we wish here to make especial mention of his service to a particular side of religious thought.

In many wise teachings of the greatest authorities of early Islam opposition to the hunting for heresy was shown with indubitable definiteness. They unwearyingly maintain that one should beware of brandmarking, on account of slight differences of opinion, anyone as an infidel (*kafir*) who belonged to the *ahl as-salāt* (those who take part in Islamic worship) or to the *ahl al-qibla* (those who turn in prayer towards the qibla, that is, confess themselves members of the community. Concerning this we possess very instructive information from Mukaddasi (circa 985 A.) a writer on geography, who in his study of the Muslim world was particularly interested in facts of religion.

The dogmatic theology of Islam cannot be conceived on a parallel with the corresponding factor in the religion of any of the Christian Churches. There were no Councils and Synods, which, after lively preliminary conflict, established formulas which from that time were regarded as of the essence of right belief. There is no Church official who expounds the standard of orthodoxy; there is no exclusively authorized exegesis of the sacred text on which the content and the manner of the teaching of the Church should be based. Concensus, the highest authority in all questions of religious theory and practice, is a flexible thing, hardly to be conceived in a definite manner, and, in addition, its concept is also defined in different ways. Especially is it difficult in dogmatic questions to establish unanimously what is to hold indisputably as Concensus. What by one party is accepted as Concensus is held by the others as by far not established in this position.

If we were to ask the different authorities who, even within orthodox Islam, are everywhere honoured as amongst the standard teachers of the religion of Mahommed—if they are not petrified impatient partisans—what makes a man an unbelieving heretic and what we are to understand by a heretic we should receive the most contradictory answers. And even these answers are given with the consciousness of their merely theoretical validity. For it would be indeed truly barbarous to be controlled in life and in death by these definitions. "A true infidel counts as excommunicated;

one may have no social relationship with him; one may not eat with him; marriage with him is invalid; he must be avoided and despised; one may not pray with him when he steps forward as the leader of prayer; the judge will not recognise his evidence; he cannot be accepted as a guardian; when he dies the prayer for the dead cannot be uttered over his body." This is indeed very strongly put. But in practice only very few, such as a dwindling minority of fanatical Hanbalites, thought of actually carrying out such an idea......yet sufiism alone seemed to breathe a tolerant spirit, which went even so far as to reject sectarianism entirely. Ghazali did not go so far as this......Nevertheless he devoted a special treatise to the idea of tolerance: "*The Criterion of the Difference between Islam and Heresy*"......"Thou mayest hold thy tongue with reference to people who turn towards the qibla". That he recalled this old teaching to the remembrance of his religious brethren, that he took it seriously and obtained adherents for it, is his greatest service in the history of Islam.

In this he did not preach anything new, but taught a return to the better spirit of earlier times. From self-satisfied scholasticism and from the ideas of the theologians which caused divisions he turned, and strove to attract the souls of his fellow Muslims to spiritual faith which unifies, to worship the altars which are in the hearts of men. This was the greatest influence of Sufiism on the religion of Islam

CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NOTION OF TRUTH IN THE RIG-VEDA

P. V. Kulkarni

The most fundamental problem with reference to any philosophy or religion is without doubt that concerning the nature of truth and how it is attained. The adherents of most religions have one or more books which they accept as containing some truth. It is an interesting question therefore, as well as one of great importance, to ask how the nature of truth is represented in these books. In the present paper we intend to discuss this subject as it appears in the Rig-Veda.

i.

At the outset it may be insisted, though it is hardly necessary, that the contents of the Rig-Veda being mainly hymns, we cannot expect to find any systematic discussion of the character and source of religious truth, such as is present in later writings as e. g. the Upanishads. Nevertheless, as the following discussion will show, there are certain attitudes implied, and these we wish to make clear. These may be compared with the later philosophical discussions which profess to be based on the Vedas.

The nearest equivalents to the term truth to be found in the Rig-Veda are rita and satya.

The term rita is the past participle of the verb *ri* - to go, and thus means gone. Used here as a substantive it implies that whose nature it is " to go". The Vedic people saw that the sun, moon, and stars, made their appearance regularly, just as the seasons of the year, and the term gradually assumed the meaning of " going again and again", and so also "regularity". It is probable that thus rita eventually came to signify the law and order in the universe. We shall see that in the Rig-Veda rita is used in three senses: i. the cosmic principle regulating all ; ii. the moral principle residing in the heart of every creature ; iii. the sacrifice as the visible embodiment of what is right.

It is interesting to note some parallels in other early thought. The Chinese term "Tao" (the way) as used by Lao Tzụ suggests an essential principle underlying nature expressing itself in unfailing regularity. This in an ethical connection gives the precept "Follow nature". (See Lional Giles. *Taoist Teachings* 1912.) In Aristotle's doctrine of the *mean* there is an implication of an order corresponding with the eternal fitness of things. In Stoicism a similar conception is represented. There is an immanent principle of order or reason in the universe, and the moral ideal is conformity with this, "living in accord with nature", cooperating for the good of the whole. It is pointed out by Mr. P. E. Matheson (See Introduction p. 24 of his edition of *The Discourses and Manual.* Oxford, 1916) that the Stoic *Epictetus* assumes sacrifice, and worship as part of daily life but raises them to a higher plane by constant identification of god with reason.

Satyam is formed from *sat* the present participle of the verb *as* " to be", by adding the termination *ya,* and means "being". The added termination ya has the sense of "good", as in the word gavyam, "good for a cow". Literally, therefore, satyam means "good for being or existence". That which is satya thus possesses some fundamental reality in it. Truth is shown by this term to be intimately and inseparably bound up with the ultimately real. In one of the later hymns* rita and satyam are declared to originate in the same function of the Primeval Being. Sayana practically identifies rita and satyam in this passage, interpreting the former as mental truth consisting of true determination and the latter as truth consisting in speaking what is real.

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*The numbers refer to the sanskrit sources pages.

The question is asked "Which is truth, and which is untruth, and what is the support of truth?"[2] and the answer given is simple: "The first born is the first born perception of truth". Truth in the universe reflects itself in the heart: it is not here a question of intellectual subtleties and speculation, but of intuition. Obscurities found in the Rig-Veda, cited as examples of their speculative habits, are only exceptions which prove the general rule. So the poet says "When to me there came the first born of the Highest Truth, then only I could acquire a portion of the divine speech".[3] Only when he obtained insight by intuition and inspiration was he able to grasp the mystery of divine knowledge. Other than this there is little teaching concerning the *way* in which the human mind *attains* truth.

ii

Rita, it has been remarked above, is used in the sense of a cosmic principle of order. The various deities of the Rig-Veda are unable to proceed with their work unless assisted by this rita. Agni, or fire, creates heaven and earth by means of the eternal law.[4] Sayana says that rita here means water, but such interpretation is obviously impossible. The brightest luminaries in heaven are also fixed in their places by rita.[5] It is only because of rita that the sun remains stable. Indra created the stars, and the plants, and streams, by established law.[6] The Host of the Gods, the Vishudevas raised the sun to heaven and spread the mother earth by ever-lasting law.[7]

The dawn is hailed with delight by the Vedic poets. She awakens the people from their sleep and prompts them to perform the sacrifices and brings the sun back to earth. She is said to be "born of laws and law's protectress."[8] Experiencing the regularity of the dawn they comprised this under the broad term rita. "With horses harnessed by eternal order, the dawn travels round the world."[9] Dawn manifests herself by rita.[10] Sayana takes rita here in the sense of "light", but this is certainly against general Vedic usage. The meaning is that dawn comes according to the requirement of rita and not according to a capriciousness of its own. The idea is more clearly expressed in I. 123-13. "Dawn is obedient to the reign of law eternal."[11]

Soma also is "born in law, hath waxed mighty by the law : king, god, and lofty ordinance."

A poetical but significant passage is that of v. 62-1. "Oh Mitra and Varuna by your high law firm order is established there where they loose for travel *surya's* horses".[12] Sayana takes the second rita in the sense of the "orb of the sun." The punctuality, as it were, of the chariot and steeds (of the sun) in their journey across the sky is mainly because of rita. "Indra moves with steeds yoked by eternal order. By law Indra lighteth up the host of mornings."[13] The celestial path by which the luminaries in heaven travel is called the path of rita or order. The sun and the dawn are said to follow the path of law.

Thus everything in this universe is born of truth or law and is bound to obey it. The various deities are said to be the law's protectors, law's promoters, and so on. "Heaven and earth are strengtheners of law".[14] Agni is ritapa, the protector of rita. The term ritava, observer of order, is most frequently applied to Agni, but sometimes also to Mitra and Varuna.

iii

Though the different meanings of rita are only with difficulty separated it has a fairly definite moral significance in various relations. The Vedic gods are eminently moral and require others to lead a moral life. Varuna is the most notable figure in this moral pantheon. He is the supreme moral governor watching over the actions of men. He is usually associated with Mitra "They are true to law, born in law and strengtheners of law and haters of falsehood."[15] Varuna has his spies who wander round the world to find out the sinners. Even what passes in our heart, is known to him. They are ritavridha, that is, they increase the action of truth in man. They are satya, true to their own being, do not put on false appearances. "They carefully tend law with law"[16] that is, they require the help of law to promote law. Sayana gives a fanciful meaning: he says; "They obtained sacrifice through water." At the most one might say that they carefully tend the law through sacrifice. But we find many similar expressions where it is much more appropriate to interpret as we have done. The law can only be furthered by what is true and right. "They are true to law and are debt exactors"[17] that is, they are the punishers of sinners. It is difficult for the wrong-doer, especially perhaps, the teller of falsehoods, to escape the nets of Varuna. The wish is also expressed "May the path of order of Mitra and Varuna lead us over all troubles".[18]

Mitra and Varuna are described as the charioteers of law meaning that it is they who keep the law in operation.[19] The same idea is referred to in various ways: they are the guards of the everlasting law,[20] the leaders of truth or of the law[21]. "Surya, sent forth, guards the universe's law".[22] It has been remarked that the sun is the most prominent embodiment of rita, and the sun drives away all darkness and symbolically also moral wrong.

The god Indra similarly is requested to "lead beyond all pain and grief along the path of Holy Law."[23] The meaning of rita as moral truth is also associated with the dawn, which, making its appearance with utmost regularity, admonishes men to arise and pursue their duties. "The dawns of old were true with the birth that springs from Holy Order" i. e. the birth that is embodied in the moral law in truth as it springs up from the austerities of the Primeval Being.

While the deities preserve rita, further it, and make it known to men, it gives them power. They are mighty because they are devoted to rita : " Mighty, through law, Adityas, is your greatness."[24]

iv

Attention may now be turned to the use of rita as sacrifice, which is a fact of the universe binding men and gods together. The first object the Aryans had in performing the daily rites was the insistence on a mutual obligation between the gods and men, and the promotion of social feelings. The poets say that at the sacrifice they must speak the truth only and they request the good gods to guard them from falsehood and other vices. With a soaring flight of their imagination they conceived the fire as a messenger, the chariot of the rites, the leader of rites, the guard of rita. The sacrificial altar is frequently called the " hall of rita ", the " womb of rita ", and so on. These and other expressions suggest that rita has a transcendental and spiritual character emanating from the Primeval Being itself.

It was Agni, who under the authority of Varuna first created the sacrifice. The purpose was to establish a feeling of fellowship between gods and men. At the sacrifice the *yajamana* offered various kinds of oblations and the gods were supposed in return to give long life, cattle, off-spring. Unless fire consumed the offering the sacrifice was not efficacious or complete. Agni is the most conspicuous figure in this aspect of rita. He not only instituted the sacrifice, but is the divine messenger, travelling the three worlds daily, calling the gods to the sacrifices. The fire, as Agni, stays on earth, and speaking of the sun in heaven (i. e. of other lineage) says " I, looking on the guest of other lineage, have found many a rule of law and order."[25] The sun comes as it were to reveal the laws (e. g. the times) which govern the sacrifice. If Agni is not present there will be no sacrifice and no rita: "Agni, shine forth in thine own house as a guardian of the law"[25] He is many times requested to kill the enemies who strive to put obstacles in the way of the sacrifice. He guards and protects the oblations entrusted to him to convey to the gods.[26] Thus he furthers holy law[26]. As the typical priest he prompts men to sacrifice. "Agni drives the chariot of the lofty ordinances". He is also "the stream of holy law", that is, its continuity and perpetuity is expressed in him. Further he is described as "the bull of holy law", meaning that he guides and defends, as a bull its herd.

At the time of the sacrifices Agni opens to men the portals of mysterious lore. "Agni has declared the lore of works to mortals, Agni, the wise, for he knows the laws of the truthful" "Agni and Varuna speak of truth, praising the truth eternal, thinking on order as the guards of order". He is the preceptor revealing the divine mystery of the universe.

The whole fabric of Vedic sacrifice is associated with the plant Soma. Sometimes Soma is also connected with rita in its moral aspect. "Soma sends the gods who strengthen law". In this way it brings together gods and men. Soma has also the work of purification, for "no one with evil thought assails the Pavamanas Holy Laws"; meaning that Soma Pavamana defends truth from the attacks of evil spirits. The chief of the gods coming from heaven to the sacrifice is Indra "the fulfiller of the law". He takes draughts of Soma-juice and gives heroic sons; he "milks the copious streams of order" i. e. enjoys the libations of law-ordained sacrifice. There is an injunction to the Yajnamana to take special notice of this aspect of rita and to abide by it; to follow Agni the leader of the sacrifice. "Mark the law and observe it; send forth the full streams of eternal order; the sacred law of the red steer I follow." Here the law is the sacrifice. The streams of eternal order are the streams of the Soma juice, which continuously flowing symbolize the eternity of the institution of the sacrifice. The red steer is Agni, on account of the red flames with which Agni is enveloped. Or the eternal law may mean the eternal function of Agni carrying the sacrifice of the gods in his capacity of priest or of animating the whole universe which, without Agni, would be dead.

SOURCES

1 ऋ॒तं च॑ स॒त्यं चा॒भी॑द्धातप॒सोऽध्य॑जायत । (X. 190. 1)

2 कद्व॑ ऋ॒तं कदनृ॑त॒म् । (I. 105. 5)

3 य॒दा माग॑न्प्रथम॒जा ऋ॒तस्यादिद्वा॒चा अ॑श्नुवे भा॒गम॒स्याः । (I. 164. 37)

4 आ यस्त॒तान॒ रोद॑सी ऋ॒तेन॒ । (V. 1. 7)

5 ऋ॒तेन॒ विश्वं॒ भुव॑नं॒ वि राजथः॒ सूर्य॒मा ध॑त्थो दि॒वि चित्र्यं॒ रथ॑म् । (V.64.7)

6 यः पु॒ष्पिणी॑श्च प्र॒स्व॑श्च॒ धर्म॒णाधि॒ दाने॒ व्यनीवरधार॑यः । (II. 37. 7)

7 य ऋ॒तेन॒ सूर्य॒मारो॑हयन् दि॒व्यप्र॑थयन्पृथि॒वीं मा॒तरं॒ वि । (X. 62. 3)

8 या॒व॒यद्द्वे॑षा ऋत॒पा ऋ॑ते॒जाः सु॑म्ना॒वरा॑ सू॒नृता॑ ई॒रय॑न्ती । (I. 113. 12)

9 यू॒यं हि दे॑वीर्ऋतयु॒ग्भिरश्वैः॑ परिप्रया॒थ भुव॑नानि स॒द्यः । (IV. 51. 5)

10 ऋ॒तेना॑ विक्रण्वा॒ना । (VII. 75. 1)

11 ऋ॒तस्य॑ र॒श्मिम॑नु॒यच्छ॑माना । (I. 123. 13)

12 ऋ॒तेन॑ ऋ॒तमपि॑हितं ध्रु॒वं वां॒ सूर्य॑स्य॒ यत्र॑ वि॒मुं॑च॑न्त्यश्वा॑न् । (V. 62. 1)

13 अ॒यं वा॑सय॒दृतेन॑ पू॒र्वीः । अ॒यमीयत ऋ॒तयु॒ग्भि॒रश्वैः॑ । (VI. 39. 4)

14 प्र द्यावा॑ य॒ज्ञैः पृ॑थि॒वी ऋ॑ता॒वृधा॑ । (I. 159. 1)

15 ऋ॒तावाना ऋ॒तजाता ऋतावृधो...अनृत॒द्विषः । (VII. 66. 13)

16 ऋ॒तं ऋ॒तेन॒ सपन्त । (V. 68. 4)

17 ऋ॒तावा॑श्चयमा॑नान॒ ऋ॒णानि॑ ॥ (II. 27. 4.)

18 ता भूरिपाशौ अनृ॑तस्य सेतू॑ दुरत्येतू॑ रि॒पवे॒ मर्त्या॑य

ऋ॒तस्य॑ मित्रवरुणा प॒था वा॑मपो न ना॒वा दुरि॒ता त॒रेम ॥ (VII. 65. 3)

19 यू॒यमृ॒तस्य॑ रथ्याः । (VII. 62. 12)

20 राजाना मह ऋतस्य गोपा॒ । (VII. 64. 2)

21 अ॒यं हि ने॑ता वरु॑ण ऋ॒तस्य॑ । (VII. 40. 4.)

22 विश्व॑स्य॒ हि प्रेषि॑तो॒ रक्ष॑सि व्र॒तम् । (X. 37. 5)

23 ऋ॒तस्य॑ नः प॒था न॒याति॒ विश्वा॑नि दु॒रि॒ता नभं॑ताम् । (X. 133. 6)

24 ऋ॒तेना॑दित्या महि॑ वो महि॒त्वं । (II. 27. 8)

25 पश्य॑न्न॒स्या अति॑थिं व॒याया॑ ऋ॒तस्य॒ धाम॒ वि मि॑मे पु॒रूणि॑ ।(X.124.3)

26 घृ॒तप्र॑तीकं व ऋ॒तस्य॑ धू॒र्षद॑म् । (I. 143. 7)

Appointments to Professorships and Lectureships.

To Principals of Colleges and others concerned :

Principals of Colleges and others who have vacancies for Professorships, Lectureships or Fellowships in Philosophy, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, or Pali, are requested to send us early information concerning the same and a notice of the vacancy will be inserted in the Review free of all charges. Information concerning actual appointments is also requested from Principals or from those appointed.

Seminar for the Comparative Study of Religions, Baroda.

Applications invited *immediately* for Sanskrit Fellowship. Must be M.A. (Sanskrit) with some knowledge of Philosophy. 120 p. m.

XXIII

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Co-operative Research

Already throughout the whole extent of India scholars and others of varied attainments have shown their interest in the endeavour which the Association with its Review represents, and have become either Members of the Association or Subscribers to the Review, so that at the time of printing this issue the editions of the previous issues are almost exhausted. There must still be very many who would give us their support, and we urge all concerned to make our movement known. If sufficient additional requests are made we shall entertain the idea of a second edition of the first issues, so long as we may see an opportunity of covering the cost. Except the cost of printing and the publisher's commission all the work associated with the Review is honorary. The reason why we should work for a still wider membership is that there are many who should be interested in the development of careful scholarly philosophical research and discussion in India. It is this subject of research and some ways in which the Association might do some useful work by the systematic co-operation of its members that we wish to dwell upon briefly in the following paragraphs. Much useful and interesting work may be done in the Local Branches in the reading and discussion of carefully prepared papers ; but the Members of some of the Branches may perhaps undertake amongst themselves a definite task in which they might co-operate. There are, however, many individual members in different parts of India where there are no Local Branches, and these might contribute something to the achievement of some of the aims we may set ourselves. Here we shall suggest three important subjects which the Association might do something to help forward. They are all necessary preliminaries for careful scientific advance, and before some real progress is made with them it is of little avail to attempt any exhaustive systematic study of Indian philosophy as a whole.

a. *Bibliographies:* Systematic bibliographies of manuscripts, printed texts, translations, critical expositions, commentaries, and systematic studies whether articles or books, in the various departments of Eastern philosophies and religions are absolutely essential. Already a creditable beginning has been made for Buddhist literature by two young scholars, members of the Association. For Jainism the work has been well begun in A. Guerinot's *Essai de Bibliographie Jaina. Paris. 1906.* All that is necessary is the additional information keeping the list up to date. All the different fields ought to be worked over in similar fashion.

b. *Chronologies:* Few thinkers today will deny that the understanding of philosophical problems and ideas is immensely aided by the historical study of their development. The historical approach is frequently the best. The difficulties of Indian Chronology are almost proverbial. Yet the very attempt to make provisional chronologies is one of the best ways to overcome the difficulties. What is wanted is not so much dates as lists showing the relative chronological position of the texts or movements of outstanding importance. The task should be begun, however tentative the results may be. A beginning has been made for Buddhism and for Muslim philosophy by Fellows of the Seminar for the Comparative Study of Religions at Baroda.

c. *A Dictionary or Comparative Glossary of Indian Philosophical Terms:** Even the amateur in the history of the philosophy of the West, or anyone who may have consulted Eisler's *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* knows how much the usage of philosophical terms varies in the

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* The Revd H. Gulliford of Mysore suggested this in an interesting letter.

> writings of different individuals and schools. The same thing is very apparent in Indian Philosophy and it is a source of frequent pitfalls. The task of beginning some form of comparative glossary is as urgent as it is great. But it is a task which cannot even be begun, let alone accomplished satisfactorily, without the co-operation of many ardent workers, especially philosophical Sanskritists. The beginning must be modest. We therefore urge Sanskrit scholars to send us a carefully composed list of one hundred terms used in different systems of Indian Philosophy. From the lists received a list will be formed and an attempt made by co-operation to compile a glossary. If this is successful further lists will then be drawn up in a similar manner.

It is urgent that all those who are at all qualified to take part in this work, or other work which they may propose, shall do so. The Indian Philosophical Association must not be a mere list of names. Letters offering to co-operate and asking for further information should be addressed at an early date to Professor Widgery, the College, Baroda.

XXIV

CRITICAL NOTICES

HINDU MIND TRAINING : *BY AN ANGLO-SAXON Mother, with an Introduction, by Mr. S. M. Mitra*

pp. XXIV+536. 10s. 6d. (Longmans. 1917)

The author of this interesting volume is a pupil of Mr. Mitra. The problem of the education of her own children gave her a practical interest in systems of education. She studied the systems known in the West but found all of them unsatisfactory. At last she came across Mr. Mitra, who with his Hindu method of mind training exactly fulfilled her requirements. The main part of the book (pp. 81-502) is occupied with the illustration of the Hindu method as adapted by Mr. Mitra to Western needs. Mr. Mitra in his Introduction (covering the first 80 pages) gives the rationale of it. For the purposes of a review the introduction is therefore the most important part of the book.

The Hindu system, according to Mr. Mitra, is based on the recognition of the importance of "unconscious cerebration" which, though only a recent discovery in the West, has been a commonplace of Indian psychology for three thousand years. The essence of the method consists in establishing and developing a connection between consciousness and its great storehouse, preconsciousness (called also Subconsciousness). The preconscious (which is by far the larger) part of the mind must be so trained and moulded that it will always be ready to help conscious thinking. In this way the method combines the maximum of efficiency with the minimum of effort. The education is carried on by means of stories. The pupil first reads very carefully the text of a story and then is made to answer certain questions (mostly of a psychological character) based on that story. The stories are for this reason called psychological texts. A certain period of time is made to elapse between the reading of the text and the putting of the questions and again between the reading of the questions and the answering of them. In this way the student is made to think both consciously and *subconsciously*. All his mental faculties are called into play. He learns to observe and analyse his own mental states in various circumstances and to know his own powers and limitations. He acquires self-knowledge in a very real sense. He also learns to estimate things at their proper values and thereby acquires balance of mind.

On this account of the Hindu method of mind training we may observe, first, that we do not understand why this system should be called 'Hindu'. It is true that intellectual and moral training has been carried on in India through the medium of stories from very ancient times till to-day. But we never see the reciter of the stories putting questions to his hearers. In the well-known epics, Ramayan and Mahabharat, it is always the pupil that asks questions and the instructor only answers these. The answer may be given in the form of a story but the disciple applies the principle revealed in the story to his own particular case and raises the difficulties that he may meet with in this application. "मनु lays down the rule." " नापृष्टः कस्यचिन्द्ब्रूयात् " ("The teacher should not speak to anybody till he is questioned ".). The obvious principle in this is that this is the best way to ascertain whether the pupil is in a position to grasp and assimilate the answer. This process is necessarily very slow and was only rendered possible in India in the old days by the absence of a bewildering multiplicity of subjects, doctrines and books. As far as the stories, as media of instruction, are concerned, this is no speciality of India. All other nations and religions have got their own fables and stories. We do not mean to minimise the merits of Mr. Mitra's method. The importance of giving a psychological training early in life cannot be exaggerated. It is eminently calculated to engender habits of thinking in children without much conscious effort on their part and to give an introspective turn to their minds. It may even be said to be better adapted to the conditions of the modern world than the old Hindu method. But it is extremely difficult to suit the questions to the varying circumstances and aptitudes of the pupils. This difficulty does not present itself if the pupil is made to ask his own questions.

The title of the book is likely to mislead the reader in another way also. The Hindus distinguish between Intellect and Mind (बुद्धि and मनस्). The function of the former is to perceive, understand and ascertain (अध्यवसायात्मिका बुद्धिः) and that of the latter is to form desires and doubts (संकल्प विकल्पात्मकं मनः). Mind training would mean in India the regulation of desires which is accomplished by means of a discipline that is both intellectual and bodily. The Hindu codes of life, therefore, contain rules regulating the minute details of daily life (like eating, drinking, sleeping and even breathing) in view of the fact the mind can be influenced both by the intellect and by the body. The reader must always bear in mind that the method described in the book is an adaptation of the Hindu method to the conditions of modern Western nations. Owing to the many important differences between the circumstances of ancient India and those of modern Europe it is impossible to apply the methods of education of the former to the latter without serious alterations.

The habit of mind-analysis, as Mr. Mitra points out, is a great help in moral progress. The principle that 'Virtue is knowledge' was first propounded in the West by Socrates. Plato and Aristotle contributed largely towards removing the paradoxical character of this teaching by explaining what kind of knowledge constitutes virtue. But the exact way in which knowledge acts in building character cannot be understood as long as we neglect the close relation between consciousness and subconsciousness. The knowledge of the good can manifest itself in action only when it is constantly dwelt upon (this process is called in India निदिध्यासन).

This dwelling upon a moral truth moulds our subconscious nature and thus gives a new turn to our character. In the thirteenth chapter of the Bhagavadgita a list of about twenty *virtues* is given as forming the definition of *knowledge* (7—12).

According to Mr. Mitra, the sharpening of the understanding and the balance of mind which are the results of the system advocated by him will also help a man in bringing about his material advancement. We admit that a psychological training if made part of the education of every youth is likely to reduce the large number of lunatics and suicides in the modern money-making world, but that it will enable a man to increase his material wealth is more than we can say. It may more truly be said that before a man can hope to become a millionaire, he must lose the balance of his mind. We need not enter here into the discussion about the relation between the wealth of individuals and the wealth (or the happiness) of nations.

In the course of his Introduction Mr. Mitra passes in review the various systems of education obtaining in England and on the continent. He points out that the importance of sub-conscious thinking is not recognised in any of them. He takes a cursory view of the opinions of Western philosophers, psychologists and educationists, pointing out where they agree or disagree with Hindu notions. Every good system of education, he says, ought to develop in the scholars the power to reason quickly and correctly on matters of practical concern. The Hindu system in as much as it forms habits of thinking on the problems of conduct very early in life enables the youths to come to a swift decision in all practical situations. They can never be taken by surprise as they have thought beforehand on most of the problems that confront men in their after lives. The solutions of these problems have been stored by them in the preconscious apartments of their minds and are ready to enter consciousness when the occasions for them arise. Mr. Mitra takes some illustrious men from English History, who have possessed a remarkable power of forming a swift decision and says their success cannot be accounted for by any education that they received. He concludes that the Western systems of education have not produced successful statesmen or warriors. But we are afraid he takes only favourable instances. The universities of Oxford and Cambridge can point to many of their sons having become distinguished statesmen in their after lives while it is the boast of Eton that the battle of Waterloo was won on its cricket fields. The fact is that with regard to the success of great men it is very difficult to say how much is due to native talent and how much to education. Can we not ask, Why is it that the Hindus trained in the best system of education (according to Mr. Mitra) have allowed themselves to remain behind in the march of nations?

The stories (together with the questions based on them and the answers from various pupils) which form the main body of the work form very interesting reading. They are chosen from the Indian epics and books of stories and are told in a very attractive style. The number of questions on each story is very large so that a person who wants to instruct himself or another according to this method will find abundant material in the book itself. We can agree with Mr. Mitra when he says that the present volume " represents the arduous labours of one of the most enterprising of my lady pupils."

At the end there is a chapter written by Mr. Mitra on the Franco-Hindu Psychological Affinity. Here he takes some of the sayings of the French writer La Rochefoucauld and compares them with those of the well-known character in the Mahabharat, Bhishma. He chooses for comparison the sayings of the two regarding the doctrines of expediency and Fate (or Karma). As regards the first point we find both reducing all human feelings and motives to self-love very much in the manner of Hobbes. Both lay down rules for the guidance of men in their dealings with others. The Frenchman's words are tinged with the sense of his own disappointment while the Hindu speaks as it were from an eminence. Both agree that contentment is the only source of lasting happiness. On the second point the quotations from La Rochefoucauld show that he believed in such a thing as Fate, Luck or Chance guiding the destinies of men and carrying itself out through men's efforts and sometimes even in spite of them. Yet he did not encourage idleness or inaction. According to Bhishma a man enjoys in this life the fruits of his doings in past ones and is happy or unhappy according as these have been good or bad. But just because they are his own deeds it is possible for him to counteract their effects of a bad karma by his own efforts. Mr. Mitra takes the resemblances between the opinions of these two warrior-philosophers to be proofs of the psychological affinity between Frenchmen and Hindus. But this argument would enable any civilised nation to claim a like psychological kinship with the Hindus. Similar doctrines in matters of general interest need not point to any special affinity. These similarities proceed from the fact that human nature is essentially the same everywhere though it may differ in accidental details.

Indore. V. B. SHRIKHANDE.

OUTLINES OF JAINISM. *By Jagmanderlal Jaini*, M.A., CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1916. 4s. NET.

We cordially welcome the appearance of this volume on the outlines of Jainism, published by one of the leading University presses in England and written by a Jaina.

Too long have the Jainas been dependent on the labours of alien scholars : Colebrooke, Jacobi, Hopkins, Hoernle, Bühler, Weber, Guerinot; but of late signs have not been wanting that they are beginning to explore the mysteries and the history of their ancient religion for themselves. Jainism has been called the Cinderella of Indian faiths, and indeed, no creed in the peninsula has been more neglected by the students of Oriental lore or of the Comparative Study of Religions. This is the more remarkable since small as is the number of Jainas in comparison with Hindus or Mahomedans, they nevertheless, when compared with other small communities such as the Parsis or the Sikhs, wield an enormous influence over the people amongst whom they dwell. Indeed, many of the movements of modern Indian thought may probably be traced to the persuasive example of Jaina asceticism and Jaina reluctance to take life.

The glory of Jainism, which up till now has certainly not received full recognition, is its ethical character. Much has been written with regard to the ethics of Buddhism, but little has been said of the ethics of its sister faith. Jainism has a magnificent contribution to bring to the cause of righteousness in the splendour of its annual service of forgiveness (the most impressive Indian ceremony that the present writer has ever witnessed), and in the emphasis it lays on the importance of Renunciation and on the greatness of the spiritual as compared with the material world.

In the volume that lies before us, Mr. Jaini has given us in a small compass a survey of the tenets of this faith and a most interesting collection of proof texts which throw light on the meaning of these tenets. Two capital tables also give particulars of the twentyfour Tirthankara and of the effects of Karma. But in reading this book one does not feel that sufficient justice has been done to the glories of Jainism : indeed one almost doubts if the writer himself has quite realized the full content of his faith. Neither does the value of the book lie in its scholarship, for few Jaina scholars of repute would pass statements, such as that made on page xxxvi, which overlook the important additions made by Mahāvīra to the faith of the preceding Tīrthankara, or that on page 8 with regard to "souls of air"; or would sanction the total omission of S'ithila Karma, the destiny which we may by extraordinary exertions evade, and whose inclusion saves Jainism from the imputation of absolute fatalism. There are several other omissions, the most serious of which is that in the section defending idolatry (p. 75) the fact is completely overlooked that one, and that a very important sect of the Jainas—the Sthānākavāsī are strongly opposed to the worship of images. But though these omissions detract from the value of the book as a manual of Jainism, nothing can lessen its importance as a real attempt by a Jaina to state the outlines of his own creed.

So long as Indians were willing to leave actual research into their faiths to aliens, and to content themselves with sweeping assertions that all religions were alike, so long were they liable to be led astray by superficial resemblances, to the over-looking of crucial differences. As yet the great Dictionary of Indian Faiths written by Indians is to seek. Only when this is written shall we foreigners be able to grasp fully the contribution of India to the History of Religions. But until far more Indians are prepared to put aside all thought of worldly position and advancement and to spend laborious days and years in studying their own particular sects and subsects in the spirit of true scholarship and scrupulous accuracy, that great Dictionary can never be compiled. It is because we recognise in Mr. Jaini's book the fore-runner of other and greater books on Jainism, written by Jainas themselves that we offer it a hearty welcome.

Rajkot. MARGARET STEVENSON.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

By H. P. Farrell (LONGMANS, GREEN & Co.)

In these days when India is so rapidly passing through a variety of political changes, one cannot hope to shut off a discussion of current political questions from the sphere of academic education. Nay, it is desirable that all young men who have an opportunity of enjoying the benefits of a liberal education should be grounded in the elements of political theory. As a matter of fact the study of the subject is confined to a few elect who desire to take an honours degree in history and economics. Principal Farrel's book which we have before us is designed as an introductory manual to the study of political theory ; no doubt it will be primarily of use to the honour's student in history, but we are sure the book can plead for a larger audience ; it appeals not merely to the student but to the lay reader who desires to have a methodical initiation into the subject. It is an attempt at a concise statement of the theories embodied in the writings of representative political philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Plato and Aristotle deservedly occupy one half of the treatise ; we wish, however, that an ampler survey of the conditions of political life in the ancient city state had been given to us and that the purely historical details of some of Aristotle's chapters had been replaced by a critical estimate of his leading principles. There is hardly any connecting link between the second chapter which ends with Aristotle and the beginning of the third which plunges us right into the complicated conditions of the end of the mediaeval period. The short paragraphs devoted to Thomas Acquinas, Dante, Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli are of course inserted with a sense of proportion ; but they can scarcely convey an adequate conception of the political views of these great figures of the Middle Ages. The treatment of Rousseau is more critical than that of any other of the philosophers whose views have been summarised ; but we regret that the organic conception of the state which underlies his theory as regards the "general will" has not been adequately brought out. But in spite of these short-comings, this handy volume is a welcome addition to the books already available on the subject ; the lay reader will find in it an accurate summary of the leading political thinkers of ancient and modern times: it is a safe substitute for the originals to those who have not the leisure or the opportunity to consult them. The treatment of Aristotle is admirable ; careful and concise and remarkably happy in bringing out the leading features of the Politics. There is a brief bibliography, and a carefully prepared index, which add to the usefulness of the book.

Bombay. P. A. W.

SVA : *Sir George P. M. Birdwood*, K.C.S.I. &c., *Edited* by F. H. BROWN. *London, Philip Lee Warner 1915. India, The Oxford University Press.*

Of the making of books on India there is no end ; for Civil Servants retire at fifty-five and there is much lying on their consciences which could not have been said in Durbar speeches. But the volume entitled 'Sva' by Sir George Birdwood is unique. Politics are not touched except in a short sympathetic paper of twenty pages on 'Indian unrest'; the problems of commerce, industry, and defence are unknown. Indeed, some would hesitate to call the volume a book at all. It consists of a series of twelve papers, some of them published many years ago and now brought together for the first time within the confines of two covers. Neither are they all on Indian Subjects : 'The Empire of the Hittites' brings us no nearer than Mesopotamia ; while 'Oriental carpets' are discussed with hardly more than a reference to some Indian place names. But we need not look for unity when the author and Editor propose none ; probably nothing more definite could have been chosen for a title than the author's 'Sva'—*his own.*

Students of history will find two papers, big with names and figures, on "The Mahratta Plough' and 'The Rajput in the History of Hindustan'. To readers of the 'Indian Philosophical Review' two others will be of interest, 'The Muharram in Bombay' and 'The Christmas Tree'. The former is a popular account of the historical background of the festival and of the procession which ends with the immersion of the *tabut* in Back Bay. The latter is an attempt to connect the "Christmas Tree" of Europe with plant worship in general and in particular with the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden. In the mass of materials presented the main subject is often lost, but the paper may serve as an inspiration to students of the comparative study of Religions in India. There is a wealth of material in the land which needs patient collecting, even though it require another to arrange it in a logical and straight-forward fashion.

Indore R. A. KING.

JESUS CHRIST : *Summaries of Sermons and Lectures delivered in Bombay.* By the Revd. A. Goodier S. J. The "Examiner" Press, Bombay 1917. *Eight annas.*

At the present time in India there is frequent talk of "the unity of religion" and of something called "comparative religion" (the meaning probably being "The Comparative Study of Religions").—The general idea appears to be first that all religions are alike, and secondly that all are about equally good. The conclusion is drawn that each person should go on with his own religion and be tolerant to others, but this tolerance is interpreted to mean that no person should try to influence a person of another religion on religious matters. This attitude appears to us in the main false. Only from a superficial survey, or a philosophical conception which ultimately regards all distinctions and differentiations as not essentially real could one seriously put forward such contentions. The religions show as much similarity as a deformed and diseased illiterate man of little moral goodness and a man sound in mind and body with the insight of a great thinker and the character of a great saint, and between these extremes there are various intermediate positions. We come to an understanding and appreciation of the different religions as little by taking into account simply the common denominator as we might if we tried to understand and evaluate men by emphasising their similarities. As I have contended elsewhere (*Sanskrit Research vol. ii p. 181 ff.*) the task of the Comparative Study of Religions is to state carefully the similarities *and the differences* : the latter are so important because they contain those elements in which one religion may be judged better than another, just as we may judge one man better than another on account of differences between them. In my conception and in the general practice of scholars that Study does not concern itself with estimating relative values but merely with the actual facts. The estimation of values is left to The Philosophy of Religion, which has to consider the truth and value of doctrines and practices and investigate what constitutes the highest form of religion.

It is only if the attitude criticised above is abandoned that anything like justice can be done to books treating of the subject of the present small book. Here at once lies the fundamental difference between Christianity and all other religions : in the person of Jesus. In contrast with the attitude criticised, this *differentia* is the central fact in the religion. This is expressed in many modern phrases such as "Christianity is Christ" ; "Christianity is the friendship of Christ" ; "Christianity is loyalty to Christ". All forms of Christianity insist on the personal character of the relations of men and God, and emphasise the function of Jesus Christ essentially from this central position. The beliefs concerning the actual attributes to be ascribed to Jesus differ very much amongst Christians but to many that appears secondary. Every non-Christian interested at all in religion should try to enter into the spirit of this attitude in order to decide on his own position with regard to the religion, and he would do well to read works of persons of varying theological standpoints. The work of the Revd. Father Goodier seems to us so important because it presents in a clear straightforward manner the orthodox position with regard to Jesus and this with a spirit of devotion to Jesus Christ which is evident in almost every line. The writer makes one feel something of the reality and depth of his own faith. If one were not persuaded that after all this is what is required to present to men the essence of Christianity and its main difference from other religions, one would desire more explicit evidence and discussion of the positions the author adopts with regard to modern theological problems. However, anyone who has followed at all closely recent Christian literature on the subject will read between the lines that Father Goodier has intimate knowledge of the literature and a firm conviction as to the character of the solution of the problems. The author was once asked by a Hindu : "What after all, in practical life, does Jesus Christ mean to you?" That is a question which many non-Christians may ask, and if they were to enter into the spirit of Father Goodier's book they might learn much of the answer. The suggestion in the Preface that these short summaries may be useful for daily meditation indicates a particular purpose for which the book is eminently suited for Christians whatever the branch of the Church to which they belong. The printing and binding of the book are remarkable for the very small price of eight annas, even apart from any considerations of the present conditions of the paper market.

A. G. W.

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With the Assistance of the Members of an Advisory Committee.

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THE
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

VIII.

JAMES WARD'S PLURALISTIC THEISM : I.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

i

Of the current systems of pluralism, the least unsatisfactory is that of Professor James Ward. It is an honest attempt to stand within the realm of thought and face the dangers and difficulties of pluralistic conceptions. Ward does not want to give up logic for the sake of his philosophy ; he does not stifle the demands of intellect simply because intellect is inconvenient and makes him conscious of the limitations of his views. He frames his system on the pattern of Leibniz's Monadology, though he does not slavishly imitate it. He knows that if Leibniz had followed out the consequences of his doctrines, he would have been led to the monism from which he sought to escape. The infinity of God and the world, the absolute determination of every event, the eternal dependence of the infinite number of monads on a central spirit would leave no room for real struggle and endeavour but would lead to a monistic unity where all things are one. Ward assigns to himself the task of reëditing Leibniz's Monadology, dropping out all doctrines incompatible with a pluralistic scheme of things. He accepts the fundamental motive of Leibniz's Monadology.

As a psychologist Ward takes his stand on experience, and the most patent fact of experience is the plurality of individuals. Materialism and absolutism both deny the reality of this pluralism and so Ward dismisses them as false theories. As against naturalism, he argues for the reality of *spirit*; as against absolutism for the reality of *many* spirits. He knows that the time-spirit requires that he should recognise the multiplicity of facts. "It will be well too as regards method to let the spirit of the time lead us; turning aside from what has been described as 'naturalism's desert on the one hand and the barren summit of the Absolute on the other', to follow the historical method as far as possible in tracing the gradual evolution of ideas, but trusting to speculative methods only in the endeavour to divine the most satisfactory solution of the problems to which they give rise." (P. & T. p. 24)* In his first series of Gifford Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism,* Ward shows the futility of the naturalistic and agnostic assumptions about the constitution of the universe and man's place in it. Naturalism regards the world as a single mechanical system of constant mass and energy, and mental reality as epi-phenomenal or a by-product of physical evolution. The three props of this theory are (1) the mechanical theory which resolves all physical processes into movements of masses : (2) the theory of evolution which believes in the production of the organic from the inorganic ; and (3) psycho-physical parallelism which thinks of the psychical series as running parallel with the physical series without entering into causal relations with it. Ward succeeds in showing that the physical series is something more than mass particles in motion ; that the theory of evolution cannot account for the life and purpose of the universe; and that the events of the mental series are not simply parallel with those of the physical. The impossibility of a connected view of the whole universe of experience as a complete mechanical system is proved. Simply because matter and motion do not account for organic growth and mental process, it does not follow that idealism is the true hypothesis ; for it may well be that while matter does not account for mind, mind does not account for matter. If materialism does not account for history, it may be that spiritualism does not account for

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*In the references P. & T. is used for *Pluralism and Theism* and N. & A. for *Naturalism and Agnosticism.*

science. The world may be broken into the two parts of man and nature, mind and matter. We should have to be content with a dualism which posits the existence of two utterly disparate but equally real worlds, a world of matter and a world of mind. This theory is criticised as having its origin in an intellectual confusion between duality and dualism. Experience is a subject-object relation, and therefore a duality in unity. Though the two aspects can be analytically discriminated they cannot be actually separate. Dualism mistakes logical distinction for actual separation. The hypothesis of abstract absolutism which holds that Reality is something different from mind and body, a *tertium quid*, a *neutrum* behind mind and matter is next considered and dismissed as philosophically unsatisfactory. A spiritualistic theory is suggested as the only satisfactory guide which takes account of all the concrete facts of life and experience. It is only in terms of mind that we can understand the unity, activity and regularity that nature presents. In so understanding we see that nature is spirit.

We have no quarrel with Ward thus far. As a matter of fact all idealists are grateful to him for the service he has rendered in freeing idealism from the objections of mechanism and agnosticism. But when from the established conclusion that the world is spiritual, Ward proceeds to argue that nothing really exists but spirits, we feel considerable hesitation in following his lead. Once again the dominant motive is his interest in ethical and religious idealism. The progress from spirit to spirits is due to his terror of the monistic tradition which holds up a dead in-human unity in which all life is extinguished and distinction abolished. Absolutism or Singularism as Ward prefers to call it believes that " beyond the universe of the Many there is a single transcendent experient who comprehends the whole " (P. & T. p. 228). Taking his stand on experience, Ward finds that it is impossible for him to feel that the world in which he acts is merely a shadow or an appearance of the one substance. The individuals in the world are experiencing subjects quite as much as God himself. The world is full of knowing, feeling, and willing subjects. "This world immediately confronts us not as One mind nor even as the manifestation of One but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction" (P. & T. p. 3). Ward contends that while Hegel starts with the right premiss of pluralism, he draws a wrong conclusion from it, viz absolutism. When once we reach unity of this type we cannot get plurality from it. Ward also refers to the panlogistic strain of Hegelianism which makes the historical development of the world the phenomenal unfolding of the timeless Absolute Idea, which is the sole reality. In contrast with this he proposes to regard the historical development as real and not apparent. The development of the world is a process of creative synthesis. The world of monads is a real history. Its evolution is not merely the explication of the old but an *epigenesis* or a creative process in which the subjects themselves are the agents. Reality is a realm of ends, a progressive epigenetic process in which the ideal aspirations of individual subjects are realised. Though Ward recognises that there must be some unity among the minds of the world, he is not prepared to say that there is as much unity as absolutism postulates. For, if there should be so much unity, then the appearance of the many would be inexplicable Absolutism seems to care nothing for the facts of experience but goes on its own " high priori road." "In the flights of pure thought up to the Absolute, the atmosphere of empirical fact by which it is sustained is too diffused to be detected, and when that summit is reached, the particular, the many of actual experience, tend to disappear or to be explained away" (P. & T. p.23). In whatever manner we may conceive of the Absolute, whether as Absolute Subject with Fichte, or as Absolute Substance with Spinoza, or as Absolute Self with Hegel, it cannot offer an explanation of the multiplicity of the world. The world of real existence we see before us is sacrificed at the altar of the Absolute. Ward urges that we cannot call the Absolute a Mind, as the essential characteristics of mind as we are acquainted with it are absent there. Mind as we know is a relation of subject and object which are not separable though distinguishable. If the Absolute is a mind without the distinction of subject and object i. e. if it transcends this distinction, then its unity and nature are incomprehensible to us. We have no right to call it mind at all. There are thinkers who consider that the Absolute is in some sense its own other. But if we make the idea of the Absolute its other, then the finite minds are reduced to the passing thoughts of the Absolute. Or it may be contended that the necessity for an other points only to the limitation of finite minds and it need not be a characteristic essence of mind as such, in which case there is no other for the Absolute. We may at once admit that the crux of absolutism lies in the relation of the finite minds to the Absolute. But as we shall see, Ward has the same difficulty in exhibiting the relation of God to the finite centres. But no sane absolutist of the present day thinks that Reality is a One exclusive of the Many, though the solutions of the problem of the relation of the One and the Many, till now put forward, may not be considered quite satisfactory in every way. On examination we shall find that Ward's theory is satisfactory only when it conforms to the traditions of concrete idealism, but is unsatisfactory when it sets itself up against that tradition in the zeal for a pluralistic construction of experience.

ii

Experience is the starting point for the theist, the pluralist and the absolutist alike : the differences arise later. Whatever point of view we occupy in philosophy, we cannot but begin "our inquiry about the universe as a realm of ends" (P. & T. p. 432). We start from obvious experience and try to explain it. We take the many as given, but even Ward admits we cannot end with it. Pluralism can be accepted only " within limits ". It has to be supplemented before it can be accepted as the ultimate truth. While the pluralist stops short at the totality of finite experiences, the theist tries to satisfy the religious minded by positing a transcendent God. The absolutist affirms that pluralism and theism should find their fulfilment in the reality of an objective spirit. It is inaccurate to say that while pluralism starts with experience and proceeds upwards, absolutism starts with the Absolute and ends there. Absolutism also starts with the pluralistic vision but while Ward says that pluralism has to be supplemented by theism the absolutist says that it has to be supplemented by absolutism. To both it is obvious that while we start with the many we cannot conclude with it. There is more unity than appears at first sight. The uncritical acceptance of pluralism has to be modified before it can be turned into the final truth of the universe. But whether the modification should be in the direction of theism or absolutism, is the problem.

iii

From experience Ward says, we learn that all that is real are minds or individual centres of force and appetition. The world is an indefinite variety of psychical existences, of different degrees of perfection all tending to self realisation. Each of them is a self. No two of them are exactly alike. The world as it comes to us in experience is a many, a system of individuals which interact. The history of the world is a real creative evolution. We see in it a steady progress towards greater individuality as well as solidarity. Though we have at the beginning a number of free spontaneous independent monads acting at random, we have gradually more and more integration. The world is a slow organisation of conflicting individuals into an ordered whole. The history of biological organisms and human societies testifies to this growing unification. We may reasonably expect that perfect unification would be the goal of the world. But this unity is not the starting point but only the culmination. It is the goal but not the ground of the process. The universe is not a unity differentiated into a plurality, but a plurality organising itself into a unity.

Our difficulties on this theory may be stated thus. Is it possible to view the whole world as spiritual in the sense that everything in it is a spirit with its duality of subject and object ? Does not this theory land us in solipsism ? And does not any attempt to get over solipsism take us straight to the hypothesis of an all-comprehensive absolute mind ? Does Ward's philosophy provide us with a freedom and immortality really different from the absolutistic conceptions thereof ? Can the growing unity of the world be accounted for on the basis of a radical pluralism? If theism is necessary to supplement pluralism, is not his supplementing unreal and ineffective unless the theist's God is identified with the Absolute Spirit ? These are some of the questions we propose to consider.

iv

Idealists would all appreciate Ward's thorough and searching criticism of dualism and assent to his proposition that ultimate reality is spiritual in its nature. But it is not easy to understand how all reality is psychical. Exposing the fallacies of the dualistic metaphysics does not necessarily amount to proving the non-existence of matter. To dichotomise the world into the two opposed parts of nature and soul is wrong, for everywhere matter serves as the environment for the soul. We cannot follow Ward when he says that in this world we have all persons and no things. We can understand his proposition that matter is not opposed to spirit in the sense that it is an element in the spiritual world and that the distinction of matter and mind lies within the life of the spirit. We agree that the ultimate metaphysical principle is mind or spirit but we cannot consent that matter is mind. Ward's contention that experience may be a subject-object relation, a duality in unity may be admitted. For it only shows that matter is not an object in itself unrelated to a subject. It can exist only as an element in a larger whole. A physical fact has no medium of existence except in conscious experience. Philosophers who are of opinion that nature is the object of spirit, the material universe the object of the world soul, admit this plea. But when it is argued that physical facts are selves, that matter has its own duality in unity, we do not find it easy to follow. To say that mechanism can get its ultimate interpretation only in terms of mind is one thing: to say that mechanism is mind quite another. To say that the world is not through and through mechanical is one thing: to say that it is through and through psychical is another. The former emphasises the relativity of man and nature, but the latter asserts the identity of the two. The former says that nature is only the other of the idea but not its copy while the latter reduces the world into a series of spiritual atoms. The former is the hypothesis of absolute idealism, the latter that of panpsychism. Absolute idealism urges that there is a part of nature which is mechanical but it is subordinate to the spiritual. The mechanism of the world serves the ends of spirit. It is an instrument for the life of man. Matter is not an end in itself. Ward recognises it when he says that just as machines contrived by conscious agents for industrial purposes serve the ends of man, even so the mechanism of the world aids man in his upward ascent But as the machine is not the mind of man who made it, even so nature is not spirit for which it exists.

The first argument which Ward advances in support of his theory of panpsychism is the inadequacy of mechanism to account for mind. " While it may be possible, setting out from mind to account for mechanism, it is impossible setting out from mechanism to account for mind. " (P. & T. 18. See also p 431). Ward emphasises the distinction between matter and life, mechanism and individuality, science and history. Ward contrasts law with fact, universality with individuality. He holds that history describes unique individuals while science deals with laws. If science touches an individual, it reduces him to a type, makes him an instance of a law.

The inadequacy of matter to mind is true but this does not prove the psychical nature of matter but the ultimate supremacy of spirit in the world Mind can account for matter ; nature is intelligible to spirit. This shows only that nature is not an alien other but has its ground and being in the same spirit which at one stage expresses itself as matter and in another as the human self. Ward notices this unity in the midst of opposition. For he says, " the world of science and the world of history have little or nothing in common : their terminology, their categories, their problems are wholly different ; and so too are the philosophical questions to which they severally and immediately give rise. The one never reaches the individual and the concrete, the other never leaves them ; for the one spontaneity and initiative are impossible, for the other inertia and rigorous concatenation ; to the one the notions of end and value are fruitless, nay meaningless, for the other they are of paramount importance. And yet the two cannot be separated, for Nature not only provides the scenery and properties of history but the actors themselves seem to have sprung from its soil, to owe their position largely to its co-operation and to come into touch with each other solely through its means" (P. & T. p. 2-3). While nature is opposed to life, it is still intimately related to life. There is continuity as well as discontinuity between life and matter. In contrasting law with individuality Ward makes the mistake Bergson does. We have creative synthesis even in the material world When water is produced from a combination of certain proportions of oxygen and hydrogen we have a synthesis which is creative, a novel production. Why should the disability of matter to account for mind point to the panpsychist conclusion ? On Ward's philosophy, it ought to prove nothing. For according to him the progress of the world is made up of a series of accidents. The growth of the world is characterised by epigenesis or creative synthesis involving new beginnings which are discontinuous with the old. If epigenesis is a fact, then there is no surprise in the rise of life out of the womb of matter. When Ward argues that mechanism cannot account for mind, he rejects epigenesis and thinks that matter cannot give rise to something in nature totally different. In other words he denies the reality of epigenesis and disallows all new beginnings. When emphasis is laid on the inadequacy of matter to mind, Ward is under the impression that out of the material only the material can come and not the vital or the mental. Idealists agree to this view that while the inorganic or physical processes precede those in which life and mind manifest themselves, still they cannot account for them The lifeless cannot give rise to the living While matter is the prelude to mind it is not an explanation of it. But when from this position Ward jumps to the conclusion that there is no real breach of evolutional continuity, that "the level of self-conscious existence, of Spirit in the narrower sense, is reached continuously by development through earlier stages of more or less conscious life" (P. & T. p. 264-265) and that the world starts with a number of monads, feeling and striving subjects, conative in their nature, which on account of their initial instability and impulse to betterment come into relations with one another and help the onward march of progress, we must say that it is all a conjecture and not a reasoned theory. We have not only a breach of evolutional continuity between the lifeless and the living, but also between the living and the conscious, and the conscious and the rational. Evolution fails to explain not only the progress from matter to life but also from life to mind, and from mind to reason. Physics cannot account for biology any more than biology for psychology or psychology for logic. If there is continuity between life and mind, and mind and reason, then there is as much continuity between life and matter; if there is discontinuity between life and matter, then there is as much discontinuity between life and mind or mind and reason. It is not only the material that cannot account for the mental but also the vital fails. The animal mind cannot account for the human. Ward feels the " glaring psychological discontinuity between man and brute." (P. & T. p. 90) An appreciation of these facts should have led Ward to admit that nature comes into existence for us as something opposed to the self, and that from thence there is a steadily growing attempt on the part of self to overcome the externality of nature. The self begins by opposing the world to itself and ends by finding itself in it. The self becomes full self-consciousness through the mediation of externality. The initial opposition of self and objects is broken down. The object becomes conscious of itself in us. This is what Hegel means when he says that nature comes to self-consciousness in man. In man matter loses its rigidity and becomes fluid. It becomes transparent to mind. From the historical point of view, nature is mind not yet come to itself, while from the logical, "Nature is Mind out of itself." (P. & T. p 154) In the historical world we see how nature or mere isolation or pure externality which is the ideal limit gradually grows into the individualities of the physical bodies, biological organisms and human personalities. The process of nature while not spiritual from the beginning still helps the progress of spirit. The breaches of continuity in the historical world cannot be accounted for unless we suppose that there is an all-pervading spirit of which the several parts are the lower and higher manifestations. These are the successive attempts of nature to come back to the spirit from which it has gone out.

The second argument which Ward adduces to establish the psychical nature of the world is the consideration that mind is always implicated in life. In biological evolution there is a teleological factor. We have here the principles of self-conservation and subjective selection. These " teleological factors imply not a non-descript force called vital, but a psychical something endowed with feeling and will. Finally, recalling our survey of evolution in the wider sense, we have seen that, unless the cosmos itself is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indwelling, informing Life and Mind. " (N. & A. Vol. II p. 302) But this only proves that there is an all pervading mind and not that everything is a self. If the former hypothesis is enough, we do not need the latter. The law of parsimony requires that we should not multiply entities without necessity. If nature is teleological, if it conforms to human intelligence and is amenable to human ends, it only shows that the opposition between the two is not absolute. (See N. & A Vol. II p. 254). Ward argues that to call "such descriptive scheme pure or rational science is to emphasise its source in mind; and when this intelligible scheme of our devising, with which the scientific inquirer greets Nature is confirmed by Nature's response, are we not justified in concluding that Nature is intelligent or that there is intelligence behind it ? " (P. & T. p. 5) The two alternatives are not the same. Nature is intelligible but not intelligent. There is unity between nature and mind but not oneness. The next argument is that based on the law of continuity. Granting that there is guidance or direction in vital process, does it prove that it is a mind that is everywhere present ? Ward appeals to the law of continuity. "Of such guidance or direction, we have immediate experience only in the case of our own activity, as in building a house or organising a business. It may well seem rash therefore to attribute such processes as the formation of chlorophyll in a blade of grass or of albumen in a grain of corn to guidance in this sense. But at all events they are processes pertaining exclusively to living organisms, and found nowhere else......But it may be asked, what right have we to identify life and mind; what right, for example to credit plants with souls as Aristotle did ? The right that the principle of continuity gives us. No sharp line can be drawn between plants and animals, nor between higher animals and lower."* But continuity is just the problem to be explained. It is a neat summing up of the question and not its solution. The only argument which Ward offers in support of continuity is this : "Recent knowledge has shown the range of life to extend far into the region of what was once regarded as the inanimate, purely physical world, and it has further shown the lowest known organism to be highly complex and extremely varied But there is nothing to suggest that we have reached the limits of life; all we can say is that our senses and the artificial aids and methods of research at present available do not enable us to discriminate between yet simpler forms of life and their environment; not they do not exist." (P. & T. p. 21) We cannot say, that they do exist. It is an open question. They may exist or may not. There is no doubt that we have a limit to life in matter or mere externality. Even though life may be said to be present throughout, it does not follow that it is present in the form of a self. Logically the argument would require us to consider continuity to be complete from matter upwards. The law of continuity brings out an essential truth that while matter is necessary to life, life is necessary to mind and so on. But it does not ask us to

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*(*Heredity and Memory* pp. 7-8.)

reduce all the complex facts of experience to a single type.

Dr. Ward's next argument is that we cannot have an inanimate object; for " what can neither do nor suffer, what is nothing for itself, is truly nothing at all; ..every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endeavours to persist in its own being". (P. & T. p 21). Nature, if real must be a plurality of conative individuals. It will be conceded that all objects tend to persist in their own beings; but is this tendency an impulse ? And is every impulse a conation. If pluralism believes that every object is a self with conative impulse localised in it, it is an assumption. It is Ward's belief that throughout we have spontaneity though not absolute activity. As the materialist's atom is completely determined from without and has no spontaneity, it is unreal. Wholly inert things which are mechanically related to each other are unreal. In a world of pure matter thus conceived, motion would be impossible. On the panpsychist theory, matter is to be regarded as " the manifestations of the interaction of perceptive and appetitive monads or entelechies." (P. & T. p. 63) The changes of the material world are not due to any transcendent cause but to the " impulses initiated and determined by feeling. " (*Ibid*)

But all this is the statement of the theory and not its proof. When driven to a corner, Ward admits that panpsychism is only a matter of faith. He only proves that there is no such thing as a mere potentiality unrelated to any mind. It is only the lower limit which is always in conjunction with a higher limit The upper and the lower limits are just the ideal abstractions which are found present in all the monads. ' So then it would seem that as the unattainable upper limit of pluralism points towards an absolute and unconditioned Being transcending the Many, so the unattainable lower limit points towards an indeterminate Being, an *apeiron*, that affords no ground for the discrimination of individuals at all." (P. & T. p 196) The lower limit is the *Prakriti* or the bare potentiality or matter or non being. Any attempt to regress to the lower limit takes us to the notion of pure potentiality and this, of course, Ward admits, to be an abstraction. If it should exist by itself, then we would require a Prime Mover from outside to set it in motion. And so he says that the first concrete living individual is a mixture of both and it has in it the tendency to act. What we have is life or activity, though our intelligence is able to perceive in it these two. The upper or the active is the principle of kinship or identity. The lower or the passive is the principle of individuation The former gives the unity of direction: the latter makes the monads different. When the individuals strive to better themselves, it is the imperfection due to the lower limit that they are trying to get over. Thus the upper and the lower limits are the Being and the Non-being of the absolutists.

Ward thinks that panpsychism alone is needed for theism. "We cannot begin with theism, nor, unless dualism is refuted can we ever attain to it. Naturalism which regards matter as wholly independent of mind and mind as wholly dependent on matter is the inevitable outcome of dualism and has ever barred the way to theism." (P. & T. p. 483). It is true that naturalism is an obstacle to theism, true that a Cartesian dualism leads to naturalism, true also that we must have a spiritualist monism; but this spiritualist monism need not be of the panpsychist type. The panpsychism of James Ward is not very different from the primitive anthropomorphism which made souls of everything. It has had a long history. Thales believed that the world was full of Gods. Leibniz thought that all nature was animated. Clifford regarded the molecules as possessed of mind-stuff, which became consciousness when present in sufficient complexity as in man. The truth that the panpsychist hypothesis contains is the kinship of nature with spirit. It asserts that in spite of all apparent opposition and antagonism nature is not alien to spirit; but when it denies all distinction between them it goes hopelessly wrong. It is at the opposite pole to materialism. While the latter reduces all to the lowest limit, the former elevates all to the highest. But nothing is gained by spiritualising matter or materialising mind. Body is not soul, and matter is not monad. The idealists are charged with confusing things with thoughts. Whether the idealists are open to this charge or not, Ward is. He dissolves the concreteness of the world into a white blankness. The mystic unity of mind swallows up all differences. While it is important to maintain identity it is equally important to maintain difference. It is useless and unphilosophical to exaggerate or minimise, identity or difference. It is strange that the critic who is vehement in attacking the absolutists for minimising the significance of diversity should himself have succumbed to this temptation.

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If the whole world is psychical, how it is we have dead nature? If everything possessesa self, how does it happen that we have apparently selfless beings in the world of matter? With Bergson Ward argues that matter is only the arrest of spirit. As Bergson urges that reality is life, *élan vital*, and matter is the arrest of spirit even so, Ward thinks that throughout the world we have present the psychical in the sense of the historical or the purposive or the spontaneous, which becomes later mechanised. As in human life the behaviour which is first unique and purposive becomes later regular and automatic, even so in the world, fixity and materiality are the products of spirit and spontaneity. The living purposes of selves get crystallised into inert solids. From this it follows that we have no fixity at the beginning, but that the orderliness and regularity come into operation in the later stages. The whole world at the beginning is *natura naturans*, where the subjects make trials and efforts. When the trials succeed they get stamped in as *natura naturata.* The regular ordered aspects of the universe represent the *natura naturata.* At the start there is no order, it is yet to be. In the initial stages every thing is indefinite. The individuals create order which is just the ground traversed. Freedom represents the *natura naturans.* Thus according to Ward the spontaneity of living agents underlies the whole uniformity and regularity of the historical world. But are we to suppose that the golden age was in the past and the future which we are achieving at great cost and trouble will result in a complete mechanisation of mind? Is this the goal of the epigenetic process of the world? Or perhaps as epigenesis involves new beginnings, it can somehow create perfection of creative activity. While a dead automatism promises to be the goal of the process when viewed logically still as we allow new beginnings, it may be that perfect automatism becomes suddenly transformed into perfect spontaneity. Again it is not easy to see how mental activities become material states. How can the interaction of spiritual entities called monads account for the appearance of matter? That mind and matter are opposed in their features does not show that mind is real and matter is shadow. Ward knows that it will also be objected to the theory that "we have only to an insignificant extent shaped Nature, we have not made it" (P. & T. p. 20)

Ward is not satisfied with this account of the genesis of matter. His system requires that nature should operate from the beginning of things. So he puts forward a different theory that nature is only an indefinite number of simple monads The bare monads or the lowest forms are in contact directly without any intervening medium. These constitute the material environment which serves as the uniform medium for the intercourse of the higher monads. The inorganic world consisting of bare monads constitutes the mechanical basis for the life of the higher monads. " The existence of an indefinite number of simple monads would provide all the 'uniform medium' for the intercourse of higher monads that these can require" (P. & T. p. 257). The bare monads and the higher monads are all monads and therefore alive. But in one case it is life without memory and recognition ; in the other it is life with them. As the consciousnesses of the bare monads are momentary and as they do not learn by experience, they act in a routine manner. A bare monad is in essence its own body. It has only a momentary consciousness without memory, a pure sensation, an immediacy of awareness. To use Bergson's phrase the bare monad is self-repeating movement, the higher is unique creative movement. The lower limit of the plurality of the monads is according to Ward the mass point or centre of force physical and psychical. He says it is a momentary consciousness devoid of memory and recognition. But why should we look upon it as psychical or conscious when it has none of the features associated with psyche or consciousness. It does not grow expert by experiment. When we do not see any signs of consciousness, why should we indulge in the speculation that it is conscious ? That the world of inorganic matter is made up of momentary consciousnesses is a pure guess. We are under no obligation to think that the bare monads have any consciousness at all or possess perception and appetition or sensation and activity. If they are not conscious, how do they generate consciousness. Even granting that they are conscious without memory, how is memory produced ? How can a momentary consciousness without memory, develop into a synthesising mind with memory ? Ward calls the primitive condition one where the monads are not differentiated. It is an indeterminate something where many are nascent. How does this indeterminate something of a material environment move out into the world of motion and life ? It cannot be said that the bare monads and the higher monads exist together from the beginning, for Ward proposes to be faithful to experience and in the historical evolution of the world matter comes first and life later. What is it that quickens the bare potentiality called matter by Ward into the development of the universe? Are we to follow Aristotle and hold that a prime mover is needed to set the ball in motion? Is not the way of escape offered by Absolutism, which on the hypothesis that matter is spirit gone out of itself can account for its coming back to its nature at the end of things? The lowest limit which is mere externality forces us to posit the highest limit as well. For the bare monads which in historical evolution precede the conscious living monads to develop into the rich universe, we should either postulate an outside cause which is illegitimate or grant that the monads themselves are prime movers which is a speculation or admit that the bare and conscious monads are the lower and higher stages of the one spirit, when the Absolute spirit becomes the creative ground and the final cause of the universe.

If Ward admits that mind stuff is present as mere externality in matter, vitality in plants, feeling in animals and thought in men, it is the same as the Absolutist doctrine; only mind stuff is not a very appropriate term. Matter, life, consciousness are the different forms in which the one ultimate spirit objectifies itself. But we have no right to identify the lower with the higher and say that all is mind. To wipe out the distinctions between the several kinds of reality is an unscientific procedure to which Ward as a psychologist very solicitous about the distinctions of experience has no right.

Even if we consider that the world is created, it is quite possible that God might have created inorganic matter. There is nothing intrinsically impossible about it. But Ward thinks that making God the creator of the world would be to attribute to Him two apparently quite distinct forms of divine activity. God has first to produce a world of mechanism and then create man and call upon him to adjust himself to it at the risk of his life. Ward cannot admit God's creation of the mechanical world as that hypothesis would make God responsible for physical evil. As we shall see, the reality of evil which is the crux of theism is overcome by his conception of a limited God who creates free monads. God does not tempt man but evil is due to man's wilful acts. As the individuals are free to try and risk, error and evil become possible. But if the natural world be looked upon as the creation of God, then He must be looked upon as the author of evil which takes place in it. God is relieved from the responsibility for physical evil which is traced to the monads. It is said that the monads on account of their inherent incapacity for progress petrified themselves into dead inert matter. But what is this petrification, which is the cause of evil, due to ? The monads are not responsible for it and if God is not, who is ? While Ward is inclined to make God the creator of the world of matter, especially when he is emphasising the necessity of matter as a fixed stable system for the higher purposes of mind and spirit, when he thinks of the wrong effects of the world called physical evil, he makes his God wash his hands of all responsibility.

Another explanation which Ward offers is that the monads which do not belong to the dominant monads are viewed as material. Each dominant monad regards its own subordinate monads as alive and vital, while subordinate monads of other dominant monads are viewed as dead and material. So to each dominant monad its own subordinate monads are not phenomena. This explanation is suggested to him from the way reality comes to be perceived by the growing individual The bicycle when it is fully controlled by the rider is not distinguished by him from himself though he calls it an object when it gets out of control. While this is true as a psychological description of the perception of external reality, it is confusing to substitute it for the metaphysical theory of the nature of reality.

Ward contends that the monads are the real individuals while the material world is only an appearance. Mechanism is a phenomenon or appearance. For pluralism, " Matter can only be phenomenal, it cannot be real. " (P. & T. p. 65) " Meanwhile we may remind those who demand of us an explanation of the appearance of mechanism, that if the term be strictly taken there need for spiritualism be no such appearance at all " (P. & T. p. 14). So the appearance of mechanism is due to our defective knowledge. The higher we advance the more completely shall we be able to interpret the world as a realm of ends. This only means that the opposition between self and the other is gradually broken down, and not that the self is the other, though it finds itself in the other.

Sometimes Ward makes matter an appearance or a phenomenon due to our scientific habits. This is another similarity between Bergson and Ward. What exists is mind. But science describes its outer surface in terms of mechanism. Nature is something relative and unreal. It is a theoretical construction. The laws of science are statistical averages which do not express the behaviour of beings. The real significance of the world can only be understood in terms of mind. Science may give us laws eminently valuable for purposes of calculation. But it is essentially abstract and hypothetical as it does not give us an account of real concrete experience. The distinction of persons and things which we know to be real in the world of experience is dissolved by Ward in a dead unity of life " The ordinary historian is content to recognise nature as indispensable so far at least as it is the scene and provides the properties of the drama. But this contrast pluralism claims altogether to transcend. To the distinction of person and thing, of nature and history, it allows only a relative value." (P. & T. p. 50). The gravamen of Ward's charge against absolutism is that it dismisses the distinctions of the many which experience tells us to be real and absolute as unreal and relative. But is Ward faithful to this experience which also tells us that physical nature is a reality ? When he dismisses the physical as relative and unreal, his ideal is not fidelity to experience but speculative consistency. And if this ideal requires the absolutist to consider the world of plurality by itself to be not the final truth, why attack him ? He is but following the impulse of logic which, Ward well knows, sometimes overrides the testimony of experience. The result of our discussion on this point clearly establishes that Ward does not give us any logical or consistent view of matter, as he views it either as the product of the interaction of monads or the context of the bare monads, merely an appearance due to defective insight or scientific habits.

IX

THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

The previous historico-critical studies led to conclusions which may with advantage be briefly summarised here. The distrust of thought and reason, to the extent found amongst most of writers examined, who have directly or indirectly put forward the proposal that beliefs should be justified by the satisfaction chiefly of emotional religious needs, has been shown to be unwarranted, frequently leading to self-contradiction. Reason is not merely relative but has in its own nature something absolute. The argument from needs has very often assumed the form of an argument from value-judgments, and in this connection it has been contended that general arguments from judgments of value alone are not sufficient to justify the kind of beliefs which they are required to support. This becomes clear when these beliefs are considered in their particular nature. It was maintained further, that for the satisfactory treatment of the general problem and in order to pay the necessary attention to the individual character of beliefs and needs, an empirical survey of both in their relation is required. In a cursory psychological survey and analysis approached from the side of beliefs and from the point of view of the principle of development, it became evident that the apparent contradictions in beliefs and in alleged needs are not necessarily final, but that their removal depends upon an advance both in the consciousness of the nature of individual needs and of the form of the individual beliefs which will satisfy them.

An elaborate detailed analysis of the nature of belief may be dispensed with here. All that is required for the purpose of this essay is to emphasise two characteristics of beliefs. They are expressions of thought, that is, they are theoretical propositions and as such at least are addressed to the intellect. To the formation of the individual's religious beliefs, and out of the beliefs of individuals the doctrinal substance of social religion is formed, contribute on the one hand needs and desires, and on the other "meshes of logically connected ideas born of observation and reasoning upon the world" and one's inner experience. Though the adoption of propositions as beliefs is influenced by feeling, they are in their own nature essentially expressions of thought: they are cognitive, concerned with ideas. And as soon as anything is expressed in the form of thought and language it *ipso facto* places itself in a position compelling rational and critical consideration. On this ground alone it might justifiably be maintained that reason is the chief court of appeal as to the validity of religious as of other beliefs. The rock on which all contrary views come to grief is the intolerable inconsistency of appealing to reason and intelligence to deny reason. Dr. Schiller recognised this inconsistency in his paper on "The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt," but his discussion is after all an appeal to the intelligence. As Dr. Oman puts it: "The work of renouncing intellect is itself a very difficult intellectual feat."[1] Even if conation and activity predominate in human nature it is thought which has to recognise that predominance.

The second characteristic of beliefs is that these propositions are regarded as true by those who hold them. They may be accepted on grounds short of demonstrative proof such as is supposed to exist in those parts of some sciences, of which no instructed person feels doubt. In saying that a belief is regarded as true it is meant at least that the proposition is accepted by reason. The problem is in part as to the real nature of reason. In the mind of the person who would minimise the importance of reason this term far too frequently suggests the process of reasoning, as predominantly or solely the passing logically from one or more premisses to a conclusion. But it is evident that for any such process (1) the meaning of each proposition must be grasped sufficiently for the purpose, and (2) " in the last issue " it must be either accepted or rejected. Only so far as the meaning is known can reason accept or reject the proposition The condition " in the last issue " is necessary because for the sake of argument one may state one's acceptance of a particular proposition or series of propositions, but if it came to the question of ultimate and genuine acceptibility, reason might reject the proposition or propositions. The premisses and the conclusion of a process of reasoning must all be grasped individually and in relation to one another immediately by the reason. There is a definite meaning in saying that reason accepts or rejects, and that this acceptance or rejection does not necessarily admit of analysis. In other words, there is no test of reason itself. When we say that " thought has come to rest " we refer to this immediate grasp of the meaning and the definite acceptance or rejection of the conclusion both in itself and in relation to the premisses. The important thing for our discussion is that when it is maintained that reason is essentially concerned in the justification of beliefs, it is not meant that a process of reasoning is required in every case, but that there must be acceptance in rational intuition. The process of reasoning may indeed be itself considered as a continuous series of rational intuitions Rational intuition has the character of immediacy and the sense of finality found in all forms of intuition. But this does not imply that every proposition accepted by the reason of any individual at a particular time is therefore to be accepted always by himself or others. Why this is so constitutes a most important consideration.

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[1] *Problem of Faith and Freedom*. 1906. *p*. 273.

Reason does not function as something merely formal and abstract. Rather it is concrete, acting as it were in and through "apperception masses", formed through experience, less or more adequate, of the subject matter. Frequently reason is called upon to judge between what appear to be the only alternatives and it accepts one. Later, another possibility may become evident and the previously chosen proposition may be rejected. As an example may be taken the famous argument with regard to Jesus, that either the claims he made are true or he was an impostor. Faced by those two alternatives many persons knowing the impression of the goodness of the character of Jesus they have experienced, have felt compelled to reject the latter alternative and to accept the former. Later, it has become sufficiently clear that there is a third possibility: that Jesus was no impostor, but being of extraordinary goodness and personal power, was the object of so much adoration on the part of his disciples, that along lines well known in human psychology, they made for him and even put into his own mouth claims he did not himself make. Reason can accept or reject only what is consciously apprehended, that is, it must be acquainted with the relevant facts. The truth with regard to reason itself seems to be, not that it is itself defective, but that it is beset with limitations owing to not yet being supplied with the whole of the necessary subject matter. "Where it knows the whole of its subject matter it judges with an authority that is beyond appeal; it has no inherent weakness".[2]

Distinction might with good grounds be made between the educated and the uneducated reason–though the term educated would have to be interpreted in the widest possible sense. Further, there must be insistence on the particular character of the propositions concerned. The reason of the historian may be an educated one with regard to history, for in that reference he has formed "apperception masses." It may, however, be quite uneducated with reference to chemistry. The rational intuitions of the "theologically" educated must be looked upon as more likely to be correct on matters of religious belief than those of persons not thus educated. In passing, however, it is imperative to protest that by "theologically educated" here we do not include the majority of those called theologians at the present time. These are far too often men who are well informed on matters philological and historical relating to the sacred scriptures, doctrine and the history of the church, but have made no scientific study of the religious life. Many professors of philosophy also there are who with some psychological knowledge and an acquaintance with what previous thinkers have said about certain religious ideas, such as "God" and "Immortality," discuss the problems of religion, without having made an adequate study of the religious life in its diverse forms and implications, an empirical study corresponding to that which is rightly expected from one in any other sphere of research.

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[2] Illingworth J. R. *Reason and Revelation.* 1902. p. 67.

The fundamental motive underlying all active thought, whether expressed or not, is to view the aspects of experience as rational and intelligible. The implicit faith in all intellectual investigation is that the data with which the investigation deals may be grasped as factors in a scheme more or less rational and systematic. This is so whether the aim is purely intellectual or whether the knowledge is sought as a means to some other kind of satisfaction. Ultimately we have to recognise that reason "accepts itself," and that is no more and no less circular than when, in using the term *self-consciousness* we mean that the self is aware of itself. The existence of elements of empirical data which do not at once fit into a rational whole is not regarded as a ground for reason to abandon its attitude, but rather as an instigation for more arduous and careful consideration. "What is alogical now for A or B is not therefore destined to remain so for all men coming"[3]. If a distinction is made between what men really believe and what they may think they believe, it will be found that the former beliefs are always held because the world appears more intelligible with than without them. The test of the acceptibility of a particular proposition, even for common sense, is in most cases the extent of its conformity with the general system (more or less "ragged-edged") already accepted. Only occasional extraordinary experiences lead to such radical change in grouping or looking at the facts that one may justifiably talk of the acceptance of a new general system.

One distinct method of reason is its rejection of the contradictory, and its aim at general consistency. This is not disputed by anyone. The great difficulty is that of sufficiently careful analysis as to when propositions are in real contradiction. The fallacy of so many of the earlier Idealists has been to confuse the rational consistency of propositions with an actual metaphysical and ethical harmony of realities. Yet propositions describing a world full of oppositions and conflicts might form parts of a coherent non-contradictory system of propositions. The tendency, especially among Absolutists, is to talk as though they suppose that when they have fought for a consistent view of reality they have established the position that there are no ultimate oppositions in reality. For this attitude there is no logical justification. All that may be said is that we have no ground for believing that actual oppositions are irremediably and ultimately a characteristic of reality and so may proceed to enquire how those oppositions of which we are aware may be overcome. We may say at least that it is not irrational to accept the view that ultimately all reality may be harmonious.

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[3] F. H. Bradley. *Mind.* Oct. 1909.

On this ground, therefore, seeing that needs and beliefs are different products of the same reality, arising in, or in the case of beliefs being accepted by, the same human minds, it may be maintained that there is, in some form or other, a connection between human needs and the validity of the beliefs which will satisfy them. The important question, where the justification of beliefs is concerned, is, as we have previously urged, not as to any general principle, but as to the particular beliefs.

It should be a commonplace to say that the kind of evidence which reason demands for the justification of beliefs depends upon the actual character of the individual beliefs. Religious beliefs are the intellectual expression of the " objective " and the " subjective " sides of the religious experience, and the types of relationship involved. To give an adequate account of these beliefs would require a careful statement of the diverse thought contents of the different religions in their historical development. By speculative philosophers, abstract theologians, agnostic journalists and scientists, it is far too frequently overlooked that these thought contents or beliefs in the religions have been formed in relation with empirical facts of religious experience. To the particular individuals who experience these facts the presence of " objective " elements is not open to doubt. So also in the historical development of beliefs in the religious life of the community the objective aspects are sufficiently maintained. In reference to the former it is important to remember that religious beliefs are in the first place a personal and individual concern. The justification a person may suggest to himself for a particular belief may appeal to him from some peculiarly individual experience. For philosophy to refuse to recognise this is futile. If a philosopher is, for example, a genuine Theist, he must admit at least the possibility of God exerting influence in a quite distinct and individual manner on a distinct individual human being, and one such influence might be in making a particular person aware of a particular need, or that a particular belief satisfied a particular need, or aware both of the need and the belief at the same time. To the individual experient in such cases, as those of religious and moral prophets, there is no doubt of the objectivity, although others may not have felt it till this particular individual brings it before them in a way in which they may obtain the same kind of experience. How particular beliefs or particular ideas originate in the mind, how they make their appearance in the history of the race, whether in religion or in any other sphere, is not clear, and although no more than one individual has the knowledge, it may nonetheless be truly objective.

The character of the objective is its inevitableness: it is not what we wish to think but what we must think. There is a feeling of compulsion about it. This inevitableness may be felt by one or a few individuals and not by others till a later time, or even perhaps never if they do not come into the particular conditions in which to feel it. It is radically wrong to treat what may be individually experienced as though it is simply subjective.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the beliefs with which philosophy and science generally are concerned are those which may become shared by all. In other words, universality is attributed to the truths which the beliefs are supposed to express. The correct representation of the distinction between what is objective for the particular individual and what is objective for all is one of the most difficult problems of philosophy and upon its solution depends also, practically, the increase of tolerance amongst persons of diverse religious beliefs. The objective for all has been described as that which " is so far detachable from the series of our private experience that it may be made an object of universal apprehension. " But though " detachment " may seem logically conceivable, it may be questioned whether it is psychologically possible. If a man uses the term " God ", he means by it (1) a certain particular concept, relating to (2) certain religious experiences, and these may include aspects entirely peculiar to his point of view, aspects which are to him just as objective as any others. The test of objectivity appears to be not so much an identity as a consistency of individual objectives.[4] The activity of one individual upon another, " intersubjective intercourse ", widens the experience of the different individuals in related ways, so that for those concerned there is a growth of knowledge and often also of language. Only such a conception of the " universal " and " objective ", and not the common denominator theory, is adequate for the rational consideration of religious beliefs. Only such a view will enable humanity to arrive at a conception of religion, or of reality as known in the religious experience, which will be as rich in content as the religious life itself. The question is not: "What has this, that, and the other person, experienced in common, or might experience in common ? " but " What is the richest consistent whole taking into account the similarities and the diversities of the different individual experience[5] ?" Thus we are again led back to the necessity of a scientific study and a philosophic consideration of religious beliefs for which a wide empirical survey is essential.

Whatever its references beyond, religion for the individual seems more than anything else to have some of its most important roots in his own nature. So the propositions which he adopts as beliefs must have a definite relation to this. They must have that relation to his religious needs suggested in a wider reference to truth in general in the passage from Dr. Bussell ' If truth is to mean anything to me it must be my truth; truth within my powers of apprehension and in relation to certain of my cherished aspirations".[5] The individual may, and often must, seek to justify to himself his acceptance of a belief by pointing to the authority of some other person or some corporate institution, – as the Muslims to Mahomet and the Christians to the Councils or other representative assemblies of the Church. This, however, is not to justify the proposition itself, but simply the individual's acceptance of it as a belief. The real justification must in the end be one which appeals to the individual mind, quite apart from whether others accept it or not. This justification being felt, the fact that others generally accept it will give, at any rate psychologically, a confirmation and a strengthening of the belief. And in the end, irksome though it may seem to the average individual, he can have no adequate, no serious and stable justification of his beliefs without the use of his own reason. Even though he may not himself seek grounds but only accept grounds put forward by others, his acceptance is an act of reason and the worth of his efforts to justify his beliefs will depend chiefly upon the serious persistent use of his reason, and upon the width of his survey of relevant facts.

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[4] Absolutism regarding the individual objectives as ultimately not merely logically identical but also as metaphysically identical gets rid of the problem by virtually denying the metaphysical reality of individual consciousnesses as such.

[5] *Christian Theology and Social Progress*. 1907. p. 166.

Though the real justification for the individual depends thus on the exercise of his own reason it is not correct to represent this as predominantly individualistic as does Mr. Kidd. As a matter of fact a wider and more varied influence is exerted upon the individual through speech and the printed page, that is, through that which appeals to thought than is exerted in any other way. The power of contagious emotion and feeling may admittedly be stronger and more intense in particular experiences, but the range of persons affected is always less than those influenced by ideas, which live on through centuries. The development of a justifiable and satisfactory system of beliefs is a social and historical task. The majority of the ideas in the thought of the individual have been passed on to him through his life in the community, and these ideas have grown up in the experience of the race.

It is through thought expressed in language that he enters into this inheritance. Innovations and modification made by individuals are not great except in the occasional instances of outstanding personalities. Nevertheless, the progress of knowledge depends upon the contribution made by the average thinker who confidently uses his own reason.

The contributions which can be made are of two kinds: first, the expression of some need or the more accurate analysis of a need previously incorrectly or inadequately analysed ; and second, the suggestion of a justifiable means of satisfying the need. Advance involves both of these. Needs are part of the data which thought must survey and consider when reason is presented with certain propositions for acceptance or rejection. On the other hand the propositions cannot be regarded as justifiable satisfactions of the need unless the other aspects of experience are also given due consideration. For the former a careful untiring analysis of the need is essential ; for the latter a wide and penetrating examination of other facts and propositions. It is as wrong to leave the fact of particular needs out of account as it is to assume without thoroughgoing investigation that particular beliefs actually satisfy the needs and are justifiable simply on that ground.

From one side and from another we are led to the conclusion that though each belief requires individual consideration the acceptance of most beliefs will depend not so much on the particular evidence for them as upon their fitting into a general scheme of expressions more or less appropriate of a " type of life " and conception of " the world." The justification of beliefs which reason itself demands is not simply an abstract logical consistency of propositions but a consistency of propositions with percepts, with feeling and the active striving of the mind. Reason cannot accept propositions which are contradictory, in conflict with perceived facts, or in utter opposition to the persistent generic feelings and strivings of men.

Though these last may appear to be subjective, they have nevertheless just as much claim to consideration in philosophical reflection on the validity of beliefs as have those perceived facts which are usually regarded as objective. The fault of most of the positions previously discussed, showing distrust of reason, was chiefly that of dividing into two complete spheres what should only be considered as different kinds of facts within one experience. One and the same reason is called upon to survey the whole facts and in relation to them thought must develop its system of beliefs. The creed or scheme of beliefs (with ragged edges, no doubt) will be rather a "philosophy of life" than a "cosmology" in the older sense. It will do justice on the one hand to the nature of the human soul in all its concreteness and particularity as a knowing, feeling, and active subject, and on the other hand to the character of the world, other than itself, in which it lives. This indeed is the kind of justification the reason of the average educated believer in any particular religion seeks when asked to give a reason for the faith that is in him. For each particular religion is, as such, a type of life, and its world-view has its justification in its agreement with all sides of that life in relation to the world in which it is lived. Here there is neither a scepticism towards reason nor an attitude which expects to find all established by merely logical intellectual operations. This general attitude of the ordinary educated believer is also the most justifiable philosophically. The difference between the theologian or philosopher from such a person will consist entirely in the greater care and penetration in analysis of needs and beliefs, in the wider grasp of facts, and the fuller appreciation of their meaning. The evolution of religion and of its implicated beliefs will show the same tendency, i. e. towards a more correct knowledge of the nature of needs, a clearer and more careful statement of beliefs, a more comprehensive understanding of the relevant data.

Every philosophy of life, every creed or scheme of beliefs, implicitly or explicitly involves some propositions in themselves ultimate. The critical consideration of these principles is to be regarded as the concern of metaphysics, usually best left to the metaphysician. But the more seriously any individual endeavours to justify his beliefs the more of a metaphysician must he become. In the main these principles may be said formally to transcend time relations, nevertheless it is worthy of notice that the knowledge of these principles amongst men begins at particular points in time.

The fact just mentioned turns the attention at once to the historical, and in this connection two things must be insisted on : first, the possibility of the attainment of insight into other, at present unknown, principles ; and second, that principles are interwoven with empirical data with historical relations. The facts of experience owe a very large amount of their character, and very much of their significance to their historical relationship Philosophy in the past has far too often neglected to take into account the historical, not merely in its formal nature but also in its concrete fulness. Leave out the actual continuous flow and interaction of the concrete facts of history in their individuality, and little else than merely logical formalities are left for thought If human feelings and activities are to be taken into account, if the needs from which these activities partly spring are to be duly considered, then the course of human history must be carefully studied and its interpretation sought. As it appears to us reality is historical and a philosophy which does not recognise this is not a philosophy of life but of death.

This applies to the historical on all its sides. Especially however, in this essay attention should be directed to the facts of the history of religion as seen in the religions. When emphasis is placed again and again on the necessity for the philosophy of religion to be based on an empirical

Alban G. Widgery

survey of the data of religious experience it is not meant that the facts revealed by present psychological analysis shall alone be considered, but along with these also those of religious development.

All the great religions have definite contact not merely with the historical as such but also with particular historical facts. In the course of history men become conscious of their needs and in the course of history the grounds of their satisfaction are revealed. Some of these grounds may be actual individual historical facts, or experiences accepted as historical facts. The life of Gautama Buddha contains a clear presentation of certain deeply rooted human needs and further than that a noble eightfold path by which it is believed Gautama himself as a historical fact reached the peace of Nirvana. For many Christians the need of the triumph of life over death, of the powers of good over those of evil, seems manifested in the "tragedy" of the Cross and its satisfaction to be indubitably established by the physical resurrection of Jesus

How far such beliefs as the realisation of Nirvana by Gautama Buddha or the resurrection of Jesus are based on actual facts must be left for historical science to try to ascertain. Again it may be held that what the historian accepts will depend in large measure upon the relations of particulars with the main plan. The particular event or personality while considered in its individual nature has also to be interpreted in relation with the whole historical development of which it is a part. In this task of the historian the claims of a rational intelligible system will be recognised, but it must be protested strongly that this does not imply mere mechanical uniformity, but may involve an immense variety of facts, many unique in character, and just on account of that uniqueness of the utmost importance. Whether the assertion of such particular "facts" is accepted or not may depend on the evidence presented in support, and the strength of this will depend in part upon the general philosophy of life held.

Though the famous dictum of Lessing will be generally accepted, that " Contingent facts of history can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason, " it is becoming more clear that contingent facts of history may nevertheless be the means by which the mind is brought to pay attention to important truths Truths may be revealed to the human mind through its experience of historical facts. But the significance of history for the consideration of the relation of needs and the justification of beliefs is chiefly that it presents an open possibility for the nature of human needs to become more and more clearly felt and understood and for thought to attain to an acceptable system of beliefs. What is required is an *attitude* of persistent endeavour to know the truth. Dogmatism, scepticism, and anti-intellectualism are chiefly due to impatience in the search for truth. To this it can only be said that a peace of ignorance and ease is dishonourable whether it disavows all knowledge or whether it claims to be already in adequate possession.

The justification of beliefs may thus, in conclusion, be said to be a task of reason functioning in relation to the relevant subject matter, part of which are the facts of human needs. Reason is called on to understand the propositions and in consideration of the empirical data to accept or reject them. In this task it will examine propositions individually in themselves, but even more evidently in relation to other propositions and to the whole nature of human life. The justification of beliefs will be almost entirely a question of the justification of a whole philosophy of life including a view of the world. A most important aspect of the empirical is its historical nature and this is to be given its due in the philosophy of life. And the historical point of view gives room for confidence that sooner or later the whole of human needs will be accurately known at the same time that they will be met by a completely justifiable body of beliefs.

NOTES.

I. Besides the charges of relativity discussed in Vol. I articles XX & XXVI a further charge is sometimes based on the theory of evolution. It is contended that as man is at a stage of evolution his reason, as every other aspect of his nature, is defective This argument has only to be consistently applied in order to refute itself. If the theory of evolution – a product of reason – involves that reason is imperfect, the theory itself must necessarily share in the imperfection. But it was only on the ground of the theory being absolute that it was thought necessary to apply it to the reason, and this absoluteness must be traced back to the source of the theory, i. e. reason. In his earlier writings Mr. Balfour put forward a charge similar to this, but as Professor H. Jones wrote concerning his view : " The fact is, that on this basis there can be no criterion whatever of knowledge, and one is puzzled to know how Mr. Balfour has discovered that the sensuous material of knowledge is illusory and that the reason which operates on that material is defective ". (*Hibbert Journal Vol. III.* 456). Try as one may it is impossible to escape attributing to reason an absolute nature. Metaphysics will insist that in some sense reason transcends evolution. But this is not to deny a real meaning in the idea of an evolution of knowledge. Such an evolution will be admitted in the manner suggested in the present paper, as due to an increasing contact of reason with the data of experience.

II. Mr. J. G. Walker has drawn my attention to Henry Sidgwick's Essay: "On the nature of the evidence for Theism, " (*Henry Sidgwick : A Memoir.* Appendix I.) in which the similarity between verification in the realm of science and in that of philosophy and religion is emphasised. It is contended that the more we examine " the process of change in what is commonly accepted as knowledge, the more we find that the notion of verification by experience – in the sense of verification by particular sense perceptions – is inadequate to explain it or justify it. The criterion which we find really decisive in case after case, is not any particular new sense perception or group of new sense perceptions, but consistency with an elaborate and complicated system of beliefs in which the results of an indefinite number of perceptions and inferences are combined. Hence we are led to accept certain religious views as being, more than any other view of the universe, consistent with and calculated to impart a clear consistency to the whole body of what we commonly agree to take for knowledge – including knowledge of right and wrong – *we accept it on grounds analogous to those on which important scientific conclusions have been accepted.* " The method of justification of beliefs here stated in Mr. Walker's words is in essentials the same as that maintained in the present chapter. But if the difference in the subject matter of religious beliefs and the propositions of the natural sciences is remembered it will be seen that the statement (Vol. I. p. 306) that "the type of verification possible in the natural sciences is not possible for religious beliefs " is not meant to deny an " *analogous* " form of verification in the general sense insisted upon, but that there is no similar method of accurate experiment by which all might be convinced.

X

A SCHEME FOR A BUDDHIST BIBLIOGRAPHY

J. MASUDA AND OTHERS

With increased attention to its own past, India, waking up to a more independent spirit, will surely turn increasingly to the study of Buddhism. For the rise and decline of Buddhism in India forms one of the great problems of human history. The compilation of a Buddhist Bibliography is therefore a task worthy of the members of an Indian Association and our members are urged to co-operate in it. A scheme for a Buddhist Bibliography is given below: much work has already been done upon it. Information having definite relation to the locality from which it is sent, perhaps obtainable nowhere else, would be specially useful: this applies particularly to manuscripts and to *epigrapha*. Needless to say valuable information, however small in quantity, will be acknowledged in the publication.

The following are some of those already invited to participate, especially for the sections mentioned :– *Bk.* I. i. C. V. Rajvade, M A., B.Sc., Prof. of Pali, the College, Baroda; Bk. I. ii. J. C. Chatterji, B. A. (Cantab.), Dharmadhyaksha of Baroda State, Formerly in Archaeological Service in Kashmeer State; Bk. I. iii. C. D. Dalal, M. A. Sanskrit Librarian, Baroda State; *Bk.* II. vii. Rev. Ekai Kawaguchi, Author of *Three Years in Tibet*, Lecturer in Tibetan in the Imperial University of Tokio;

Bk. II. ii. Surigoda Sumangala, Principal, Vidyadaya College, Maligakande, Colombo, Ceylon; Bk. iii, Shew Zan Aung. B. A. Treasury Officer and Headquarter's Magistrate, Henzada, Burma, Translator of the *Abhidhammattha-sangaha*; With relation to Bk. II. v. H.R.H. Prince Vivit Warma Preeja, Bangkok, Siam is being requested to supply information ; Bk. II. ix. and xi. Jiryo Masuda, Scholar deputed to India for researches by the Busan College, Tokio, Bk. I. iv. Prof Alban G. Widgery, M. A. (Cantab.). The volume will he edited by Prof. Widgery and Mr. Masuda.

Librarians are requested to send (1) information regarding MSS existing in their Libraries or known to exist in their locality, especially those not already mentioned in published Catalogues; (2) the names of published Catalogues in which any such MSS they possess are mentioned.

Professors and other Scholars of Sanskrit or any languages implied in the Scheme of the Bibliography, are requested to send information concerning literature in their particular languages printed or in MSS having reference to Buddhism according to the Sections proposed in the Scheme.

The work will be greatly facilitated if contributors will observe the following :

(*a*) The contributor should state clearly his name and address and should initial all papers.

(*b*) Each independent subject should be treated on a separate sheet of paper.

(*c*) References to MSS should, whenever possible, give the place where they are preserved.

(*d*) References to books and articles should contain whenever possible the place and date of publication. The name of the book should be underlined, and care should be taken to give the exact initials and spelling of the name of the author.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that accuracy is of most fundamental importance.

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N. B.—

* To prevent inordinate length the compilers of the present work find it necessary to limit the number of references to non-canonical works in Sinhalese, Burmese, Siamese and Japanese to about fifty representative works.

† References to Canonical and non-canonical works in Tibetan and Chinese are limited to 250. An examination of the comparative catalogue of the Chinese canon with the Tibetan compiled by Ch'ing-'chi-hsiang and others in A. D. 1285-1287 (Chi-yüan-'fa-pau-k'an-t'ung-tsung-lu') shows that many of the works are identical. In the section on Tibetan Buddhist literature, therefore, emphasis will be laid on works not found in the Chinese Tripitaka.

‡ The canon in Mongolian is entirely left out in the present work, as it is a mere translation of the Tibetan canon, rendered during the reign of Kublai-khan (1279-1294).

XI

THE MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP OF THE VEDĀNTA SŪTRAS

S. K. BELVALKAR

To doubt the genuineness of an ancient text, to smell interpolations in it, to call into question the correctness of its traditionally ascribed authorship and to hypostatise more than one author or teacher of the same name, are often likely to be regarded as marks of true scholarship and critical acumen; and it must be admitted that in their zeal for appearing original scholars sometimes do tend to invent startling theories and bolster them up by arguments the most flimsy. But it would be unfair to make such a sweeping accusation against all attempts to call to book the current time-honoured literary traditions. In a few cases at least it must have happened that to set up a dual or a multiple personality was the only way to harmonise and explain satisfactorily certain stubborn and well-ascertained facts. For example, a friend of mine recently took me to task for summoning up into existence a Gauḍapāda different from the teacher's teacher of the great S'aṅkarāchārya. But can we credit the author of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikās with a literary forgery of the most shameless type, being no less than an almost wholesale misappropriation of another's work and palming it off as his own ?

I have proposed to myself in this paper the thankless task of delivering a few strokes of the hammer against a literary fact which all have been hitherto content to accept as a fact. Of what is known as the *Prasthāna-traya* for the Vedānta philosophy, viz. the Upanishads, the Brahmasūtras and the Bhagavad-gītā, the Upanishads have long ago been recognized as belonging to different times and different authors, though the task of distributing the whole mass, on the basis of some strictly scientific chronological tests, into definite strata has not yet been satisfactorily performed. For the Gītā Garbe's conclusions have been generally accepted as almost the final word on the subject. And although I have my own quarrel with Garbe on many a point—I hope soon to be able to lay the whole case before scholars—the existence of interpolations in, and consequently the multiple authorship of, the Gītā is in any case an idea that has been before the literary world for some time. Not so with the Brahma-sūtras. They have always been regarded as the work of one individual, Bādarāyaṇa or Vyāsa, although Bādarāyaṇa himself is quoted in the sūtras explicitly in eight places (i. 3. 33, iii. 2. 41, iii. 4.1, iii. 4. 8, iii.4.19, iv.3. 15, iv.4.7, iv.4.12) and implicitly in two more (iii.4.40, iv.1.27). It was of course recognised that Bādarāyaṇa had his predecessors—काशकृत्स्न, औडुलोमि, आश्मरथ्य, आत्रेय, कार्ष्णाजिनि, and others—who, like him, essayed the task of harmonising the diverse and divergent teaching of the Upanishads, and Bādarāyaṇa often quotes their views with reverence. It may be that some of these even composed sūtras which might have served as models for Bādarāyaṇa. But the sūtras in their present form scholars have generally ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa alone. The case is in fact parallel to that of Pāṇini the grammarian. As the more perfect work of Pāṇini effectually supplanted those of his predecessors so did that of Bādarāyaṇa those of काशकृत्स्न, आश्मरथ्य and others. And as Pāṇini unconsciously used the technical terms of his predecessors (cp. i. 3.120 आङोनाऽस्त्रियाम् upon which Bhaṭṭoji remarks (आङिति टासंज्ञा प्राचाम्) so might Bādarāyaṇa have utilised the labours of his predecessors, though we have no means to lay our finger accurately on such occurrences. But to admit indebtedness to predecessors is one thing and to suspect later interpolations in a work is quite another thing.

And yet I want to make some capital from the fact of Bādarāyaṇa's admitted indebtedness to his predecessors. If Bādarāyaṇa improves upon his predecessors that means that the Vedānta doctrine, like the science of grammar, was gradually formulated or evolved ; and if Pāṇini had his Kātyāyana, his Patañjali, and his Kās'ikākāras who, with more or less deference to the original text of the sūtras, suggested improvements and made corrections in Pāṇini by composing *vārttikas* which, in spite of the Bhāshyakāra, have in four or five cases at least got inseparably mixed up with the original sūtras so that we cannot say whether they are Pāṇini's sūtras or Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*, why must we hold Bādarāyaṇa exempt from sharing a similar fate at the hands of his successors ? For instance, it is usual to explain the occurrence of the name of Bādarāyaṇa himself in the sūtras as a polite third-personal reference of the author to his own doctrines ; but why should Pāṇini have denied to himself the credit for this politeness even though occasions for its exhibition were not wanting ? And for the Vedānta sūtras the case is much more complicated by the puzzling circumstance that while the Vedānta sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa quote in at least ten clear cases (i. 2 28, i. 2.31, i. 3.31, iii.2.40, iii.4.2, iii.4.18, iii.4.40, iv. 3.12, iv.4 5, iv 4.11) जैमिनि the author of the पूर्वमीमांसासूत्रs by name, Jaimini's Pūrva-mīmāṁsā sūtras in turn quote Bādarāyaṇa three times (i. 1.5, v. 2.19, xi. 1.64) by name. Unless we imagine therefore that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa were not only contemporaries but fellow-workers who compared notes almost every day, it would be difficult to explain the fact of this mutual quotation except on the assumption, by no means improbable, that these references were supplied by the pupils of these sūtrakāras at some later period, unless of course, as a third alternative, we gratuitously ascribe the composition of all the sūtras in their present form not to the reputed sūtrakāras but to some pupil or pupils of a later date belonging to the respective schools. Under the circumstances, therefore, the introduction of Bādarāyaṇa's own name in his sūtras *prima facie* suggests a later interpolation, though not very much removed from the time of the original sūtrakāra.

And what the earliest disciples and followers of the sūtrakāra did some of his latest commentators and expositors are not likely to be much averse from doing. Our earliest authority for the text of the Brahmasūtras is S'aṅkarāchārya who gives a total of 555 sūtras thrown into 192 अधिकरणs or topics; and it is only in one or two solitary cases, e.g. ii.i 15, that he notices any variant readings in the sūtrapāṭha. Now I have, for the purposes of this paper, carefully compared the sūtrapāṭha as given by S'aṅkara with that given by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha, Bhāskara, Vijñānabhikshu, and S'rīkaṇṭha, and have been able to gather evidence tending to prove that these later Bhāshyakāras freely altered the text of the sūtras not only by joining two successive sūtras into one or splitting one sūtra into two or changing their sequence, but have even modified the words, omitted some sūtras altogether and actually inserted new sūtras. The most glaring instances of the last kind are Vallabha's addition of वरुणाच्चाग्नीन्द्रप्रजापती between iv. 3.3 and 4, Madhva's addition of युक्तेश्च between ii.3.18 and 19, and प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधात् between ii.4.2 and 3, Bhāskara's addition of अस्थुलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घमशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम् between iii. 2.14 and 15 and Rāmānuja's addition of प्रतिज्ञाविरोधात् between i. 1. 8 and 9 and of अत एव च स ब्रह्म between i. 2.15 and 16, in which he has been followed by Nimbārka and S'rīkaṇṭha. The sūtras given by S'aṅkara and omitted by his successors form a yet longer tale. Thus Rāmānuja omits ii. 2. 31 (क्षणिकत्वाच्च), ii. 2. 38 (संबन्धानुपपत्तेः), iii. 4. 46 (श्रुतेश्च) and iv.3.5 (उभयव्यामोहात् तत्सिद्धेः), in most of which omissions he is followed by Nimbārka and S'rīkaṇṭha. Vallabha omits iii. 4.22 (भावशब्दाच्च); but the greatest offender in this respect is Bhāskara—and his editor, Vindhyes'varīprasāda, places him even earlier than Rāmānuja--who has omitted as many as ten sūtras entirely.

I will here draw attention to one of these omissions in particular, that of ii. 2. 45 (विप्रतिषेधाच्च), which, as will be remembered, is the last sūtra in a section directed against the Pāñcharātra school. Theistic commentators-Rāmānuja Nimbārka, S′rīkaṇṭha, and others are at great pains to prove that the section does not condemn the Pāñcharātra system altogether. The last sūtra विप्रतिषेधाच्च goes against such an interpretation, and its convenient omission by Bhāskara is therefore particularly noteworthy.

Some alterations in the wording of the sūtras permitted by these Bhāshyakāras are also worth consideration. In about half a dozen cases almost all the later Bhāshyakāras adopt a reading differing from that of S′aṅkara (e. g. ii. 3 44, ii 1.11, iii. 4.40, iv. 2.11, &c.) and there it seems as if S′aṅkara has adopted a wrong reading and his successors are following an independent and a correcter tradition. In other cases however the changes seem to have been deliberately made. Take for example the sūtra ii 2.19. As read by S′aṅkara it runs—इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादितिचेन्न, उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात्, which means that if the Buddhists were to maintain that the doctrine of the transitoriness of things can hold ground because of mutual causation (इतरेतरप्रत्यय), i. e. to say, because one passing moment can become the cause of the next passing moment and so on in this way through the whole groups of things in the world, that cannot be admitted ; for in this way they can at the most explain the mere origination of things (उत्पत्तिमात्र) and not their grouping together or संघात. As S′aṅkarāchārya says—इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वेऽप्यविद्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वमुत्तरोत्तरस्योत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तं भवद्भवेन्न तु संघातोत्पत्तेः किंचिन्निमित्तं संभवति। Now the word उत्पत्तिमात्र in the sūtra is not, as will be seen, explicit enough; " mere origination and *not the grouping* " is what is meant to be expressed. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Bhāskara, and S′rīkaṇṭha here read संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात्, instead of उत्पत्तिमात्रानिमित्तत्वात् thus making explicit what was only implicit. They also add one more word in the first half of the sūtra which is accordingly read— इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुप-

पञ्चामिति चेन्न. According to the usual laws of textual criticism it follows that the original sūtrapāṭha was as it is given by S′aṅkara as it contains the more difficult reading which later has been simplified. This instance is typical of a number of others of a like nature.

In the light of this evidence I believe we would be justified in asserting that the text of the Vedānta sūtras was never regarded as so rigidly fixed by tradition that any the least change in it would be absolutely sacrilegious. Changes small and large always came to be made in them not only by the earliest "vārttikakāras" but also by the later Bhāshyakāras, and in this respect they afford a striking analogy to the Ashṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini But the changes that I have been discussing hitherto cover not even a tenth part of the entire text of the sūtras. A vast majority of the sūtras are given identically by all the Bhāshyakāras. The thesis of this paper however covers a much wider range than what is implied by a few occasional variations which can by no means justify our ascribing a multiple authorship to the Vedānta-sūtras as a whole For that an evidence of an entirely different nature is needed; and that I shall now shortly put forward.

In an article "On the philosophical sūtras of the Brahmanas" contributed by him to the December 1910 issue of the Journal of the American Oriental Society—an article by the way which I was not able to consult at the time of writing this, as that particular issue of the Journal was not available to me in Poona or in Bombay—Professor Jacobi has given reasons that go far to establish the proposition that such of the sūtras from the various Dars′anas (with the notable exception of the Sāṅkhya-sūtras) as deal with the refutation of the Buddhistic theories of nihilism and idealism—शून्यवाद and विज्ञानवाद -seem to be the product of the same phase of thought and so more or less contemporary in origin in as much as the line of argument taken and even some of the words used in the argument are so very similar. Now seeing that the rise of these two schools of Buddhism into prominence are events connected with the names of नागार्जुन and वसुबन्धु and so to be definitely dated, it follows that the sūtras refuting these systems are later than the systems themselves.

So far no exception can be taken to Jacobi's reasoning. One might urge perhaps that the sūtras have in view a form of शून्यवाद or of विज्ञानवाद earlier than that to which currency was given by नागार्जुन or वसुबन्धु; but the assertion needs to be proved. I have no hesitation therefore in accepting Jacobi's conclusion as far as this point is concerned. But Jacobi goes further. He argues from the particular sūtras refuting these Buddhistic schools to the sūtras as a whole and assigns them a date ranging between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D. But if, according to Jacobi's showing, an identical line of argumentation and even identical expressions are met with in all the various Dars′anas, *prima facie* that would suggest the theory of their being inserted into the several sūtrapāṭhas if not by one hand at least during one and the same period of thought-activity. Jacobi does himself consider this possibility, but he has not been able to dispose of it satisfactorily; for he has not been able to prove that the particular sūtras are so vitally connected with the rest of the sūtrapāṭha that they cannot be omitted without breach of continuity. As far at any rate as the Vedāntasūtras are concerned not only the particular sūtras refuting the Buddhistic theories, but the whole तर्कपाद which is devoted to a refutation of the various current philosophical systems seems to my mind not perfectly in harmony with what the Vedāntasūtras as Vedāntasūtras are expected to be. As the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā sūtras formulate rules and attempt to deduce from the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas a consistent and unified system of conduct, so the Uttara-mīmāṁsā or the Vedāntasūtras should make it their business to deduce a consistent and unified system of philosophy from the Vedānta, the end of the Veda, or the Upanishads proper. They were not called upon to go out of their way

and deliver attacks against other heterodox systems. As S'aṅkarāchārya says—यद्यपीदं वेदान्तवाक्यानामैदंपर्य निरूपयितुं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तं न तर्कशास्त्रवत् केवलाभिर्युक्तिभिः कंचित् सिद्धान्तं साधयितुं दुषयितुं वा प्रवृत्तं तथापि वेदान्तवाक्यानि व्याचक्षाणः सम्यग्दर्शनप्रतिपक्षभूतानि सांख्यादिदर्शनानि निराकरणीयानि ।......। ननु मुमुक्षूणां मोक्षसाधनत्वेन सम्यग्दर्शननिरूपणाय स्वपक्षस्थापनमेव केवलं कर्तुं युक्तं किं परपक्षनिराकरणेन परद्वेषकरणेन। बाढमेवम्। तथापि......प्रयत्यते। From the apologetic tone in which S'aṅkarāchārya seems here to silence an opposition which he himself raises it is clear that he felt the स्मृतिपाद and in any case the तर्कपाद as not perhaps belonging to the original scheme of the Vedānta sūtras proper. In any case if the admission of certain sūtras in the sūtrapāṭha requires us to assign to the whole sūtrapāṭha a date which on other grounds is highly improbable, I think we need have no hesitation in putting down those sūtras as a later addition especially when, as we have seen no great hesitation was at any time felt in making, from perfectly honest motives, a few slight additions and alterations in the traditionally received text of the sūtras.

For we cannot, I think, assign the Vedānta sūtras—and by parity of reasoning all the other sūtras including the Yogasūtras of Patañjali—to a date as late as A.D. 400. One obvious objection is that Patañjali the author of the Yogasūtras is, according to a tradition which is as old as the author of the Vākyapadīya, regarded as identical with the author of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāshya whose date, cir. 150 B.C., can no longer be called into question. To meet this difficulty Professor Jacobi, and his American pupil Professor Woods, attempt to separate Patañjali the grammarian from Patañjali the Yogasūtrakāra on the basis of an alleged solecism of grammar on the part of the latter and an alleged difference in the use of their technical terms. It is not perhaps necessary to give here the details of their arguments, nor of my refutation of them. I have had opportunities in America as well as in Germany, just on the eve of the present war, of discussing the point with both of them, and Dr. Jacobi conceded to me in his conversation the weakness of a particular line of argument he had followed in splitting one Patañjali into two. See H. O. S. No 21, Introd., p. xlv. In the absence of any convincing argument to the contrary I am prepared to accept the tradition of the identity of Patañjali the grammarian with Patañjali the Yogasūtrakāra especially as it is reiterated by authors like Bhartṛihari, Bhoja, and Chakrapaṇidatta; and if one of Patañjali's works contains, on Jacobi's showing, an allusion to a doctrine which came into vogue four or five centuries after the date accepted for him, the only explanation for the fact that we can give is that of a later interpolation, especially as the motive for it is so very evident. And if the fact of the interpolation can be proved in one case it makes it probable in the other cases also.

To strengthen this evidence I am happily enabled to adduce some internal evidence from the sūtras themselves pointing in the same direction. As is well known the third and the fourth pādas of the second chapter have for their object the harmonizing of the various Upanishadic assertions regarding the order of cosmic creation, the number and nature of the prāṇas or indriyas and so forth. The third pāda discusses in succession the creation of Ākās'a-Vāyu-Tejas-Jala-and Pṛithivī and tells us that the order of dissolution is just the reverse of this. Then sūtra ii. 3. 15 just opens up the topic of the creation of the mind or manas and buddhi and one naturally expects that the sūtrakāra would now speak of the prāṇas or indryas. But no. A long discussion as to the nature and size of the individual soul extending to over 35 sūtras—a discussion which naturally has evoked strong differences of opinion amongst the various Bhāshyakāras brings the pāda to a conclusion. Then a new pāda resumes the discussion about प्राणs by the sūtra—तथा प्राणाः 'and likewise the Prāṇas.' This is a most awkward beginning for a pāda as the word तथा 'likewise' is required thereby to refer not to what was the topic of the concluding sūtras of the last पाद् but to the Elements the creation of which was discussed in the earlier part of that पाद. S′aṅkarāchārya himself notices the awkwardness—कथं पुनरत्र तथेत्यक्षरानुलोम्यं प्रकृतोपमानाभावात् । सर्वगतात्मबहुत्ववादिदूषणमतीतानन्तरपादान्ते प्रकृतम् । तत्तावन्नोपमानं संभवति सादृश्याभावात् ।.........। तस्मात्तथेत्यसबद्धमिव प्रतिभाति । Here again, as on the earlier occasion, S′aṅkarāchārya raises an objection which he is not able himself to meet effectively. He decides for a व्यवहितोपमानसंबंध, and that to my mind is an indication that the intervening discussion about the nature, number, and size of the individual soul did not once form part of the original sūtrapāṭha. In fairness I must here point out that Vallabha alone makes जीव the उपमान for प्राणs, making both of them immortal. He thus gets rid of one difficulty though whether, according to the sūtrakāra, the प्राणs are to be regarded as eternal or not is an open question.

A somewhat similar remark applies to what in contradistinction from the त्वंपदार्थविवेचन at the end of the third पाद of the second chapter is called the तत्पदार्थविवेचन occurring at the end of the second पाद of the third chapter. One would imagine that a discussion about the nature of Brahman would come most fittingly at the very beginning of the Vedāntasūtras where a formal definition of Brahman is attempted. To tack it on at the end of a पाद which is devoted to a description of the dream, sleep, and other conditions of the individual soul seems logically most questionable. Probably the तत्पदार्थविवेचन was added on at about the same time as the त्वंपदार्थविवेचन, though for this second supposition we cannot assign definite internal evidence as we have done for the first.

Let us look at the same problem from another point of view. A large number of the Vedāntasūtras contain a suggestive word or two which enables us to locate definitely the passage from the Upanishad which it proposes for discussion: e. g. ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् which refers to छान्दोग्य iii. 13. 7 or वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् which refers to छान्दोग्य v. 11. The majority of the Bhāshyakāras are in accord with regard to the interpretation of such passages. Now if we put together all such cases of clear reference in the order in which they occur in the Sūtrapāṭha one normally does not expect that the referred passages would themselves prove to have been taken seriatum from one definite text. But this is exactly how the case stands. For instance i. 1. 20–21 refer to छां० i. 6 and 7; i. 1. 22 refers to छां० i. 8 and 9; i. 1. 23 to छां० i. 10 and 11; i. 1. 24–27 to छां० iii. 12 and 13; i. 2. 8 to छां० iii. 14; i. 2. 13–17 to छां० iv. 10–15; i. 2. 24–32 to छां० v. 11–24; i. 3. 8-9 to छां० vii. 1ff; i. 3 14–18 to छां० viii. 1–6; i. 3. 19–21 to छां० viii. 7–13; i. 3. 41 to छां० viii. 14–15. The same applies to chapter ii pāda 3 and chapter ii pāda 4. Surely this cannot be a mere accident.

It is true that the sūtras that I have omitted in the above enumeration contain some cases which are of doubtful or debated reference as also others that clearly refer to passages taken from Upanishads other than the छान्दोग्य. In cases of the latter kind we can usually assign a reason why a passage from another Upanishad is taken for discussion. It probably contains the same word or theme as the one given by the छान्दोग्य passage. In a few cases however no such obvious connection is perceptible. For example i. 1. 27 ends with the discussion of the छां० passage–अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते विश्वतः पृष्ठेषु सर्वतः पृष्ठेषु…… इदं वाव तद्यदिदमस्मिन्नन्तःपुरुषे ज्योतिः which occurs in the 13th खण्ड of the 3rd प्रपाठक. A passage from the 14th खण्ड of the same प्रपाठक is discussed in the next but one अधिकरण after this, the intervening अधिकरण discussing a passage from the कौषीतकि Upanishad, which does not seem to be in any way connected with the ज्योतिः passage from the छान्दोग्य. Can we say that the addition of the intervening कौषीतकि passage was an after thought or even an interpolation? What lends colour to the supposition is the fact that the कौषीतकि passage discussion ends the पाद and a fresh पाद takes up the discussion of the 14th खण्ड of the 3rd प्रपाठक. As is well known interpolations are likely to be more often made at the end of a section.

Besides the छांदोग्य the sūtras refer to कठ, तैत्तिरीय, कौषीतकि, प्रश्न and several other Upanishads not excluding the बृहदारण्यक. The preponderence given to छान्दोग्य by the sūtrakāra is therefore quite remarkable. The बृहदारण्यक for instance contains as many and as diverse passages calling for discussion as the छान्दोग्य; but the बृहदारण्यक passages are introduced into the sūtras as side illustrations and regardless of the order of their occurrence in the Upanishad. Does not the fact suggest the conclusion that the original framework of the Vedāntasūtras was made by the छान्दोग्य passages? One might make a guess even yet bolder. If the छान्दोग्य needs a Vedāntasūtra to secure harmony within itself—for we must never forget that the छान्दोग्य is not one text but an accumulation of a series of texts comparable to a family book of the Rigveda—why should not the बृहदारण्यक claim a similar privilege, although it would be too much from this to argue for the existence of a Vedāntasūtra for each शाखा or चरण? The present पूर्व and उत्तर मीमांसा सूत्रs afford evidence for the existence of works—probably sūtras—composed by काशकृत्स्न, कार्ष्णाजिनि, बादरि, आत्रेय, औडुलोमि and others and discussing topics similar to those in our सूत्रs. Can we not imagine that some of these may have composed what we might call the छान्दोग्य Vedāntasūtra or the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Vedāntasūtra? Pāṇini speaks of the existence of भिक्षुसूत्रs, and the Bhagavadgītā reference to ब्रह्मसूत्रs, as I have elsewhere pointed out, may be to these earlier Brahmasūtras.

I do not at all wish to press these conclusions too far. Granted the existence of many Vedāntasūtras before the days of Bādarāyaṇa or Vyāsa, his work may just have consisted in welding all these sūtras, with the necessary additions, transpositions, and alterations, into one harmonious whole which we now know as the Vedāntasūtras, though this very supposition lends plausibility to a further supposition that the sūtrapāṭha, as it last left the hands of Bādarāyaṇa, itself suffered a similar treatment at the hands of his successors early and late, some one or more of them being responsible for the large additions in the second chapter. We need not at all assume that the present quadruple adhyāya and pāda division was there from the very start, seeing that the sister Dars'anas are not at all symmetrical about their adhyāya and pāda divisions.

In conclusion and to guard against possible misunderstanding and disappointment I must say that I do not myself think that I have absolutely proved the multiple authorship of the Vedāntasūtras. With our present knowledge propositions of this kind hardly admit of absolutely convincing proof. Owing to the peculiar nature of the work and the difficulty of accurate interpretation, the usual stylo-metric and other tests cannot be applied to the case, and as scholars differ widely as to the time of the composition of the Vedāntasūtras, the argument from the Buddhistic passages—which might otherwise have been convincing—fails to be such to one who sees nothing illogical or against established chronology in assigning the Vedāntasūtras to A.D. 400. At the end of the paper therefore I might be permitted an expression of my personal convictions in the matter which might be taken for what they are worth.

I think that even before the days of Pāṇini and the Bhagavadgītā *i e*, in the Post-Upanishadic period anterior to the advent of Buddhism, attempts were being made to reduce the teaching of the Upanishads to harmony and self-consistency. These are our earliest sūtrakāras. The Buddha's acquaintance with the Vedāntic doctrines must largely have come from them. In process of time when, after the wave of Buddhism had come and gone, it was felt necessary to combat the doctrines and practices of of the great "heresies" of Jainism and Buddhism, one of the activities in which the thought of the time expressed itself was in the composition of the तर्कपाद of the Brahmasūtras. The present text of the sūtras must have been fairly fixed at least a couple of centuries before the advent of S'aṅkarāchārya in the 8th century.

To hold that a text like the Brahmasūtras or the Bhagavadgītā is a composite work embodying different strata of thought is one thing and to try to attempt a clear and consistent interpretation of the text as a whole *in its present form* is anothor. The latter is quite feasible, as the existence of so many Bhāshyakāras on the sūtras as well as the Gītā abundantly testifies. But we must not I think give up the task of interpretation as absolutely hopeless just because the work is a composite product. It may be just possible that the authors of the successive additions belonged to the same school or held the same philosophical views or that the author of the last substantial addition so overhauled or modified the text before him as to make it an adequate representative of that philosophical synthesis which he had himself attained. The first is what probably happened in the case of the Brahmasūtras and the last in the case of the Gītā. The conclusions arrived at in this paper need not therefore be supposed to upset necessarily the traditionally established views about their teaching, though what their teaching as a whole is will have to be independently ascertained in each case.[1]

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[1] This paper was read at a meeting of the Poona Literary and Philosophical Club on the 27th of February 1918, Sir R. G. Bhandarkar being in the chair.

XII

HINDU EUGENICS

I

Foundations of Hindu Eugenics

In the East and especially among the Hindus, the subject of the propagation of the human species of the best type-physically, intellectually, and morally-is intermingled with religion like all other temporal subjects. Eugenics is a part of a wider science of sociology, and conceptions relating thereto would remain in the region of mystery, if the principles of the formation of a particular civilized society are not properly understood.

Indo-Aryans were children of Nature. They worshipped the Divine through its various manifestations in Nature God and Nature spirit and matter, subject and object, were not regarded as absolute irreconcilable opposites, but as modes of manifestation of one underlying substance designated in the Upanishad period, Brahman or Absolute. But Brahman was not Absolute *Real*, but an Absolute *Ideal*. It was the all-pervading Self vivifying each individual ego, as also the noumenon of the phenomenal world. This Brahman was regarded as God and was clothed with all the attributes of a Personal Deity. He was the Primeval Person (पुरुष) creating, sustaining and destroying the multiform universe in and through Himself, through his externalised Maya which was his innate power(शक्ति or प्रकृति). God and Nature were the undivided parents of the Universe, and were the archetypes of perfect human beings. God became Manu (Thinker) and Nature became Satarupa (Multiform female), and through their union this multiform organic world came into being. The same drama is played for ever, and God and Nature-Manu and Satarupa-play through all fauna and flora, through all genera and species.[1]

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[1] cf-ऐतरेयोपनिषद-cf-जनक जननीमज्जगदिदम् (सौन्दर्य लहरी)

In later mythology the Vedic type of divine couple द्यावा पृथिवी मनुशतरूपा - was developed into Siva and his consort Pārvati- the marriage of whom is immortalised in Kalidas' Kumārsambhava.

Apart from the conceptions of Godhead as a Divine couple the Hindus regarded the aims of life as two fold- (1) temporal and (2) spiritual. The first aim was epitomized in the word त्रिवर्ग or threefold object of life; and the other was termed मोक्ष or Summum bonum. The त्रिवर्ग or threefold object of life had for its basic body Righteousness (धर्म) while Wealth (अर्थ) and Pleasure (काम) were its two wings. Sages taught that one of these pursued for itself not only did not fulfil the purpose of life but rendered human life miserable. The three are interdependent, and should be pursued in a harmonious spirit. Human being *per se* is not a mere spirit, not a mere intellect and not a mere fleshy organism. He is a triple whole and is, therefore, in need of spiritual (धर्म), material (अर्थ) and physical (काम) elevation.[2]

To achieve the threefold object of life the Hindu sages developed a Society in which each individual had full scope to develop his life in the best manner possible.

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[2] Cf. आहारसधर्माणः कामाः (कामसूत्र of वात्सायन)

i. e., Desires are coeval with food.

धर्माविरुद्धः कामोऽस्मि लोकऽस्मिन् भरतषभ ।

i. e., Oh Arjuna ! I am Cupid who is not opposed to righteousness.

चातुर्वर्ण्यं मया सृष्टं गुणकर्मविभागशः (गीता.)

i. e., Humanity was divided by me (Krishna) in four divisions according to difference in quality and action.

नोन्मेषश्चेत्स्ववृत्तेरन्यजातीयाः (व्याससूत्र in सिद्धान्तदर्शन 1 iv. 14).

वृत्तिस्थमपि चाण्डालं तं देवा ब्राह्मणं विदुः (Vedic text quoted in निरंजनभाष्य on the above सूत्र)

If human beings born in a particular class do not exhibit their special characteristics, it is to be presumed that they are of a different class.

Gods consider even a Chandala to be a Brahmin if he is true to his profession.

The upper three strata of this Society consisted of (1) Brahmins in whom righteousness (धर्म) was prominent (2) Kshatriyas in whom pleasure (काम) was uppermost and (3) Vaishyas in whom ambition coupled with accumulation of wealth was the dominant idea. These three subdivisions (वर्ण s) were not like the modern castes in India, but permitted an individual of the lower class with a special higher aptitude to occupy a place in the higher class. The case of विश्वामित्र is conspicuous of the catholic spirit of those times. The Sudras who were indigenous aboriginal races were admitted into the Hindu Society but they had not the same freedom of intermingling as the upper three Societies had The Indo Aryans were exogamous, and males of the upper classes were permitted to take wives from the lower classes, but the converse course was not permitted i e., males of lower classes were not permitted to marry girls of the upper classes. There was thus a wide field for marital selection. Polygamy was and is still permitted among Hindus. Monogamy was held out as an ideal which was gradually realised in course of time among certain high caste Hindus, but was not forced upon people whose sexual proclivities were not humanised. Polygamy with purity of conduct and a sense of responsibility towards the weaker sex is preferable on ethical grounds to monogamy with license and infidelity.

Even in Vedic times the institution of marriage was regarded as a means to achieve the threefold object of life. A wife was a necessary help-mate in the performance of social and domestic duties (सहधर्मचारिणी), and used to take interest in the philosophic aspirations of her husband (सब्रह्मचारिणी).[3] Marriage (विवाह) was a sacrament and occupied the same purifying aspect with reference to girls as the sacred thread ceremony (उपनयन) occupied with reference to boys. The wedded couple had to fulfil the mission of (1) parenthood (प्रजाति), (2) of establishing a sweet

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3. Compare the story of याज्ञवल्क्य and मैत्रेयी in बृ. आ. उ.

comfortable home (रति) and (3) of achieving spiritual bliss (आनंद).[4] An *ideal* marriage was that which produced healthy children, established a comfortable home, and led to spiritual bliss. The sages knew that such a marriage was difficult to realize. They, therefore, prescribed various forms of marriage to suit the social conditions of various clans and tribes. The four forms of marriage called आर्ष, दैव ब्राह्म and प्राजापत्य–were intended for cultured people: in these the consent of the parents and the idea of giving away of the bride for establishing a new home were prominent aspects. The fifth form of marriage called गांधर्व based on pure love was also in vogue among Kshatriyas, but this form of secret marriage was subsequently solemnized externally, lest the sacred union be repudiated, as Dushyanta did with reference to Sakuntala. The remaining three forms of marriage called आसुर, पैशाच and राक्षस were intended for aboriginal tribes as also for those who chose to have brides from lower social strata. Many instances of these forms of marriage are given in Ramayana and Mahabharata. Even in Vedic times social reformers elevated the institution of marriage and adopted the first four forms of union. The scholar Swetketu taught the lesson of temperance, condemned adultery and prostitution, and composed a treatise on ideal love.[5]

As marriage has to achieve the threefold object of progeny (प्रजाति), conjugal felicity (रति) and spiritual bliss (आनंद), the principles of Hindu Eugenics are embodied in the three different sciences viz. (आयुर्वेद,) Medicine, (कामशास्त्र) Aesthetics, and (धर्मशास्त्र) Ethics respectively.

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4. Compare the संप्रदान कर्म in which a dying father puts the responsibility of discharging social and domestic duties on his son, where, these three aims of marriage are touched upon. (कौषीतकि ब्राह्मणोपनिष II 15.)

5. See वात्सायन कामसूत्र:-तदेवतु पंचभिरध्यायैरौद्दालकिः श्वेतकेतुः संचिक्षेप. i. e. Shvetketu Auddalaki compiled the Erotic Science in five Chapters.

II

Biological Conceptions underlying Hindu Eugenics.

The ancient sages of India were not mere Platonic idealists, but were Aristotelic realists. They taught to their pupils at the time of the समावर्तन ceremony that it was their duty to their family and their race that they should beget healthy children. It was no use marrying, if the idea of the propagation of the species was subordinated to mere intellectual companionship. This is the reason why the birth of a child and especially a male child is looked upon in Hindu society as a divine blessing This natural craving for a child in healthy couples is not to be condemned on grounds of false prudery and sentimentalism.[7] Just as sexually normal beings have a responsibility towards the well being of the race, so sexually abnormal beings have a duty of refraining from begetting children. The sages taught in their धर्मशास्त्र that the sexually unfit should not marry, that they should be fed and clad by house holders; that they should either be forest recluses (वनी) or mendicants (संन्यासी) and that they should fulfil their mission of life by leading a life of piety. This was no injustice to such males or females; for if they labour under physical disability, and are yet intellectually superior they could render service to society by self-sacrifice and piety. If they are both physically and intellectually weak, they have nothing to offer to society, and they can at the most expect their individual preservation from society on humane considerations[8]

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As has been stated in the previous section the Hindu conception of life is complex. It is epitomized in the

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6. प्रजातन्तुंमाव्यवच्छेत्सीः (तै. उ.)

i. e. Do not stop the propagation of the species.

7. अंगादंगात्संभवसि हृदयादाधिजायसे ॥ आत्मा वै पुत्रनामासि स जीव शरदः शतम् । (कौ. उ.)

8. क्लीबोऽथपतितस्तज्जः पङ्गुरुन्मत्तकोजडः ।
अन्धोऽचिकित्स्यरोगाद्या भर्तव्याः स्युर्निरंशकाः । (या. स्मृति 140)

term " *Atman* ". This term originates from the roots आप् to obtain; दा+आ to seize ; अद् to eat ; and तन्+आ to spread, and involves four fundamental conceptions.[9] A living being, whether it be of the vegetable or animal kingdom exhibits four phenomena:- (1) it obtains food for its sustenance from organic or inorganic elements around it; (2) it digests and assimilates the food stuff; (3) it has power or a tendency of self-preservation; and (4) it has a tendency to propagate a like being during its cyclical changes. These four fundamental biological ideas are conveyed by the term *Atman* in Sanskrit. In man these functions of *Atman* are developed to a large extent, and human life exhibits physiological, psychological, ethical and metaphysical phenomena. Hindus believe that the evolved life in a human being has (1) ontological basis of Absolute Self which is impersonal (शुद्धात्मा) (2) germinal soul appearing like an eddy on impersonal Absolute self, which has a cycle of evolution and involution to perform and whose characteristic properties are limitation in volition sentiment and thought (प्राज्ञजीवात्मा), (3) a psychic indiviualized ego (तैजस-जीवात्मा) working through mind, and senses and (4) an organic animating being (विश्वभूतात्मा). The organic form has a beginning and an end designated under the names of birth and death. It is merely an incident in the life history of the immortal migrating soul, and is determined by the heredity of parents as also by the innate tendencies of the individualised soul seeking birth on a physical plane. Here lies the crux of Hindu Eugenics. The Western biologists do not admit the continuity of the living principle except through the " continuity of germ plasm " the origin of which is involved in mystery; Hindus admit the existence of a basic principle of life for all organic forms and at the same time postulate an individualised ego which appears and disappears physical forms. The continuity of the former noumenal principle called ब्रह्मन् or शुद्धात्मा is absolute; while the persistence in of the latter (लिङ्गात्मा) is relative although appearing in innumerable series of births until its cycle is completed. It is beyond the scope of this essay on Hindu Eugenics to examine the validity or otherwise of this absolute or relative immortality of the human ego. Suffice it to say that the law of heredity working in Eugenics according to Hindu ideas operates on two parallel planes of parents and individual ego seeking birth. The hereditary tendencies of the individual ego seeking birth are designated as अनुशय or " attaching capital "; while the germ-plasm of the parents which affords an organic residence to the ego is called योनि or " basic substance ".[10]

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[9] यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह ।
यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मोतिकीर्त्यते ॥
(स्मृति quoted in the दीपिका of विद्यारण्य on ऐतरेय उपनिषद्)

The law of heredity or nature for practical eugenics is to be sought both in the germ-plasm of the parents and the " attaching capital " of the individual ego seeking birth. The birth of the individual on the physical plane is three-fold according to Hindu ideas :-(1) the location of the individual ego in the germ cell of the male parent, (2) the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm cell in the uterus of the female parent, and (3) the final separation of the individual organism from the mother. The moment the second stage is reached Nature has done its duty, and the realm of Nurture commences. This nurture is prenatal and post-natal. and the Hindus designated this nurture by the name of संस्कार or purification[11] It may be argued that the ceremonies have a religious significance, and have no Eugenic value. But a rational reply to this argument is that the *Modus operandi* followed in these religious ceremonies has a secular eugenic significance and points to certain duties and responsibilities.

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[10] Compare the " origin of life " for a human ego as described in पञ्चाग्निविद्या Chapter of छान्दोग्य उपनिषद् प्रपाठक v-3-10 where the hereditary tendencies of the Individual ego and the germ-plasm afforded by parents for his organic life are poetically described.

See also ब्रह्मसूत्र- III-I-1-6.

[11] See ऐतरेय उपनिषद् II where the threefold birth is described and the duty of pre-natal nurture and care of the expecting mother are forcibly impressed for purity of race. Also बृ. आ. उ. 8-4 for (1) preservation of piety and self-control preliminary to impregnation, (2) prenatal and post-natal ceremonies.

The propagation of the species although based on innate sexual instinct has a voluntary basis in the human species. " To marry and multiply " as the Bible says, or " don't sever the thread of the human species " (प्रजातन्तुं माव्यवच्छेत्सीः) as the Veda declares, follows the natural sexual instinct in man. It is an injunction subject to voluntary limitations by individuals, wherein lies the utility of eugenics. The Hindus classify this kind of Vedic texts as a नियम विधि or restricting rule or a परिसंख्याविधि or excluding rule The duty is not an absolute duty as the performance of daily solar worship is to a Brahman. If married couples wish to undertake the responsibility of parentage, they should *jollow* certain rules of sexual hygenic and personal purity before impregnation, and should *avoid* certain modes of life. The ambition of the Hindu father was according to the Veda, that his child should be physically as hard as a *stone* or an axe, that intellectually it should be as brilliant as gold or light and that it should live for a hundred autumns.[12] The ambition of a Hindu girl was " to be the wife of a hero and to be the mother of a hero[13] ".

w.p.

w.p.

The law of genetics demands recuperation of energy, and this is not possible unless and until the life fluid is brought under proper control during the period of adolescence. The Hindus believed, and that belief has now been scientifically established, that the racial tissue or germ-plasm undergoes a special development at puberty. If the vital energies are properly controlled and the normal secretions are transmuted, wonderful possibilities are opened out to the individual. This transmutation of vital energy at its proper period builds up the individuals for proper parental responsibility. If it worked on the *physical* plane, the race was benefited by healthy and intellectual children; if it was diverted to the *spiritual* plane it gave birth to the most altruistic spirit of service to society[14]. The instances of Shankaracharya in India, and Miss Florence Nightingale in the West are vivid proofs of spiritual advantages flowing from a life of perpetual self-control and discipline.

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[12] अश्माभव परशुर्भव हिरण्यमस्तृतं भव ।
तेजो वै पुत्रनामासि स जीव शरदः शतम् ॥ (कौ. ब्रा. उ. IV)

[13] इलासि मैत्रावरुणी वीरे वीरमजीजनत् ।
सात्वं वीरवती भव याऽस्मान् वीरवतोऽकरत् ॥ (बृ. आ. उ. VIII-4)

But the Hindu Eugenics prescribed different kinds of abstinence for different Social orders. Hindu parents have been forbidden from cohabiting except when impregnation is possible under normal sexual laws During pregnancy there is absolute prohibition, for one of the objects of marriage viz., progeny is achieved in embryo. The intellectual and spiritual union (रति and आनन्द) remain.

Those who are sexually unfit, or not inclined to undertake the responsibility of parenthood have to avoid (1) thought of the opposite sexual being, (2) songs inciting libidinous ideas; (3) playing with the opposite sex; (4) observation of the person of the opposite sex; (5) secret talk; (6) formation of an ideal union; (7) determination of having sexual union; and (8) actual sexual coition.[15]

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[14] The trans-mutation of vital energy through sexual self-control is the fundamental qualification in Hinduism for all kinds of spiritual training. The Upanishads teach ब्रम्हचर्य as a necessary preliminary for spiritual insight. Patanjali lays it down as the bulwark against all physical ailment and the source of intellectual and spiritual strength (योगसूत्र-II-38).

The modern school of Regenerists admits the fact of transmutation of seminal fluid into the regenerating energy in tissues.

[15] cf- स्मरणं कीर्तनं केलिः प्रेक्षणं गुह्यभाषणम् ।
संकल्पोऽध्यवसायश्च क्रियानिवृत्तिरेवच ॥
एतन्मैथुनमष्टाङ्गं प्रवदन्ति विपश्चितः ॥

III

Psychological Basis of Hindu Eugenics.

The initial axiom of the thinkers of India is that nature and spirit are not to be regarded as parallel principles or as absolute opposites but as inseparable though distinguishable. Even the dualists of the Sankhya School admitted that there is a kind of relation based on appropriateness between matter and spirit.

In the earlier Upanishads the inherence of the intelligent principle throughout nature was taught as a fundamental doctrine.[16] The first product of Nature (प्रकृति) was called महत्तत्व or महान् आत्मा (the great principle or the great soul) a sentient and intelligent substance remaining as a base for subsequent evolution terminating in the human organism. Nature was infused with spirit from the commencement of evolution or to use Krishna's words, " its womb was impreganted by the divine radiation[17]. "

Thus organic evolution is not the result of a mere fortuitous concatenation of dead atoms ; but the gradual manifestation of the divinity through a variety of organic forms. Man is or at least is known to our limited consciousness as the culminating point of evolution on our earth.[18] The basic principle of Nature or more accurately the Great Brahman (महद्ब्रम्हयोनि) had the potential *germs* of all future panorama of life revealed up to now, and still contains in its womb infinite variety of new forms of life. This theory is not to be confounded with the " preformationism " of Western biological thought in the *seventeenth* and eighteenth centuries. The Hindu conception of evolution of organic life is not the manifestation of a preformed miniature through successive generations which would involve the necessity of packing the germs of two hundred thousand millions of men in the ovary of our primeval mother, call her Eve or Satrupa according to the nomenclature of the West or the East. The Hindus believed that although nature was infinite in her revelation, and although her activity was guided by the inherent divine will, evolution was materially affected, especially in her organic aspect, through the operation of living beings some of which had attained the stage of self-consciousness[19]. A phenomenon which requires millions of years for its appearances if Nature is left to her own course, is accentuated by the operation of conscious beings acquainted with her own laws. Thus the power which is inherent in Nature is given away freely by the Divine mother to her children who know her method to work and the ultimate spiritual good implanted in her by the inherent spirit with whom she is invariably associated.

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[16] See अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मण in बृ. आ. उ.

[17] मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम् ।
संभवः सर्वभूतानां ततोभवति भारत ॥ (भ. गा. XIV 3)

[18] जन्तूनां नरजन्म दुर्लभमतः &c.(विवेक चूडामणि of शंकराचार्य)

Nature's fertility is accelerated by knowing her laws. An intelligent scientific agriculturist or a clever zoologist and breeder of domesticated animals achieves wonderful results which would not have been possible, had nature been allowed to take her own course[20].

The *Hindus* of old recognised a two-fold operation in the evolution of organic life viz , one of the Cosmic Will and the other of the individualised human will. The first operative cause was the mediate ; while the latter was the immediate efficient cause. The immediate could not work without the inner guidance of the inherent mediate ; nor could the mediate operate without the instrumentality of the immediate. Thus in practical Eugenics the Hindus enjoined that the parental responsibility towards the race and thereby towards the Cosmic Will required that prudential considerations must prevail in the domain of genetics. Here lies the predominance of the psychic element in Eugenics There may be infinite ova and infinite sperms containing the germ-plasm of the future humanity. But just as full multi-cellular beings are co-ordinated and made subservient and interdependent in a well-organized society, so these unicelluar beings in human individuals should be regularized and made subservient to the will of the individual. The racial instinct, no doubt, asserts itself in a variety of ways; but the stock of the human race which desires perpetuation of the best type must exert itself to control the influences which operate in the domain of genetics.

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[19] तत्रात्मा हि स्वयं किंचित्कर्म किंचित्स्वभावत :।
करोति किंचिदभ्यासाद्धर्माधर्मोभयात्मकम् ॥ (या. स्मृ. III 681)

[20] Compare the myth of Gaṉpati pleasing his mother Parvati and securing her blessing by a tactful conduct, and Kārtikeya loosing her gift by not knowing the spirit of her dictate of " perambulation of the earth ,' Gaṉpati is an embodiment of scientific wisdom and application; Kārtikeya is a symbol of unco-ordinated knowledge.

These influences are of two sorts:- (1) Those which improve the inborn qualities of the race; and (2) those which develop the good element to the utmost advantage of the individual.[21] The first class of influences affect the "heredity" and "germ plasm"; the second class affect the well-being of the individual after impregnation.

This "heredity" according to Hindu conceptions is derived *physically* from the parents, and *psychically* partly from parents and partly from Karmāshaya of the individual ego seeking birth. The Karmāshaya of the individual ego, which the Westerners do not admit, but which is the pivot of the Hindu philosophy and science, is the potential capacity of the individual, acquired by experiences in numerous antecedent lives. It is of two kinds:- (1) दृष्टजन्मवेदनीय or realisable in the present life and (2) अदृष्टजन्मवेदनिय or realisable in future lives. The physical impregnation of a being liberates the potential tendencies of the ego. The egg-cell or fecundated ovum is the physical basis for the operation of the kinetic energy of this Karmāshaya. It is the psychic and moral capital of the individual to be born, and although it determines the outline of the individual's future it is moulded materially by the physical apparatus furnished by the parents, and by the "nurture" of the embryo. As a rule the dominant factor in कर्माशय determines the nature of environment connected with birth (जन्म), the future realm of experience (भोग and the period of normal existence or duration of the physical organism (आयुष्). The Hindus admit that the operation of कर्माशय is moulded by nurture which includes educative influences both pre-natal and post-natal. If I borrow the words of modern biologists, the कर्माशय of the individual is the psychic germ-plasm while *nurture* affords the somatic cells. Patanjali in his Yoga system says that it is only when the Karmashaya is put into kinetic form by the psychic forces in the form of like and dislike that it results in birth, experience and duration of life. Yajnavalkya also propounds that the defect in the germ-plasm of the parents as also the maternal nurture have a powerful effect on the embryonic development.[22] Though the individual human being migrates for a new birth with the antecedent capital-psychic and moral,[23] he does not achieve his object unless it secures a corresponding physical organism to be furnished by the parents. The individual ego may pass through a variety of vegetable and animal forms of life, but this migration is purely parasitic and local without fructification of the Karmāshaya in birth, experience etc, until it finds a home in the impregnated ovum which in human species is not the result of simple sexual instinct but of voluntary act on the part of two beings. This is the reason why a migrating soul finds it difficult to come out in a suitable organic form in human species, and consequently the philosophers of India exhort men and women to make the best of human life in achieving right knowledge.[24] A birth in the human species in the *best of environments* is an uncertain factor and should not be counted on. Hindus ruled that particular care should be taken in the selection of bride and bridegroom. Yajnyavalkya ruled that if a girl born in the best of social families has got a taint in her germ plasm she should not be taken to wife,[25] and that a young man who is not able to take up the responsibilty of fatherhood, and who is not intelligent and has not an attractive character should not be selected as husband.[26]

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[21] Cf. Galton's definition :–" Eugenics is the science whih deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage."

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[22] सतिमूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्योगाः ॥ योगसूत्र II-13
कालकर्मात्मबीजानां दोषैर्मातुस्तथैव च ।
गर्भस्य वैकृतं दृष्टमंगहीनादिजन्मत :॥ याज्ञवल्क्य स्मृति
जात्यन्तरपरिणाम : प्रकृत्यापूरात् । (योगसूत्र)

[23] तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति सपरिस्वक्त :॥ ब्रह्मसूत्र VII-I ।
तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते etc. (ब्र. आ. उ.)

It was also recognised that unions of individuals of *altogether* different stock led to hybrid clans which were never virile and which propagated the weak side of humanity. On the other hand unions of the same stock brought under the recognised holy forms of marriage resulted in the perpetuation of a purer species which in itself was virile. Finally through careful selection in marriage a fallen stock may rise to its former purity at the fifth, sixth or seventh generation.[27]

In short biologically the Hindus regarded unions in the same stock (सवर्ण) subject to selection of individuals as the best; unions of males of higher stock with females of the lower stock (अनुलोम) as fair; unions of males of inferior stocks with females of superior stocks (प्रतिलोम) as bad; and finally unions of progenies of the mixed stocks as the worst from the eugenic standpoint.

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[24] अन्याधिष्ठिताधिकरण सूत्राणि, in ब्र. सू. III-I-24-27

[25] स्फीतादपि संचारि रोगदोषे समन्वितात् । × × ×

[26] एतैरेव गुणैर्युक्तः सवर्णः श्रोत्रियो वरः
यत्नात्परीक्षितः पुंस्त्वे युवा धीमाञ्जनप्रियः (याज्ञवल्क्य स्मृति I-54-55)

[27] जात्युत्कर्षो युगेज्ञेय : सप्तमे पंचमेऽथवा ।
व्यत्यये कर्मणां साम्यं पूर्ववच्चाधरोत्तरम् ॥
(या. स्मृति I-IV-90-96)

XIII

AVERROES ON INTERPRETATION

M. JAMIL UR REHMAN

We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to look into creation and ponder over it in order to be guided to the Creator,–in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For the knowledge of creation leads us to the cognizance of the Creator, through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of the Creator.

All that is required for an inquiry into philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to their books, and see what they have said in this connection. If what they say be true, we should accept it; and if there be something wrong, we should be warned by it. So when we have finished this kind of research we shall acquire instruments by which we can observe the universe, and consider its nature. For as long as one does not know its nature, one cannot know the created, nor thereby have any knowledge of the Creator. We should begin an inquiry into the universe systematically, such as is in accordance with the process of argumentative reasoning. It is also clear that this aim is to be attained by our investigation of one part of the universe after another; and that we derive help from our predecessors, as is the case in other sciences.

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* **Extracts from a translation of Averroes'** ***Kitab Fasl al Maqal wa Taqri-ma bainal Shariati wal Hikmati minal Ittisal*****, edited by D. J. Muller,** ***Philosophie und Theologie, von Averroes*****, (Munichen, 1859)**

Now we Muslims firmly believe that our Scirpture is Divine and true This very Scripture urges and brings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God and His creation. That is a fact which every Muslim will bear testimony to by his very nature and temperament. We say so, because temperaments differ in believing: one will believe through reasoning; while another will believe by contentious discourse, just as firmly as the former, for no other method appeals to their nature. There are others who believe by exhortation alone. For this very purpose our Divine Law invites the people to believe by all the three methods. This is why the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world, for his Law comprises all the three methods of invitation to God. What we said is quite clear from the following " Invite men unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation; and dispute with them in the most condescending manner. "[1]

Interpretation means to carry the signification of a word from its original sense to the metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a way as would not interfere with the custom of the Arabian tongue. We hold it to be an established truth that if the Scripture is apparently opposed to something proved by arguments, it admits of some interpretation according to the canons of the Arabian language. This is a proposition which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is accustomed to things divine can experience for himself what we have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together the Sciences of reasoning and the Sciences of tradition. Nay, we would even say that no logical conclusion will be found opposed to the Scripture, which when sifted and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or almost so, with it.

That is why all Muslims are agreed that the words of the Scripture should not all be taken literally; nor all of

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1. *Koran* : XVI. 126.

them made to undergo an interpretation. But they differ in regard to which verses are to be interpreted, and which not. For instance the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse of Equalization [2] and on the Tradition of Descent [3] while the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides: the exoteric, and the esoteric - because of the differences in human beings and minds in verifying a thing. The existence of a contradictory esoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to find out a comprehensive interpretation To it refers the following verse of the Koran : " It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book wherein are some verses clear to be understood, they are the foundation of the book ; and others are parabolical but they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is parobolical therein, out of love of Schism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded in knowledge say, we believe therein, the whole is from our Lord ; and none will consider except the prudent. "[4]

Here one can object and say that in the scripture there are things which all the Muslims have agreed to take exoterically ; while there are others on which they have agreed to put an interpretation ; while there are some about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to apply philosophical reasoning for the interpretation of those which have been taken literally or vice versa ? We would say that if the agreement be positive philosophical reasoning should not be applied ; and if it be conjectural it should be. For this very reason Abū Hāmid (Al-Ghazāli) and Abul Ma'āli and other learned doctors have ordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the common agreement, and applying the principle of interpretation in such things. You will certainly agree that complete consensus of opinion is not possible in metaphysical matters, as it is possible to establish in practical things. For it is not possible to establish unanimity of opinion at any time whatsoever, unless we confine ourselves to a small period, and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in it that is, their personalities and their number; and their views about any question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in the chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors living at that time are agreed that there are no exoteric and esoteric meanings in the Scripture, that the knowledge of every proposition should not be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the Scripture should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number of people in the early days of Islam, believed in exoteric and esoteric meanings of the Scripture, and thought that the esoteric meanings should not be disclosed to an ignorant person, who cannot understand them. For instance Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali, that he said: " Talk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give lie to God and His Apostle ? "

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[2] " It is he who hath created for you whatsoever is on earth, and then set his mind to the creation of heaven and formed it into seven heavens ; he knoweth all things. "-Koran ; II., 29. For an interpretation see Razi's *Tafsiri Kabir*, Vol I, p, 249 etc, Cairo, 1307 A, H, ; and Tabari's *Commentary* Vol. I, p. 146 etc. Cairo, 19 2.

[3] Verily God comes down every night to the earth, (*Nihayah fi Gharibil Hadith* , by Ibn Athir, Vol. IV, p 138, Cairo, 131[illegible], A, H,), For interpretations see the above and Qastalani's *Commentary on Bukhari*, Vol. IX p. 178, Cairo, 13[illegible]7.

[4] *Koran*, III, 5.

There are many traditions to the same effect related from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any consensus of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical matters, when we definitely know that in every age there have been doctors who take the Scripture to contain things the real significance of which should not be disclosed to all men. But in practical things it is quite different. For all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men alike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained by the publication of the proposition; and no disagreement is reported to us. This is enough to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things, as contrasted with matters of the Sciences.

If one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring consensus of opinion in interpretation, for no unanimity of opinion is possible in these, it may be asked what about such Muslim Philosophers as: Abū Nasr (Al Fārābi) and Ibn Sinā? For Abū Hāmid in his book the "*Refutation of the Philosophers,*" has denounced them with positive infidelity in regard to three things: the Eternity of the World; the ignorance of God about details; and the interpretation of the doctrine of the resurrection of bodies, and the nature of the Day of Judgment. We would say that from what he has said, it is not clear that he has denounced them positively with infidelity. For in his book, " "*Al Tafriqah bainal Islami wal Zindiqah,*" he has explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of opinion is doubtful. Moreover, we have definitely pointed out that it is not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters, especially so when many people of the early times have set down that there are interpretations which should not be disclosed to all, but only to those who are fit for them,—and those are men who are "well-grounded in knowledge [5]-a Divine injunction which cannot be overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in these matters they will have no special criterion of Truth, for their faith which the common people have not, while God has described them as believing in him. This kind of Faith is always produced by accepting the arguments, which is not possible without a knowledge of interpretation. For, otherwise, even the common people believe in the words of God, without any arguments whatsoever. So the Faith which the Koran has especially

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5. Koran. III. 5.

ascribed to the learned must be a faith strengthened with full arguments, which cannot be without a knowledge of the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits of interpretation which is its real significance; and this is the thing to establish by flasoning. This being so it is impossible to establish any well-grounded consensus of opinion in the interpretations which God has ascribed to the learned men. This is quite clear to one with any insight. With all this we see that Abū Hāmid has made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the opinion that God has no knowledge of details. They are only of opinion that the knowledge of God about details is quite different from ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing: such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes with a change of that thing. On the other hand, the knowledge of God is the cause of an existent thing. So one who compares these two kinds of knowledge, ascribes the same characteristics to two contradictory things, which is extreme ignorance. The word *knowledge*, when applied both to eternal and transitory things, is used only literally, just as we use many other words for contradictory objects. For instance the word *Jalal* is applied both to great and small; and *Sarim* to light and darkness. So we have no definition which can embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakalliman of our times have thought.

How can it be supposed that the Peripatetic philosophers say that God has no knowledge of details, when they are of opinion that man is sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through visions; and that he gets all these admonitions in sleep. These philosophers are not only of opinion that God has no knowledge of details as we have, but they also believe that He is ignorant of generalities. For all known generalities with us are also the effect of the existence of a thing, while God's knowledge is quite contrary to it. So by these arguments we have reached the conclusion that God's knowledge is far higher than it should be called universal or particular. So there is no difference of opinion in this proposition that is, in calling them infidel or not.

If the purpose of the Scripture be to impart knowledge of truth and of right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two methods : viz by conception or verification, as the Mutakallimun have proved in their books. There are three methods of verification open to the people: argumentation, controversy, and exhortation. There are two methods of conception : either by the thing itself or its like As all the people cannot, by their nature, understand and accept arguments and dogma together with the difficulty of learning and use of arguments and the long time which it takes to learn them, and the purpose of the Scripture being to make it quite common among men, it is necessary that it should contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the methods of verification there are some which are meant for the common people that is, exhortative and didactic, the exhortative being more common than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for the learned, and that is the ratiocinative method Now it is the primary aim of the Scripture to improve the condition of the many without neglecting the few, and hence the methods of conception and verification adopted are those which are common to the majority.

These methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while particularly agreeing in both things, that is, both exhortatively and controversially, is still true by conception and verification. The syllogisms are those the minor and major of which are certain, in addition of their being conjectural or well-known. These are set before the deductions which are taken from themselves. To this kind of religious injunctions there is no interpretation, and one who denies them, or puts an interpretation upon them, is an unbeliever. The second kind is that the premises of which, in spite of their being well-known or conjectural, are still positive. Their conclusions are drawn from analogy. Upon these, that is, upon their conclusions, an interpretation may be put. The third kind is just the reverse of the second, i. e. its conclusions are themselves intended, and their premises are well-known or conjectural, without their being positive. Upon these also, that is, upon their conclusions, no interpretation can be put; but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is that the premises of which are well-known, or conjectural, withont their being positive. Their deductions are by analogy, when that is intended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them, and of the common people to take them exoterically.

In short all that should be interpreted can be grasped by argumentation alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of the common people to receive exoterically, in both the cases, those of verification and conception. This is because they cannot understand more. A student of the Scripture sometimes finds interpretations, some of which have a preference over others, in a general way, by verification; that is, the argument of interpretation is more convincing than the literal meaning. These interpretations are commonplace, and it is possible that those, whose speculative faculties have been developed in those of controversy, may admit them. Some of the interpretations of the Asharites and Mutazilites are of this type though the arguments of the Mutazilites are generally more weighty. But it is the duty of the common people, who are not capable of understanding more than exhortative arguments, to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not necessary that they should know the interpretations at all.

XIV

CRITICAL NOTICES

PLATO AND PLATONISM : a series of lectures by Walter Pater. (Ninth Reprint, Macmillan and Co.)

The ninth reprint of Pater's study of Plato may well serve as the occasion for bringing his works to the notice of the Indian public. For, to the average educated Indian, Pater is no more than a mere name, although he has already come to his own in the world of English prose.

Plato and Platonism can hardly be said however to represent the highest level of Pater's prose. But Pater himself has left his judgment on record on his book. On being asked which of the two best known works of his, *Marius* or *The Renaissance*, he considered his masterpiece, he replied " Oh no, neither. If there is anything of mine that has a chance of surviving, I should say it was my *Plato.* " It may be that in his maturer and more deliberate moods he tired of the exaggerated " Cyrenaicism " of *Marius* and the overwrought music of *The Renaissance.* It may be on the other hand that his answer was another illustration of that impish, elusive humour, with which he warded off callow questioners with answers such as these : " I cannot advise you to read any special books. The great thing is to read authors *whole*; read Plato whole; read Kant whole; read Mill whole : " But the fact remains that he has left his judgment on record.

One wonders why this should be so. For in point of style, Pater's *Plato* is distinctly inferior to some of his other more representative works. In spite of much that is undoubtedly beautiful, one misses in it his characteristic distinction of manner, that delicate embroidery of phrase and figure, that haunting beauty of image and cadence, his fine metaphors, his subtle distinctions – in fine, all that elaborate workmanship which makes him, in Bourget's phrase, the *parfait prosateur* – the greatest since Lamb. Again, the value of the book as a philosophical study is confessedly not high: rather it is from the psychological point of view that the subject is dealt with. In his introduction he lays down that the business of the young scholar should be in regard to Plato, " rather to follow intelligently, but with strict indifference, the mental process there, as he might witness a game of skill. " It might be questioned however whether in his own treatment of Plato, he has achieved this attitude of 'strict indifference,' which he enjoins on the reader. On the other hand, the whole book is coloured characteristically by his artistic and personal obsessions. For instance, take his position in regard to philosophy. To the last he declaimed against what he called "the commonplace metaphysical instinct." Philosophy for him was not the systematic study of the ultimate nature of things, but rather served as the handmaid of Culture by its analysis of tendencies, and its suggestion, as he has said somewhere in *The Renaissance*, "of questions which help one to detect the passion, and strangeness and dramatic contrasts of life." In that sense, Platonism was for him not a defined creed, "but a tendency, a group of tendencies, a tendency to think and feel, and to speak, about certain things in a particular way." It is in this sense also that certain doctrines affect him not so much intrinsically by themselves, but rather in relation, vital relation, to the atmosphere around them, and to his own highly charged, warmly sensuous temperament. Thus the doctrine of transmigration – "that wild thought of *metempsychosis*" – was for him linked "with a fanciful guesswork astronomy, which provided starry places, wide areas, hostelries, for that wanderer to move, or rest in." And his attitude towards pantheism is equally characteristic. He attributed all pantheistic doctrines – including the Parmenidean philosophy – to an "infectious mania, it might seem – that strange passion for nonentity......to which the human mind generally might be thought to have been constitutionally predisposed." His warm sensuous humanism shrank from the conception of an Abstract Unity, a cold repellent Vastness – a frozen world of dank intellectual gloom, where all life festered, and 'stars were visible in the noonday.' Then again, in *The Republic*, he represents Plato as having conceived of Philosophy as essentially a practical thing – a means whereby to shape life and character, and through which we are enabled to obtain dominion over ourselves – a religion in fact rather than a philosophy. "It is life itself, action and character, he proposes to colour; to get something of that irrepressible conscience of Art, that spirit of control, into the general course of life, above all into its energetic and impassioned acts."

It is this characteristic attitude also that induces Pater to conceive of Plato not so much as an originator of thought, but historically as an incident – though an important and vital incident – in the progress of Greek Philosophy. He devotes his introductory chapters therefore – in fact a very large part of the book – to the consideration of Plato's precursors and his contemporary environments. Thus in a series of brilliant pen-pictures he shows us a procession of figures – each lighted up by some characteristic phrase – all vivid with the glow which Pater alone can give. Heraclitus, with his doctrine of flux – so symbolical of the 'impetuous spring-tide of Greek history;' Parmenides preaching his 'arid formula of Pure Being in the midst of the busy, already complicated life of Elea;' Pythagoras, that dim shadowy figure with the dust of his " Golden Verses," son of Apollo, ' the twilight, attempered, Hyperborean Apollo, like the sun in Lapland;' Socrates himself, "rude and rough as some failure of his own old sculptor's workshop," yet with a compelling fascination that attracted to him all the opulent youth–the *jeunesse dorée* – of Athens – Alcibiades, Aristophanes and shy Charmides, most beautiful of them all, – they pass before us in a bright panorama. In his beautiful chapter on Lacedæmon, Pater exhibits his descriptive powers with undoubted skill. He shows how Plato's Laconism was the super-imposition of an austere Doric discipline over his essentially Ionian sensibilities.

But the main reason perhaps why Pater declared his preference for *Plato and Platonism* over all his other works was its autobiographical interest. More than his own Marius, his own creation – more than his study of Winckelmann, he seems to have read into the troubled progress of Plato's mental development, something of his own soul-history. There is as all students of Plato are aware, an intellectual as well as a mystical side to Plato's philosophy. In its former aspect it was at once a development and a recoil; a development of the perception of particulars through " the pathway of reality " to the apprehension of universals and to the unity of all knowledge and being; – and a recoil from the spectre of change, from the flux of Heraclitean fire; to the advocacy of the immutable, of law and principle. In its latter aspect it took the Pythagorean heritage and bringing imagination to the aid of reason produced in the *Timaeus*, a new mythology of the Cosmos, as fascinating as it was strange. Now Pater's art in relation to his time and culture was also a development and a recoil. In the one sense, it was a flowering in prose and in art criticism of the æsthetic tradition of Keats and the Pre-Raphælites: in the other it was a deliberate intellectual recoil from that factitious sentimentality which would limit Beauty to its narrower and more sensual aspects, a recoil also from that unrestful skepticism that defied all social institutions and scoffed at all the consecrated phrases. But it is important to remember that although his work was a recoil, Pater himself in some innermost cleft of his being was in emotional sympathy with all this joyous unsettlement. There was such a thing as the beauty of passing things – the beauty of evil even – in which he seemed, in spite of himself, to take a kind of secret delight. In his youth and middle age, this delight persisted and intruded itself even in his most finished writings. This " *macabre* mood, " which was then running rampant all through the brilliant unrest of the nineties, showed itself as early as his now suppressed essay on " Æsthetic Poetry; " and we find traces of it in that incomparable passage on La Giaconda, and even in the impassioned peroration of the Conclusion to his studies on the Renaissance. He was anxious to get away from this mood and all the dangerous results that it foreshadowed: he was always harking back to the " blitheness and repose " and " the perfect poise " of the antique ideal. We believe that this was the reason that must have led Pater to pick out one only of the aspects of Platonism and emphasise it above the rest, namely Plato's conception of beauty. He took this and perhaps read into it much more than what was there. In his intellectual worship of Aphrodite Urania he was eager to get away from Aphrodite Pandemus that had threatened to lay such secure hold on his emotions. He thus conceives of Plato as gradually beating his nature into an immense seriousness which would, be the condition for the final harmony of the antique idea. But it may be questioned whether this presentation is true. There is a passage in Coleridge's Essay on Greek Drama which says that Plato's philosophy and religion were but " exotic at home and a mere opposition to the finite in all things, genuine prophet and anticipator as he was of the Protestant Christian era. " If Coleridge is right, then surely Plato's work registers a distinct artistic decline from that high, unbounded joyousness, that deep delight in being, which produced in the preceding age the glories of Periclean Greece. This was the true pagan ideal: for it visioned Beauty as the perfection of the Finite. Pater however was hankering after final harmony, seeking to trace the mystery of beauty back from the individual to ' the primal emotion. ' Somebody has said that he was a philosopher who had gone to Italy by mistake instead of to Germany. But he had gone to Italy and returned disappointed; and his intellectual craving was for seeking some refuge from his own " tyrannical impulses, " some satisfying synthesis, behind the chaos of change and turmoil. And he thought he found it in Plato.

But the analogy must end here. The chasm between the ancient and modern temper is too deep to be bridged over by mere individual resemblances. Pater himself has in this book expressed this contrast finally for all time: " The scepticism of the modern world, beset now with insane speculative figments, has been an appeal from the preconceptions of the understanding to the authority of the senses. With the Greeks, whose metaphysic business was then still all to do, the sceptical action of the mind lay rather in the direction of an appeal from the affirmations of sense to the authority of newly awakened reason. "

No better antithesis could have been written.

SATYA V. MUKERJEA.

THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF MIND. by W. Mitchell. London Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

This book consists of a reprint of eighteen lectures delivered by Prof. W. Mitchell of the Adelaide University. Though it purports to deal with the structure and growth of mind, the major portion of it is concerned with the latter only, and by itself it constitutes an important contribution to psychological literature. The lecture form has been retained throughout but unfortunately the style is a bit heavy, or the book would have been more readable than it is. It is not meant to be an elementary introduction to psychology, but the author regards it as an introduction " in the more technical sense......to a work with which we are more or less familiar, the work here being our experience. " He is fully alive to the intricacy of the subject and recognises that "psychology is no longer one study but a cyclopædia," and laments the 19th Century tendency to separate psychology and philosophy. But the book was written more than a decade ago, and the justice of the charge is less-poignant to-day than it used to be. Psychologists in the narrower sense are beginning to realise the limitations of their new scientific methods and hence are more sane in their attitude towards philosophy, while philosophers on their part are beginning to appreciate the full importance of their psychological studies for correct conclusions in other branches of philosophy. In a sense it is quite time to say that "psychology is the proper introduction to philosophy" for the subject-matter of philosophy is furnished by experience, and experience itself is dependent for its being on the structure and growth of mind.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part on the direct explanation of mind comprises the first five lectures. The second part on sympathetic and aesthetic intelligence comprises lectures VI to VIII. The third part on the growth of intelligence comprises lectures IXtoXVI. The last part on an extension of the direct explanation and indirect explanation of mind comprises the last two lectures XVII & XVIII.

If to-day of all the philosophical subjects, psychology occupies the most pre-eminent position and evokes the greatest public interest, it is due to three epoch-making discoveries (1) the recognition that the mind in all its manifestations is active ; (2) the close alliance between mind and brain, as studied by physiology; (3) and the recognition that mind is a growing entity. The book under review, not purporting to be an ordinary text-book focusses its attention principally on the last topic. As such, though it contains nothing startlingly new, it forms a very valuable adjunct-because of its detailed treatment-to such classic volumes as those of James. The burden of the book may be briefly summarised in the author's own words: " experience has a growing complexity of structure and a deepening unity." (p. 16)

The second part has very interesting chapters on imitation, and how it develops into fellow-feeling, fellow-feeling with nature and the experience of being absorbed in an object. The last is indeed a very fascinating psychological topic, and is dealt with very ably by Prof. Mitchell. He distinguishes complete absorption from aesthetic contemplation although the two are very often confounded together. Complete absorption results when we are lost in a certain activity in all its aspects while aesthetic contemplation does not involve such a complete absorption. Yet this contemplation has its own intrinsic worth. It is valuable experience, which makes us appreciate the spirit of other people's work, even when we ourselves are unable to produce a work of art. It is an error to regard aesthetic contemplation merely as a matter of understanding. Against this intellectualist fallacy Prof. Mitchell himself raises a good note of warning.

" In substituting a mere understanding for this aesthetic and sympathetic understanding, we commit a variety of errors. In the first place we judge by standards of taste and conduct which may be perfectly valid standards, but if we have not learnt the spirit from which their value is derived, we use them in the letter, and are bound to the form of stupidity called intellectualism. In the second place our standards may be defective, and this is especially the case when we are hardly aware of them; hence the arrogance and intolerance of class towards class, of age and youth towards one another, of different temperaments, manners, points of view. But thirdly, and at the root of all is the proneness to judge instead of to enjoy." (p. 191).

Prof. Mitchell is perhaps on more debatable ground, when in the third part he comes to discuss the much moved relation of instinct and intelligence. He speaks of instinct as " the power of pursuing an infinite variety of courses, directed throughout by present sensation. " (p. 194). Intelligence he regards as " the means by which instinct develops at its conscious points." This is a novel suggestion not without an element of truth. In human life intelligence plays such an important part that we are apt to belittle the worth of instincts. But evolutionists have shown how the instincts of to-day must have required great effort in their earlier stages, and how they could have attained their present ease only through the operations of intelligence solidified so to say through repetition and habit. Hence in a sense an instinct comes at the end of an intellectual process and marks its consumation. From this stand-point intelligence becomes merely the instrument of instinct. But to say this is not to express the whole truth. Instincts merely typify certain necessary modes of reacting on particular occasions, and as the experience of animals is of a very restricted kind, instincts play in their life most important part. But in the case of human beings, experience is of so wide and varied a character, so many new situations arise challenging human effort and thought, that instinctive reactions become hopelessly inadequate. Hence it is that intelligence, meaning by it a capacity to react on a new situation in a fresh way, is so imperatively necessary for us. It supplies a peculiar need of our nature, and so long as it satisfies this need, to describe it as an instrument wielded in the interests of instinct is to misunderstand its real purport in the economics of human nature.

In the XIV lecture there is a fruitful discussion of the function of "what is taken for granted." That the most educated men have to take most of their facts for granted is beyond question. But there is a world of difference in the spirit with which things are taken for granted by the educated and the illiterate and this is a point of considerable importance for educational purposes. Thus 'the problem is to bring pupils over the old course without needless delay, but so that they may arrive at thoughts with the same virile understanding as the pioneers who first made them.' Thus there arises a conflict between early specialising and the claims of general knowledge for our school-boys. It is rather unfortunate that the real purpose of education is often forgotten in discussing educational problems. Education, especially in India, is too often taken to stand merely for a mass of facts and figures, and too little for that alertness of intellect, which is the truest criterion of a really educated man. Facts and figures become useful in so far as they tend to produce that intellectual zest which has marked the highest human intellect. Hence the difference between "general intelligence" and "general information" is very vital. It is certainly possible for a teacher to make things so clear that his pupils understand him easily but fail to manifest that curiosity, which is the prerogative of an intellectual being. Such a teacher is often styled successful, but there is a weakness in him most detrimental to the interests of real education. On the other hand it would be easy for a teacher to make himself so unintelligible as to make his pupils lose all interest in the subject. Hence the problem is to teach in such a way as to produce understanding together with intelligence. The secret of a successful character is a perfect organisation of his interests. The secret of successful education is an organisation of all our faculties.

In the last part the author discusses the place of physiological psychology. We are in substantial agreement with his views, as they are those of psychologists like McDougall, who recognise the limits of physiological explanations of psychological problems.

Advanced students of philosophy will find the book instructive owing to its detailed treatment of the fascinating subject of the growth of experience.

A. R. W.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY, by Josiah Royce, Harvard University, pp. xiii +469, The Macmillan Company, New York.

It is a pleasure to read the eloquent presentation of Royce's ethical idealism in his *Philosophy of Loyalty*. This book is not technical research but simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit." (p. vii). It is in the form of eight lectures: Nature and Need of Loyalty; Individualism; Loyalty to Loyalty; Conscience; Some American Problems in their relation to Loyalty; Loyalty, Truth, and Reality; and Loyalty and Religion.

The word 'Loyalty' has ordinarily a political connotation. Royce asks us to take it in an unusually broad sense. To start with, he says that to be loyal, there should be a *cause* to which one must be prepared to give a *willing* and *thoroughgoing* devotion. Thus the devotion of a patriot to his country, that of a martyr to his religion, that of a ship's captain to the requirements of his office when, after a disaster, he works steadily for his ship and for the saving of the ship's company until the last possible service is accomplished are instances of loyalty. In each instance there is the willingness of the loyal man to serve his cause, and the devotion is thoroughgoing. It follows, further, that the loyal man when he is devoted to a cause is not moved by a mere emotion of love for his cause. He looks upon his cause as something outside of himself: it is larger than his private self. It is something objective. Moreover, though it is objective, it is not wholly impersonal. It concerns the interests of other men. "Loyalty is social." (p. 20) It tends to unite servants of the same cause in the same service. Professor Royce's whole analysis of loyalty is tersely and impressively summed up at pp. 55–56 when he says: "Whenever a cause, beyond your private self, greater than you are,—a cause social in its nature and capable of limiting into one the wills of various individuals, a cause at once personal and, from the purely human point of view, superpersonal,—whenever, I say, such a cause so arouses your interest that it appears to you worthy to be served with all your might, with all your soul, with all your strength, then this cause awakens in you the spirit of loyalty. If you act out this spirit, you become, in fact, loyal". As against the idea of loyalty so eloquently and beautifully expressed one has no criticism to offer, save that it entirely depends on the unusual sense attached to the word 'loyalty'. The word is twisted to fit in with a certain moral idealism; once this is done, everything else follows from it. Consistently with this conception of loyalty Royce works out the principle that the loyal man will respect the necessity which others have to be loyal. This principle is the principle of *Loyalty to Loyalty*. A cause to which one is loyal is good in so far as it is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in one's fellows; it is evil in so far as it is destructive of loyalty in others.

Lecture IV. is interesting inasmuch as it deals with the question of the conflict of duties. What is a person to do when moral precepts come into conflict with one another ? Mankind is required to be just as well as kind, to be generous and at the same time strict in demanding one's dues, to live for others and at the same time to be careful of one's own dignity and rights, and so on. How is one to act in cases like these ? Royce replies that though moral precepts come into conflict, yet there is no difficulty, for they are all to be treated as subordinate to the architectonic rule: Be loyal to loyalty. " Be just ; but be also kind. " These two precepts merely emphasise two inseparable aspects of loyalty. Justice and kindness apart from a desire to serve loyalty are mere abstractions and the loyal man will decide to be both just and kind by his loyalty. He has a supreme cause in life and to that he will subordinate everything. Take the instance of a woman who has to choose between the life of a social servant and that of a devoted relation. How shall she decide in such a conflict? Either of these lives is blessed, but only one can be lived by her. "No mortal knows which is the better for your world. With all your heart, in the name of universal loyalty, choose. And then be faithful to the choice. So shall it be morally well with you. " (p. 194) The solution is no doubt good in so far as it is destructive of moral inaction. There is perhaps nothing more morally dangerous than moral inaction. But the question being whether this duty or that should be regarded as more important, it is no reply to ask the moral agent to be guided by loyalty to loyalty. For the principle is vaguely described by Royce, and in it one has no surer guide than in that of either Intuitionism or Utilitarianism. One feels that Professor Royce is directing him to follow a rule which because it is too abstract and vague can be interpreted to mean anything he likes.

The lecture on " Loyalty, Truth, and Reality " is pregnant with many sane remarks against James' pragmatic view of truth. Royce tries to show how loyalty involves a metaphysical belief in the reality of the cause to which loyal service is demanded.

The concluding lecture shows how closely loyalty and religion are connected. "Loyalty" is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human belief." (p. 357) Loyalty is thus not simply a guide of life, but serves as revealing to the moral agent an eternal and all-embracing spiritual life.

The ideas are presented in a fresh, original, and vigorous tone and can hardly fail to impress the readers with Royce's elevating moral idealism. We strongly recommend the book to all interested in philosophic studies.

A. K. TRIVEDI.

The Problem of Personality.–E. N. Merrington M. A. Macmillan and Co, Limited, St. Martin's street, London.

The book is in two Parts, Part I being expository and critical, and Part II constructive. In Part I the author criticises the treatment of the Problem of Personality as it is met with in the writings of William James, F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce, G. H. Howison, F. C. S. Schiller, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, A. S. Pringle–Pattison, and in later tendencies generally. The criticisms are, as the author himself feels, "very brief". We wish they had been presented in a detailed form, with a more emphatic stress on the author's own point of view on the problem in question. One is hardly able to keep up one's interest in such disconnected criticisms, presented in as dry and terse a form as possible.

The tediousness of Part I is to a certain extent removed by the treatment of the problem in Part II. The author begins with an analysis of experience and shows how ambiguous the term "experience" is unless qualified by a certain implication of self-hood. Personality and related concepts like individual, individuality, self, selfhood, consciousness, self-consciousness, subject, soul, ego, spirit, mind, "I", and the "me," and also the correlatives, not-self, object, non-ego, and not–me are explained in Chapter II of this part. All experience comes to light in consciousness, and in self–consciousness there is an awareness of a rational, constitutive, moral part performed by the self in our highest experiences". (p. 164) And " a Person " is a term which stands for "the positively social and ethical character of self-hood". (p. 164) " Individuality expresses the aspect of uniqueness in the various selves as persons. And Personality includes all the foregoing meanings of Ego, Self, Individual, and Person, with the full circle of relationships to other selves, the world, and God. Moral character, rights and duties are provided by this concept. Æsthetic, social, intellectual, and religious ideals are the portion of man as the possessor of Personality. But God is regarded as the source and inspiration of all such aspirations, and is the ideal and perfect personality." (p. 165). With this as the central analysis of personality, the author could have proceeded much better both in the critical as well as in the constructive part of his treatise. The analysis is not properly emphasised.

The chapters on the "Metaphysic of Existence" and the "Metaphysic of Values" approach the main problem from a teleological point of view, and give a more concrete representation to the abstractions of Chap. II.

The book may be recommended to the advanced student of psychology and philosophy, interested in the constructive treatment of The Problem of Personality. The book gives signs of extensive reading though the treatment is in most places dogmatic.

A. K. Trivedi.

A GUIDE TO SANCHI, by Sir John Marshall, Kt. C.I.E., M. A. Oxon. Calcutta 1918. Price Rs. 2 as 8.

The Sanchi Topes stand out very prominently amongst the monuments that have shed an astonishing light on the ancient history of this country, both religious and political. They have, like the Egyptian Sphinx, witnessed vast empires suddenly rise, and as suddenly crumble down. Being the product of the great Maurya empire, they in their isolated grandeur looked silently upon the fall of that empire about the third quarter of the second century B. C. They also bear testimony to the power of the Simgas, who added to them in order to commemorate their comparatively short lived rule. While showing what astonishing progress the plastic art had made in such hoary days in this country, they tell us that the rule of the early Andhras had once extended as far north as upper Malva; for, the splendid gateways of the Great Stupa were erected under the Andhras, probably during the latter half of the first century B. C. The western India Kshatrapas also contributed their quota to these huge piles and have thus been connected with Sanchi. The illustrious rule of the Guptas for over a century and a half has left its indelible mark on Sanchi, both in the architecture that is a mirror of that period of all sided activity, and in the inscriptions dating A. D. 412–13. The empire of Shri Harshia of Kanauj, and following it, the rule of the Paramars have all left some kind of impression on Sanchi. And this went on up to almost the thirteenth century A. D. There has been no addition since, nor what is more important, has it ever suffered from the bigotry of some of the Mahomedan leaders.

An account of the attempts of Scholars to explore and describe these, is given by Sir John at p. 26 of the book. Cunningham, Burgess, Fergusson, Bühler, Foucher and Grünwedel are among the most noted of such scholars. In their works, especially of the last two, Sanchi figures only as one of the many important monuments that give an insight into contemporary art and history of this country. Sir John has singled out Sanchi for a detailed description and with good reason. For, no other single monument gives evidence of history and art of such a vast period, i. e. from the third century B. C. down to almost the thirteenth century A. D.

The book is divided into ten chapters, of which the first two deal with topography, history and art, in a lucid style; the third and fourth deal with the great stupa and its magnificent gateways and the last six with the other Stupas, pillars, temples and architecture in the southern eastern area etc. The first four chapters, by far the most important part of the book, cover more than half the number of pages.

John Marshall

The whole book is written in a pleasing style and gives a vivid idea of the great monument and its architectural beauty. The tone, from the beginning to the end, is that of the scholar and sympathetic critic. It is this that in our opinion gives the work its peculiar value. It does not come from the pen of one who starts with prejudices or presuppositions nor from one who like a jaundiced man, finds everywhere either Persian or Greek influence. We take the liberty of quoting a few passages, which bear out our remarks.

(a) From the remarks of the author on the art of the Simga period : " Its national and independent character is attested not by its methodical evolution on Indian soil, but by the wonderful sense of decorative beauty which pervaded it and which from first to last has been the heritage of Indian art." p. 12.

(b) " The artists of early India were quick with the versatility of all true artists to profit by the lessons which others had to teach them ; but there is no more reason in calling their creations Persian or Greek than there would be in designating the modern fabric of St. Paul's Italian". p, 14.

(c) " Both reliefs are admirable in their own way, but there can be no two opinions as to which of the two is the more masterly. The one on the South Gateway is the work of a creative genius, more expert perhaps with the brush than with the chisel, but possessed with a delicate sense of line and decorative and rhythmic composition. That on the west, on the other hand, is technically more advanced, and the individual figures, taken by themselves, are undoubtedly more effective and convincing but it fails to please because the detail is too crowded and confusing and the composition too regular and mechanical." p. 75.

For the tasteful appreciation of style the architecture seen on the different gate-ways and the fine judgment of the technique, we refer the reader to Chapter IV. We are glad to see that the work of exploring and preserving ancient monuments of India is no longer left to 'amateur explorers '. The value of the book as an excellent guide–for it is meant by the author to serve as a guide—is enhanced by the numerous illustrative plates, and especially by the map and plan of the monuments.

We have no hesitation in recommending the book both to students of archaeology and to tourists in India.

P. D. Gune.

A Guide to Taxila. by Sir John Marshall C. I. E., M. A. Oxon. Calcutta 1918. Rs. 2 as. 8.

Sir John Marshall, Director General of Archæology in India, has brought out in quick succession his two *guides* to the famous Budhistic monuments of Sanchi and Taxila so that we are able to notice them in the same issue of our quarterly.

This guide to Taxila is, like the other companion volume on Sanchi, a finely printed little volume full of fine illustrations and maps. With the help of this guide a traveller can easily see and appreciate the valuable remains of Persian, Buddhistic and also the subsequent Hindu architecture. The writer of this note was fortunate enough personally while on his way to Kashmere to visit the remains and monuments at Taxila three years back. At that time he had keenly felt the need of such a guide. This guide is descriptive only. It does not pretend to construct the history of the rise and fall of the towns on the site of Taxila, a work to be done in future with the help of the coins, inscriptions, and other relics found at Taxila and other places.

Sir John Marshall was the fittest person to write these guides as he was the first person to discover the exact site of the old Taxila and to carry on extensive excavation works for three and four years successively. We are told in the guide that this work of excavation is still going on and we may expect further discoveries of old relics as excavation goes into deeper and different layers.

This guide is written in a lucid and illuminating style and we have no doubt that intending travellers to these valuable monuments of Buddhistic art will find this guide a veritable boon to them. It gives glimpses of historical facts connected with Taxila. Taxila was a great University centre for many a·year. Up to now three cities built by successive dynasties have been discovered there.

These monuments of Taxila will disclose the history of that part of India for about a thousand years from the first building of the city before the time of Gautama Buddha down to the decline of the city when Hsuan Tsang the Chinese pilgrim visited it between 629–645 A. D. A thousand years is no small period in the history of a nation and it appears that Taxila had been one of the important cities in Northern India during all this period. So a systematic and scientific study of the relics, coins, inscriptions and other important architectural remains which are discovered and being discovered by the excavations at Taxila will throw a valuable light on the dark portions of Indian History. But the present volume is a useful and necessary preliminary to such a study and the public will feel greatly indebted to Sir John Marshall for bringing out such a fine little volume.

G. C. Bhate.

ASOKA. J. M. MACPHAIL (The Heritage of India Series).—

The last two quarters of the 19th Century and the first two of the 20th will probably be characterised by later historians of literature as a century of Series-and manual-makers. Each one of us can probably enumerate a dozen or two of them without effort and each of them probably has its own *raison d'etre* differing from that of all others. " The Heritage of India " Series is planned "by a group of Christian Men " and the editors piously hope that " many Europeans, both in India and elsewhere, will doubtless be glad to use the series. " We hope they will ; but the Indian reader will look in vain in this series—so far as it is exemplified by the particular volume before us—for the two things which the General Editors profess to make it a point to give: scholarship and sympathy. As to the first, the author himself disclaims all title to originality. He has read and digested the standard work of Mr. V. A. Smith and Prof T. W. Rhys Davids and has kept himself abreast of the subject by dipping into the latest archaeological reports; but neither in the interpretation of the facts nor in their orderly presentation has the author left his mark on the subject so that we would willingly turn to this little volume before us rather than to Mr. V. A. Smith's " Rulers of India" (2nd ed.) He is merely content to repeat other people's views. For instance he assigns to Panini a date cir. 350 B. C. ignoring latest pronouncements on the subject by Profs. A. B. Keith and A. A. Macdonell. Next, as to sympathy, even in this little book of less than 90 pages the author—probably with an eye to his " European readers',—has managed to introduce sentences like " The weak point in the Goverment of India has always been and still is in the executive, in the lack of a subordinate agency to which the task of carrying into effect the good intentions of the rulers can be entrusted (p. 58) " when vermin are preserved alive in time of plague, although it is known that they are means of spreading the disease, while starving children are left to die in time of famine " (p. 49-50) " As Brahmanism resumed its sway the hospitals dis-appeared and the practice of medicine, involving so much that to the Hindu was ceremonially unclean was relegated to charlatans" (p. 51) "the East has never understood anything but centralisation in government " (p. 27) ; or, " he lived the ordinary life of a Hindu monarch, and that was not the kind of life which a saint would look back upon with any feeling of satisfaction " (p. 19) . Comment upon these is hardly called for. They are gratuitous misstatements, some of them contradicted by the author himself, as when he says (p. 29 " The Sakyas were an independent tribe, organized as a republic in which the nobles held the place and the title of Raja in rotation"; or (p. 51) " Western medicine is becoming more disposed than ever to recognize and to utilize the indigenous drugs of India."

The author's bias for Christianity is evident throughout the volume. The General Editors are probably mainly responsible for it and we have no disposition to quarrel with it. Only, by attempting to inoculate unsuspecting minds with Christian principles through the media of little innocent looking volumes like the present—and neither the volume nor the series stands alone–there is more harm being done to Christianity than the author or the general editors can possibly realise.

S. K. B.

GROUNDWORK OF LOGIC. J. Welton, D. Lit., M. A., University Tutorial Press, London. 1917. pp 356. 4/-.

Of all the branches of Philosophy, Logic still bears the stamp of Scholastic thought very clearly and has always been loathe to break with its traditional ways and keep in line with other branches of Philosophy. As one such departure we welcome this Groundwork of Logic. This breach with the past however, is not very marked in this book, as far as the substance goes. Most of it, with a few exceptions such as the treatment of Propositions and Terms or Fallacies, is still the same as we read in all the ' Text-books '. But the change in the arrangement of topics is remarkably new and strikes a bold line, which the more recent educational theories demand.

The style of the book throughout is very simple, clear and what is most difficult when writing on such a subject, lively. Professor Welton has done all one could do to make the study of a subject like Logic interesting for a beginner. Every observation has been aptly illustrated by a number of examples drawn mostly, not from ancient mythology or old books, which nobody now knows anything of, but from recent literature, history and science. The addition of a glossary and a long list of intelligent questions and exercises, makes the book more useful to all those preparing for examinations.

The most interesting thing in the whole book is the last paragraph in it on the ' Value of Thought '. We refrain from reproducing the whole of it for want of space. One or two quotations would not however, be out of place here. " Thought is not the ultimate arbiter of our fate. A man who was nothing but a thinking machine would be a monster, no matter how perfect a machine he might be". "Its (Logic's) use is.........negatively in showing that much of what is of the highest value in life is beyond its province ". Also, " Logic cannot be the only ruler of life.........It is concerned only with a part of a part of life." All this is quite true but Logic was far above recognising it. Is it not interesting to note that Logic has after all given up its haughty and arrogant airs, (Science of sciences and all that sort of thing!) and come down to realise its proper place in the body of knowledge ?

We can warmly recommend this book to college students preparing for an examination in logic as a better substitute for some books recommended by our Universities. T. M. D.

THE HOLY SYMBOLS. J. D. Shroff, Bombay. 1918.

This small book treats of four symbols : the Fire, the Lotus, the Crescent and the Cross, called the emblems of Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Mahomeddanism and Christianity respectively. It is not a piece of research as one might be led to believe from its title. It is written in a worked up ecstatic mood and the imagination is given full play. We do not believe that Mysticism of this type is likely to appeal to any mind having undergone even a slight but genuine philosophical training.

The book contains a comparatively long introduction by A. Govindacharya Svamin of Mysore, of which we can only say that there are a thousand other better ways of using good paper than this.

The book is well printed and well bound.

T. M. D.

Also received :

Dr. J. J. Modi : *Asiatic Papers. Vol. II.* 1918.
Dr. J. S. Mackenzie : *A Manual of Ethics.*
10th impression, 5th edition. 1917.
The Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 12s. 6d. 1918.
F. B. Bond : *The Gate of Remembrance.* 2nd. ed. 1918.
B. H. Blackwell Oxford.
Paul Hookham : *Psychism, Glastonbury, and the Month.* 1918.
B. H. Blackwell Oxford.
" Sciens " : *How to speak with the Dead.* 1918.
Kegan Paul and Co. London. 3s. 6d.
F. G. Constable : *Telergy : The Communion of Souls.*
Kegan Paul and Co. London. 3s. 6d.
H. H. the Begum of Bhopal : *Muslim Home. pt. I.*
Thacker, Spink, and Co. 1916.
C. R. Jain : *The Practical Path.* Rs. 2.
The Science of Thought. Rs. As. 8.
The Householder's Dharma. Re. 1.
Central Jain Publishing House, Arrah.

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Report of the Proceedings of

THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING

held at

ST. XAVIER'S COLLEGE, BOMBAY

on

August 3rd 1918.

And

A LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION

BARODA.

Patron

His Highness Shri Shahu Chhatrapati, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
Maharaja of Kolhapur.

President.

His Holiness, the Jagadguru S'ankaracharya
of Karvir Math, Kolhapur.

Advisory Committee.

The Rev. Principal R. A. King D. D.,
The Christian College, Indore.

The Rev. R. Zimmermann Ph. D, S. J.,
S. Xavier's College, Bombay.

Professor Prabhu Dutt Shastri Ph. D.,
Presidency College, Calcutta.

Professor W. Vesey Hague Ph. D.,
Islamia College, Lahore.

Professor G. C. Bhate M. A.
Fergusson College, Poona.

Professor S. K. Belvalkar Ph. D.,
Deccan College, Poona.

Champat Rai Jain M. A.,
Hardoi.

V. Subrahmania Iyer B. A.,
Bangalore.

Professor S. Radhakrishnan M. A.,
The University, Mysore.

Hon. General Treasurer.
Mrs. Alban G. Widgery,
Baroda.

Hon. General Secretary.
Prof. A. R. Wadia, M. A.,
Mysore.

Hon. Editors.

Prof. Alban G. Widgery, M. A.,
The College, Baroda.

Prof. R. D. Ranade, M. A.
Fergusson College, Poona.

Hon. Editorial Secretary.

T. M. Desai, B. A.,
Baroda.

Report of the Proceedings of

THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING

The First Annual Meeting of the Indian Philosophical Association was held at St. Xavier's College, by the kind permission of the Revd. Principal A. Goodier S. J. The President of the Association, His Holiness, Sri Sankaracharya of Karvir Pith, being unable to be present on account of the Chaturmasa, Father Goodier presided. Among those present were the Revd. Dr. R. Zimmermann, Prof. Halberg, Dr. V. S. Ghate, Lieut. Col. Evans I. M. S, Prof. G. C. Bhate, Prof. P. A. Wadia, Prof. S. L. Joshi, Prof. R. G. Bhadkamkar, Prof. J. S. d' Andrade, M. R. Bodas Esq., B. A., LL. B., Prof. Welinkar, Mr. P. V. Kulkarni.

A number of letters were received from different parts of India expressing regret at unavoidable absence.

President's Address

In opening the meeting the President said :

GENTLEMEN, – Let me say at once that I gladly welcome this First Annual Meeting of the Indian Philosophical Association to this College. Let me add that I feel the honour that has been done to me in being asked to preside For I am conscious that the movement which this Association represents is one of great significance; that the fruit which may reasonably be expected from it is very vast; and I am confident that with the present skilful hands to guide it our expectations will not be disappointed.

For we must not look upon the formation of this Association as an isolated thing, a movement by itself. If there is one characteristic more conspicuous than another in the thought of our present generation it is the desire, growing ever more and more, for unity of mind and heart among men. The politics of the world are proof of it; the very war in which we are engaged illustrates it; religion on every side looks at religion and asks itself what it has in common with its neighbour.

It would seem that two forces have brought about this attitude. On the one hand men are growing tired of the constant wrangling of rival schools; on the other they have passed the age when they thought that difference in opinion meant difference between right and wrong. They have come to see that two men may differ and yet each may be right in his degree ; they have learnt that the main work of deep minds should be, not so much to see the differences – for that is no difficult thing–, but to discover what is in common; for what is in common must be the truth, and the truth alone is worth keeping.

And precisely this is the tendency of modern philosophic thought. Modern philosophy is not inclined to found new schools or to start on new adventures. It is content for the present to sit still and look round. It feels that of late years such wealth of material has been brought before it, that its first duty is to sift what it possesses before it ventures further. The world has suddenly come together; the West has discovered the mentality of the East and the East has discovered the mentality of the West ; each is conscious that it sees life and truth from a different angle, and each is feeling its way towards the understanding of the other ; knowing well that when this perfect understanding is reached, when the one can express itself fully in the terms of the other, then we shall have reached another epoch in the progress of man.

Now precisely this I take to be the main object of this Association. It is an effort made, by combination of all the philosophic forces in this country, to come to a perfect understanding of one another. By careful definitions, by synthesis and analysis of these definitions, we hope to come to that hinterland of understanding where, we believe, all thought is one. Whatever be the divergence on the surface, we hope, by sincerity, sympathy, and good will, to grasp more and more of the aspects of truth, as it appeals to minds other than our own, and by that means to arrive at a broad and a deeper understanding of truth as it is in itself.

I do not know what greater aim a student can have than this, nor do I know any study which is likely to produce more lasting results. To understand one another better, to sympathise more with other points of view, to broaden the mind till it grasps the truth that underlies seeming contradictions, to deepen it till it discovers the truth that is common to us all,-this, as it seems to me is a noble task; and it is the task of this Association: on this account do I welcome it; and I cannot but wish it every success, sure as I am of the good it will do with able minds, and earnest hearts to guide it.

The President then called on Prof. A. G. Widgery to read

The First Annual Report.

GENTLEMEN,

The Indian Philosophical Association was inaugurated at an informal meeting held at Rajaram College, Kolhapur, presided over by the Revd. Principal Darby, on May 31st 1917 under the auspices of Pandit Lingesha Mahabhagavat of Kurtkoti, immediately after his installation as Sri S'ankaracharya of Karvir Pith With the personal encouragement and the financial support of the S'ankaracharya during the past year we have been preparing the ground for a definite and formal establishment of the Association. Those chiefly concerned in the origination of the Society felt that the first task was to find out what persons in India and beyond would be interested in it and give it their active support. The form of its organisation was left for later settlement by those who should actually show their sympathies. The time seems now to have arrived when this should be discussed, and a Constitution adopted. To consider the proposed scheme is the most important object of the present meeting.

The activity of the past year has centred chiefly in the propaganda and endeavours literary and otherwise of the Indian Philosophical Review. A glance at the table of contents of Volume I will show that a wide range of articles and reviews of books, indicating the partial achievement of the aim of the Association and the Review as stated in the editorial of the Volume. Almost all of the subjects there mentioned have as a matter of fact been actually represented. There is, we venture to believe, reason to say that a good standard has been maintained and that the effort has been well worth making. One attempt made through the Review to begin some co-operative research has so far failed. To initiate and promote co-operative research is one of the expressed objects of the Association, and in the present condition of philosophical studies in India this is certainly one of its chief *raisons d'être.* The need for co-operation between scholars engaged in research in allied fields, especially of Indian thought, is very great. Marked developments in this direction should be attempted in the following year. One reason which has militated against much advance in this direction during the past year has been the natural and even necessary amorphous condition of the Association and the consequent delay in issuing a list of members. For the same reasons almost the whole work of the Association has devolved upon the two editors with the assistance of the editorial secretary, in spite of persistent calls from the General Secretary for some defined sphere of activity. With a definite Constitution and with the List of Members which it is intended to print along with the Annual Report, the editors will, I trust be relieved of some of the correspondence, and there will be also increased activities on sides which have had to lie in abeyance. In passing I would express my regret that so often there has been unavoidable delay in replying to communications sent to me.

The first of these spheres being that of co-operative research the second is that of the establishment of Local Branches. Already we have some progress to report in this direction. At Bangalore, Mysore, Kolhapur, Lahore and Baroda good Local Branches have been formed. In Poona there has existed for some time a Literary and Philosophical Society and the establishment of another such society would be superfluous. We would urge that when a Constitution for the Indian Philosophical Association is agreed upon, this society should become affiliated as one of its Branches. The same may be said with regard to other existent societies having a similar aim in Calcutta and other parts of India. The policy in the past year has naturally been to give great liberty to the individual Branches to plan their own courses. Some recognised form of relationship with the central Association is necessary as a part of its Constitution.

A very encouraging feature of our development so far has been the willingness of persons of almost all the leading forms of philosophical and religious thought in India to become members or subscribers to the Review. Unfortunately it is not possible to say exactly how many Members and Subscribers there were in all in the past year owing to the publisher's delay in giving the requested information, owing largely to war conditions as far as concerns England and America. Roughly in India there were between two hundred and fifty and three hundred. When it is remembered that neither the Association nor the Review aim at being popular at the expense of scholarship, this is a creditable number for the first year. An increased membership and a wider circulation of the Review may reasonably be expected. Many professors and lecturers in philosophy in Indian Colleges have not yet joined, and there are professors of Sanskrit, Pali, Persian and Arabic, Science and History and of other subjects with activities and keen interest in the direction of philosophical thought. The sympathy and the active support of these is most certainly required. We intend to send again to these information as to the Association. Existing Members would aid the movement by urging their friends whoare interested in any branch of the subject to become Members. Throughout India scholars associated with the ministrations of religion and many members of the official administration, and of the medical and legal professions have given the movement their support. This is a cause for satisfaction in that it indicates that the Association is not to be a narrowly academic one. It gives ground for faith in a good influence in India by the development of a comprehensive worthy philosophy of life. It is greatly to be desired that more non-academic members may join.

In the past year there have been great delays in the publication of the different issues of the Review. I will not attempt to enumerate all the many difficulties and the vast amount of work entailed by the managing editor in its production. One thing must, however, be mentioned. The Publisher started the volume with a kind of paper which he announced as unobtainable after the first issue. Rejecting his proposal that a much thinner paper or a paper of a different size and lighter weight should be used, at the risk of personal financial loss I decided to complete the volume with the very expensive paper which has been used for the last three issues. This has set a standard of production always to be aimed at. Nevertheless it is at present impossible to obtain a paper anything like this quality, and the paper of the second volume, including the covers, is that obtained for it some time ago by the publisher of Vol. I. What is temporarily lost in the quality of the paper will, as time goes on, be made up in improvements in other directions. As soon as the paper market admits it we shall go back to our original standard, or to something better.

Another subject upon which those present at this Meeting will expect to hear something definite is the question of the financial condition of the Association. Here again, owing to the delay in the furnishing of information by the publisher, it is not yet possible to give any statement, except that it is certain that the Association is solvent. Now that the April issue of Volume I has at last been published, we may be able to wind up our account with the firm and include a balance sheet in the published annual Report. The Members of the Association have to thank its President for his first annual grant of fifteen hundred rupees, without the promise of which the publication of the Review could not have been entered upon. For the development of the work of the Association it is essential that its funds be increased. The Association is to be congratulated on securing H. H. the Maharaja of Kolhapur as a Patron. We may rest assured that if the Members do their part the President may prevail upon other Princes and that other persons will also come forward to help the Association.

An outline of a Constitution for the Association was read paragraph by paragraph and discussion invited. A proposal that a small Committee should be formed to collect opinions on the scheme and place them before a General Meeting after a few months was not accepted by the Meeting. It was, therefore, resolved that the following scheme be circulated to all Members and their expression of opinion invited. The scheme is accepted as provisional for the current year of the Association, but is to be reconsidered along with the suggestions of Members at the Second Annual Meeting to be held, if it can be arranged, before the publication of the April issue of the Review.

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION.

I. Name.

The name of the Association shall be " The Indian Philosophical Association. "

II. Object.

The object of the Association is the promotion, particularly in India, of the study of the philosophical thought of the East and the West.

III. Means to attain the Object.

The means to be taken to attain the Object are

a. The encouragement of the formation of Local Branches for the reading and discussion of papers on philosophical subjects.

b. The support of a periodical to be called " The Indian philosophical Review".

c. The organisation of more systematic co-operation amongst those engaged in research.

d. The discussion from time to time of the details of the Philosophical activities of the Indian Colleges and Universities with the aim of initiating improvements.

e. The establishment, as soon as possible, of a circulating library of philosophical books and magazines.

IV. Admission of Members.

Membership of the Association is open to any person who expresses his or her interest in its object and readiness to aid as much as possible in the different means adopted to realise them, and pays the recognised subscription for Members. Application for Membership should be made to the General Secretary or the Managing Editor.

V. Subscription for Members.

For the present the annual subscription for Membership is six rupees.

VI. Privileges of Members.

Members receive free the issues of the Indian Philosophical Review, paying postage and V. P. P. charges when this is forwarded to them by post. They also receive the Annual Report and List of Members, and gratis or at reduced rates any other publication of the Association. They may attend meetings and conferences of the Association and vote on questions which the President or the General Committee may put before them. Other things being equal contributions fron Members have a prior right to those of non-members to a place in the Review.

VII. The General Committee.

The General Committee, which shall discuss suggestions and make recommendations to the Members, shall consist of the Office-bearers:

a. A President. *b.* An Advisory Committee. *c.* A General Secretary. *d.* A General Treasurer. *e.* One or more Editors. *f.* An Editorial Secretary.

VIII. The President.

The President shall be His Holiness Sri S'ankaracharya of Karvir Pith, so long as he is himself willing to act as President and give his support to the Association. In the event of the Office of President becoming vacant through any cause the General Committee will consider the best means to be taken to fill it for the best interests of the Association.

IX. The Advisory Committee.

The Advisory Committee is to concern itself, as such, with the Indian Philosophical Review. Its members will aid the Association as members of the General Committee. The members of the Advisory Committee will be representative of the different parts of

India, and as far as possible of the various types of philosophical thought. They will help in the development of the Review by trying to obtain suitable contributions, especially in the particular regions of thought or philosophical schools they may individually be said to represent. They will, further, assist as far as possible in the formation of Local Branches in their districts.

X. The General Secretary.

The General Secretary will send information concerning the Association to persons making enquiries, and will correspond with the Members in particular areas urging the formation of Local Branches, where there appear to be sufficient names in the List of Members, of persons living in particular districts. He will communicate with the Secretaries of Local Branches, especially with the object of obtaining concise reports of their meetings, for inclusion in the Annual Report.

XI. The General Treasurer.

The General Treasurer shall keep a record of the income of the Association from all sources and of all the expenses and shall present, as early as possible after the publication of the fourth issue of the Review a balance sheet, to be included in the Annual Report of the Association.

XII. The Editors.

The Editors are responsible for the general editing of the Review. Their decision is final as to what is or is not to be included in it, the Managing Editor being legally responsible for its contents. When (in the case of there being more than one editor) there is a difference of opinion or any doubt as to the inclusion of a paper, they will consult one or more Members of the Advisory Committee.

XIII. The Editorial Secretary.

The Editorial Secretary will aid the Managing Editor in every possible way.

XIV. Local Branches.

The Local Branches are to make the organisation which best suits the individual circumstances. The chief aim should not be large numbers so much as serious interest in the subject. The Branches should nevertheless be recruiting centres for persons to take part in the co-operative research and other activities of the Association.

Local Branches may in particular cases make extra rules for their individual needs, and levy extra fees.

XV. Associates of Local Branches.

Local Branches may, when the Members think advisable admit persons not Members of the Association as local Associates. Associates pay any local subscription but do not receive any of the benefits of Members of the main Association.

XVI. Recognition of Local Branches.

A society will not be recognised as a Local Branch unless at least half of its attendants are Members of the Association.

XVII. Reports of Local Branches.

Concise reports of the activities of the Local Branches will be printed in the Annual Report of the Association, including, wherever likely to be useful, abstracts or summaries of papers. Other things being equal papers read at Local Branches take precedence in claim upon space in the Review.

XVIII. Disposal of Funds.

The first claim on the funds of the Association is the cost of the publication and distribution of the Review. The second claim on the funds are the expenses entailed by the different office-bearers in the functions of their offices. From surplus funds after these items have been paid grants may be suggested by the Committee in order to promote particular activities of the Association.

N. B.—Members of the Association are invited to send to the Honorary General Secretary, Professor A. R. Wadia, The University, Mysore, any suggestions they wish to make for additions to or any modification of the above Provisional Constitution.

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Statement of Accounts

1917–18

Receipts

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. Annual Grant from the President, His Holiness, S'ri S'ankaracharya of Kolhapur	1500	0	0
2. Received from the Publishers	1223	0	0
3. Received direct from Members	240	0	0
4. Recovered for off-prints	30	0	0
Total...	2993	0	0

Expenses

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. Paid to the Publishers	2190	0	0
2. Travelling Expenses	186	0	0
3. Typewriting machine	280	0	0
4. Clerical Assistance	40	0	0
5. Stationery	25	14	0
6. Postage	38	4	0
7. Telegrams	24	8	0
8. Sundries	13	12	0
Total...	2798	6	0
Balance in hand Rs.	194	10	0
	2993	0	0

Marion Widgery
Hon. General Treasurer.

September 10th 1918.

Audited and found correct,
S. V. Mukerjea.

NOTES FROM SOME LOCAL BRANCHES

BANGALORE

This branch was organised at Bangalore on the 7th June 1918 by a committee meeting with G. Aravamudu Iyengar, Esq., as chairman. It was resolved at this meeting to have monthly meetings when a short paper on some prescribed subjects might be read, followed by discussion. A list of subject with their order was settled on. Subjects fixed for discussion during the half-year ending the 31st December 1918 were as follow:—

1. Philosophy : its scope and relations.
2. The Sources of Knowledge : the Validity of Agnosticism.
3. The Nature and Grounds of Certainty.
4. The Problem of the External World.
5. The Problem of the Self.
6. The Relation between the Self and the Universe : (from the stand-point of Epistemology).

(*In the discussion the Indian standpoint will be emphasised.*)

The following gentlemen form the executive committee for this year:—Rāo Bahadur M. Shama Rao Esq, M. A. *President*

K. A. Krishnaswami Iyer Esq., G. Aravamudhu Iyengar, Esq.,

Narasimha Murti Esq., M. A., B. L., (1765, Sankarpur,) *Hon. Sec.*

BARODA

The inaugural meeting of the Branch was much delayed owing to plague and the absence from Baroda of H. E. the Dewan Saheb, who had kindly promised to preside at the meeting. It was held at His Excellency's bungalow on Sunday June 30th, 1918 the Commissioners of Education and Commerce being present. The Dewan Saheb, Mr. Manubhai N. Mehta, was elected President, and together with Mr. S. V. Mukerjea and Prof. Widgery, (*Hon. Secretary*) form the Committee. The attendance of Professor R. D. Ranade of Poona added much to the interest of the proceedings. He promised to send a paper on " Mysticism in Aristotle ". Others offered to read papers. At the second meeting Mr, J. C. Chatterji read an elaborate paper on " The Point of view of Hindu Philosophy ". On Sep 30th at Mr. Whitnack's, the secretary read a paper on "The Conservation of Values ". It is intended as far as possible to have one meeting of the branch every mon h

LAHORE

The inaugural meeting of the Lahore Branch was held on October 30th 1917, at the house of the Principal of the Law College with the kind hospitality of Mr. Kanwar Sain M. A. Barrister at Law. Dr. Vesey Hague explained the object of the meeting and read letters from the Hon. Justice Shah Din and Prof. Rice expressing regret at their inability to attend. The following office bearers here elected:

The Hon. Justice Shah Din,	*President.*
Raja Norendro Nath Sahib,	*Vice-President.*
Dr. W. Vesey Hague,	*Correspondence Secretary.*
Prof. Pannalal Mathur,	*Record Secretary.*

Meetings were suggested to be held once at least every month. Papers on the following subjects were arranged:—

Principal S. C. Ray : The Immortality of the Soul.

Dr. W. Vesey Hague : Determinism and Self-determinism.

Prof. Braj Narain : Buddhism & Pragmatism.

Raja N. Nath Sahib : How to study Philosophy.

Mrs. Kundan Lal : Croce's Aesthetics.

The meeting closed with thanks to the host.

MYSORE

The Mysore Branch of the Association was inaugurated on August 16th 1917. On September 1st Mr. G. R. Josyer read a paper on " *The Pramanas* " The discussion of this paper extended to two further meetings on Oct. 6th and Nov. 3rd. The discussion centred chiefly on *pratyaksha pramana* and *sabda pramana.* During the Dussera celebrations at Mysore a joint meeting with the Bangalore Branch was held, when Mr. V. Subrahmania Iyer read a very interesting paper "Is Vedanta Philosophy or Theology ?" On December 1st Prof A. R. Wadia opened a discussion of Berkeleys' Idealism. Between December and April fortnightly meetings were held. Among the papers read were: *The Sankhya Philosophy* by Prof. M. Hirianna ; *The Kantian Conception of Space and Time* by Prof. A R Wadia; *The Pragmatic Theory of Truth* by Mr. B. Rajeevalwehaam. At other meetings selections from various texts—especially of the Sankhya Philosophy were discussed. After the vacations the meetings recommenced with a discussion of Sir Rabindranath Tagore's views on *The Problem of Evil.*

PROVISIONAL LIST OF MEMBERS

As the distinction between Member of the Association and merely subscriber to the Review has not yet been generally recognised the following list may contain names of persons who are for some reason unable to become Members. These names can be removed from the list when it is re-published. The list gives the names of most of those who have supported the movement since the inauguration of the Association in 1917.

A. Hamid Ali. I. C. S. Assistant Collector, Godhra.
K. Abdul Hamid. B. A. Large Well, Old Kotwali Moholla, Sarin, Lahore.
Prof. Syed Nawab Ali M. A. The College, Baroda.
Prof. J. C. P. d'Andrade M. A. Elphistone College, Bombay.
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